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Sunday, March 01, 2020

 

Skepticism: From the Illusion of Certainty to the Certainty of Illusion










                                                                 SKEPTICISM:
         FROM THE ILLUSION OF CERTAINTY TO THE CERTAINTY OF ILLUSION

                                                                By Dave Couric





    

                                                University of Texas at Arlington
                                              PHIL 5392: Hellenistic Philosophy
                                                        Professor: Dr. Mahoney
                                                                   Spring 1994




            It has often been said that history repeats itself.  And the flow of philosophical thought indeed bears this observation out, at least to some extent.  For the history of philosophy indicates that skepticism, the general inclination to doubt everything concerning knowledge, follows a somewhat recurrent pattern.  A time of skepticism, broadly speaking, both precedes and follows times of certainty, which is the general view that there is access to sure and true knowledge.  For example, both before and after "the golden age of Athens" (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle), skepticism flourished in antiquity. 
            Similarly, the rise of skepticism is evident in modernity such that this present time is in fact an age of skepticism, preceded by a long period of certainty throughout medieval times.  Ironically, the skepticism itself of this modern (and "postmodern") period is one thing that practically everyone would agree is no doubt the case in contemporary philosophical discourse.  For instance, both prevailing schools of philosophy today, the "analytic" and the "continental," are skeptical, at least as far as metaphysical truth goes. 
            Skepticism, then, is both old and new, albeit in different forms.  Some, such as Michael Frede,[1] would defend ancient skepticism as tenable, over against modern skepticism, which has been seen as much weaker and even unashamedly self-contradictory.
            In a sense, skepticism is not an independent philosophical position.  Were it not for the other side, the "dogmatists" such as the Stoics or Epicureans, skepticism may never have come about in ancient philosophy.  The skeptic is the ultimate "devil's advocate."  So skepticism needs a claim of certainty to play off of, which the skeptic does by the technique of ad hominem argumentation.  This type of logical argument is used when the skeptic assumes the premise(s) of the opponent in order to reduce to absurdity (reductio ad absurdum) the position of certainty. 
            Skepticism is therefore more of a negative attack than a positive philosophy.  It is dependent on certainty in this way and so crops up at particular points in history.  For instance, a crisis of authority may encourage the recurrence of skepticism.  Before Socrates came along, two famous philosophers, Parmenides and Heraclitus, had contrasting views on the main subject matter of philosophy at the time, ontology, or "ultimate reality."  Parmenides said, "Whatever is, is," meaning that reality was ultimately in a state of being.  But Heraclitus said, "Whatever is, is changing," meaning that ultimate reality was in a process of becoming.  These two great philosophers were diametrically opposed, metaphysically. 
            This tension, between static being on the one hand and dynamic becoming on the other, contributed to the rise of skepticism between the time of the pre-socratics and the three most famous philosophers of all, who later arrived on the scene to head philosophy toward certainty.  The fact that "the man in the street" did not know who to believe -- Parmenides or Heraclitus -- constituted an authority crisis, which leads to doubt in general and then to doubt about the specifics.
            A similar kind of crisis of authority was going on at the time of Descartes, probably the one philosopher that the modern skeptics and postmodernists love to hate the most.  "Bury Descartes!" has been as it were the battle-cry of postmodernism, for example.  Interestingly, Descartes used the skeptical method to begin his project though he ended up in a certain conclusion, which earned him the label "rationalist" instead of skeptic.  He started out with the problem of not knowing who to believe about ultimate truth, the new science or church tradition, for instance.  He decided to doubt everything systematically, which is skepticism.  But rather than hitting the infinite regress of ultimate skepticism, he hit the wall of certainty, or so he claimed.  What really happened is what the debate between Descartes and today's skeptics is all about. 
            The perceived failure of Descartes to truly arrive at sure knowledge led to the rise of modern skepticism.  However, since ancient skepticism is probably the more formidable foe of any kind of certainty, Descartes' famous "cogito" argument might well be even ancient skepticism's greatest enemy.  That is to say, the whole enterprise of skepticism in general, ancient or modern, hinges for the most part on whether Descartes has been buried for sure.  But, then again, if skeptics today are certain that Descartes has been buried, what does that say about the consistency of skepticism itself?  The question for this debate is not whether Descartes was right about everything he and others who followed him argued, but whether he was right about certainty.  Can anything at all be known for sure?  Or, can everything be doubted?
            In his Discourse on Method more than 350 years ago, Descartes in the fourth discourse penned the famous Latin words heard around the philosophical world ever since: cogito, ergo sum.  "I think; therefore, I am."  The whole debate essentially comes down to an analysis of these two propositions and their relation to each other and the world. 
            In terms of logic, the cogito can be classified as the minor premise and conclusion of what is called a "modus ponens," or a "constructive hypothetical" syllogism.  The unstated major premise would simply be the conditional proposition If I think, then I am.  One of the most common forms of thought, this syllogism is expressed in symbolic logic as:
                                                                        (1) P > Q
                                                                     (2) P
                                                                     (3) Q
So the cogito, slightly expanded, would be:
                        Major premise: If I (am) think(ing), then I am (existing).
                        Minor premise: I (am) think(ing).
                        Conclusion: Therefore, I am (existing).
The syllogism in short, then, is:                                        
                                                If thought, then existence. 
                                                Thought. 
                                                Therefore, existence. 
            Were the minor premise and conclusion to switch places, a well-known logical fallacy would result: "asserting, or affirming, the consequent" (Q).  The fallacy is to assert the necessary (rather than sufficient) condition (Q) in the minor premise of a modus ponens syllogism and then to conclude the antecedent, or sufficient condition (P). 
            Another similar syllogism is called "modus tollens," or a "destructive hypothetical" syllogism, which looks like this symbolically:
                                                                      (1) P > Q
                                                                   (2) ~Q
                                                                   (3) ~P
In this syllogism, the denial of the consequent, or necessary condition (Q), can be asserted in the minor premise, followed by the denial of the antecedent, or sufficient condition (P), in the conclusion. 
            The fallacy of "denying the antecedent" would be to assert the denial of the antecedent (~P) in the minor premise and conclude the denial of the consequent (~Q).  So a "negative" way to explain the cogito would be through modus tollens:
                                                If thought, then existence. 
                                                Not-existence. 
                                                Therefore, not-thought. 
By denying the necessary condition, the sufficient condition must be denied.  Without existence there is obviously no thought.
            Even though in a logical (syllogistic) sense, thought precedes existence in the modus ponens form, Descartes was actually proving that, temporally, existence precedes thought.  That is, ontology precedes epistemology.  This is easily confused, and many have naively assumed that Descartes was wrong by misunderstanding the word therefore in the English translation of the cogito.  That something is missing in the translation is the major reason the cogito has often been misconstrued. 
            When the average person hears the words "I think; therefore, I am," the word therefore is often misunderstood as, literally, thereafter.  Many people think Descartes was saying the really absurd statement that he thinks and after that he is: "I think; thereafter, I am."  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Therefore obviously comes from making two common words, there and before, a compound word.  So what Descartes was saying is closer, literally, to "I think; `therebefore,' I am," which would put things in the proper order.  The confusion is with the logical versus the temporal use of the word therefore and getting usages mixed up, a problem apparently not in the original, the Latin ergo.
            An objection might be raised, against this interpretation of the cogito, that it is not existence that Descartes is proving precedes thought, but rather it is knowledge of existence that precedes thought (If I think, then I know I am.).  However, since knowledge (of doubt, for example) is what constitutes thought, this would be tantamount to simply the redundant thought precedes thought, or knowledge precedes knowledge, which is hardly what the cogito is all about, it would seem. 
            The point is that the human ability to think about thought itself may be the only way to transcend the subject-object dilemma and thereby legitimately move from ontology to epistemology (in the order of being) while at the same time, but in a different relationship, move from epistemology to ontology (in the order of knowing).  Descartes found that he could not doubt thought without proving it by thinking at the same time. 
            So the minor premise (I think) was and is firmly established because to (attempt to) deny it is to affirm it.  And once the minor premise (sufficient condition) is established, the conclusion (necessary condition), in this case I am, necessarily follows logically -- which actually means that existence was a necessary condition to begin with.  So both existence and thought are established on certain ground, the former being the connection with the world.
            Another way to look at the cogito argument, in a way Descartes probably would not have objected to, would be to put it in the most common of all syllogistic forms, the same well-known form in which mortality is often predicated of Socrates:
                                            All thinking beings are existing beings.
                                         I am a thinking being.
                                         Therefore, I am an existing being.
            It is difficult to see how the skeptic could honestly deny the premises of this argument.  And the conclusion certainly says something about the world.  This is a case where the formally true makes the connection with the materially true, which is what skepticism denies ever happens.  In other words, the skeptic cannot escape (extreme) solipsism, which is the absurd consequence of denying the existence of self, and remain a skeptic.
            With the cogito, Descartes is simply attempting to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that he exists, i.e., he is establishing existence of self as philosophically certain, which would put the skeptic in the position of having to deny the truth of one's own existence.  The reason the skeptic would have a problem is because Descartes essentially proved that everything can be doubted except the doubt(er).  Thought cannot be doubted, nor can the thinker, who exists in reality. 
            Put another way, the skeptic cannot be skeptical of himself (or skepticism itself) in the same way he is about everything else.  Doubt requires (or is) thinking, and thinking requires a thinker.  To doubt doubt is to be squarely back in the realm of certainty.  Logically, doubt cannot be doubted because it would then be its nemesis, certainty.  Doubt cannot be doubt and be non-doubt (certainty) at the same time and in the same relationship (according to the law of [non]contradiction), which is what would have to be the case if a skeptic were going to be consistent and doubt doubt itself. 
            Therefore, the "infinite" regress is blocked by the inevitability of running into certainty when the skeptic tries to apply his skepticism to skepticism itself.  If he is skeptical of skepticism, then he is in certainty by definition and logical necessity.  Ultimate skepticism, then, is impossible because to be consistent requires the skeptic to be a dogmatist simultaneously, which is absurd.  The fact is, there cannot be an infinite regress because the skeptic is dealing with finitude alone.
            The major objection that the skeptic has against certainty is the argument of equipollence,[2] which is the basis of the appeal to infinite regress.  But this concept that all arguments have an equal counterargument is itself self-referentially absurd.  For if equipollence is true, then there must by definition be an equal counterargument to equipollence itself, which would render it false.  So equipollence would be in the contradictory position of being false if it is true. 
            In fact, equipollence is incoherent.  All arguments are not "created equal."  Neither do all arguments have some sort of dualistic counterpart.  Binary oppositions do indeed seem to play an important role in philosophy, but equipollence as the absolute that skepticism requires is untenable.  Since equipollence does not pass the "negative test" of logic, it certainly cannot be true of the world.
            One example of the difficulty the skeptic is faced with in the insistence on denying certainty in order to be consistently skeptical is found in examining that most famous of all syllogisms:
                        Major premise: All men are mortal.
                        Minor premise: Socrates is a man.
                        Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.
            The interesting thing about this classic syllogism is how easily the premises can be challenged.  For instance, a skeptic might contend that there is the problem of induction in that it is impossible to know for sure whether all men are mortal, or even whether Socrates is a man.  This is the inductive side, which can at most only yield a high degree of probability, close to certainty, perhaps, but not close enough. 
            However, if the focus is on the relationship of the conclusion to the premises, there is a certainty which almost no one could deny.  For example, if a proviso is added to the premises, it changes the probability to absolute certainty:
                                                           (If) all men are mortal,
                                                (And if) Socrates is a man,
                                                (Then) Socrates is mortal.
            That is to say, even a skeptic cannot deny that there is such a thing as the absolute certainty of the necessary relation between the above premises and the conclusion.  This is not knowledge about Socrates.  This is knowledge about truth, of what ultimate reality is.  Regardless of the content of the argument itself, there is still the knowledge that any deductive argument in which the premises are true has a certain conclusion.  Just that there is such a thing as an absolutely certain relationship (between whatever true propositions) must count as a kind of knowledge, even if in the abstract.  The idea here might be thought of as the "content" of syllogistic form itself. 
            How could even the most radical skeptic deny that if the premises are true, then the conclusion inescapably follows?  The only way to deny that this kind of formal certainty exists is to deny all premises whatsoever.  But even the skeptic has a premise, if nothing else at least the principle of equipollence -- not to mention the view of "being left with" impressions, as Frede maintains.
            The objection might be made that certainty is either always absolute, or else it is always ("absolutely") relative, which would land it in the realm of doubt.  But certainty does not necessarily imply omniscience.  To know something for sure does not necessarily mean to know it or everything exhaustively.  Something can be known truly, Descartes might say, without knowing everything about it.  An "all or nothing" position on certainty is an "either-or" fallacy.  Some certainty is possible.  That is, it is possible to be certain about some things, starting with the cogito, for example.       
            Certainty of this kind is to be understood in the context of finitude.  Certainty in the context of infinite being is another debate.  Of course, there is also legal certainty, "beyond a reasonable doubt."  This is the certainty upon which the American justice system is built and operates.  That there are degrees of certainty no more implies skepticism than degrees of probability imply eventual dogmatism. 
            The point is that there is a formal truth that is undeniable by the subject who knows it, the one that can only be existing in material reality.  For the skeptic to be utterly consistent, he would have to deny any truth whatsoever, including formal truth, or validity.  The skeptic would have to deny the certainty that if all men are mortal and if Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal for absolutely sure.  Otherwise, that counts as sure and true knowledge -- about the way things are, even for the skeptic.  For example, any "reasonable" skeptic would have to admit that he and the dogmatist cannot both be right, simply based on the principle of (non)contradiction.  That is in itself an admission about something real: certainty.
            A major objection to skepticism is the necessary connection between theory and practice.  When someone does not practice what he preaches, he is called a hypocrite.  By definition, a skeptic does not practice what he preaches because he cannot preach anything.  He would have to practice nothing to be consistent with his theory, which is basically the plight of the nihilist in the Nietzschean mode. 
            All but perhaps the skeptics themselves would argue and agree that everyone practices some theory.  What if the skeptic no longer cares what theory he is practicing?  Then he forfeits the right to be taken seriously.  Not even the man in the street will take anyone seriously who self-consciously ignores his own principles.  Who has time for the kind of person who goes around saying things like, "A preposition is not the right thing to end a sentence with," or its equivalent, and really means it? 
            The only place for inconsistency and contradiction, besides a padded room, is in the realm of humor, hence the popularity of such movies, for example, as the "Naked Gun" series where contradiction is the hallmark of humor.  But for the serious side of life, that will not do.  People are still serious about truth even after all these centuries of history and debate.
            Comes Michael Frede into the fray with the polite suggestion that perhaps the ancient skeptics have been misunderstood and maligned all these years and deserve a reconsideration.[3]  His secret weapon is the special distinction that might allow the skeptic to practice his theory after all.  But the "practice" would somehow not be a violation of his no-practice theory. 
            The skeptic's theory is, in a way, one that says theory and practice do not have to match.  But if they do not practice it (matching practice with theory), then they lose their theory's relevance.  And if they do practice their theory, then they violate it.  So they are caught in a trap.  They cannot both practice and not practice their theory at the same time and in the same relationship.
            Contemporary thought has challenged the notion that something cannot be both materially true and formally false.  While it is conceivable that something can be formally true (valid, coherent) but materially false (not in correspondence to reality), the reverse is not so.  Even if the reverse were coherent (possible), that would not necessarily make it true, anyway. 
            Theory and practice follow along the same lines of reasoning such that while a valid theory that is not practiced is possible, practicing a false (invalid) theory is impossible.  For example, consider the possibility of practicing the (theoretical) denial of the proposition I think.  It is actually impossible because the person denying the proposition (in theory) is practicing it at the same time. 
            Frede's solution to the problem is to divide practice, or in his word assent, into two kinds, one of which the skeptic is allowed to do in order to function in life and the other of which the skeptic is not allowed to do because it would make him inconsistent with his own premise that nothing can be known for sure.  So basically Frede posits that a skeptic can indeed act -- as everyone must -- without believing.  That is, acting on something, according to Frede's understanding of the skeptic's real position, is not necessarily acting on the belief that that something. 
            Logically, Frede puts it this way: acting on the "impression" that p is not the same as acting on the impression that it is true that p.  The skeptic is free to do and does the former but not the latter.  So action does not require the belief that an impression is true -- only that there is an impression.  But does action require the belief that it is true that there is an impression, one wonders?  
            The problem comes in at the use of the word impression.  Frede is careful to note that he does not mean proposition, although he frequently interchanges the words thought, idea, view, and mental entity with impression as he discusses the two kinds of assent.  Presumably, he means sensation or sense perception.  Unfortunately for the reader, Frede chooses not to dwell on the meaning of this most significant term in the argument for skepticism.  For if impression is indeed a synonym for proposition, then Frede's argument is invalid, as he admits that the propositions "that p" and "that it is true that p" are identical, in which case the skeptic would be assenting to the truth of his premise that nothing can be known, and this he cannot and must not do. 
            At least one ancient skeptic seems to contradict Frede on this point: Arcesilaus, predecessor to Carneades, whom Frede uses as his prime example of the consistent ancient skeptic.  Arcesilaus said that what people assent to is in fact a proposition.[4]  So both assents would be to a proposition, according to Arcesilaus, and not just to an ambiguous "impression."  Apparently Arcesilaus did not make the distinction between two kinds of assent, though Frede might argue otherwise.  If an impression is a proposition, then the skeptic who assents to "that p" also assents to "that it is true that p," in which case there would be only one kind of assent and only one kind of skepticism (inconsistent).
            Another important aspect to discuss in the doubt-certainty debate is the appearance-reality dichotomy.  It "seems" to be a difficult thing to be consistent with, and yet the skeptics "certainly" need it to prop up their argument for ultimate illusion.  But Frede, on the other hand, and his ancient skeptics do not need it, he points out.[5]  Frede astutely recognizes the problem.  The dichotomy breaks down when considering real-life examples like the Luby's fiasco in Killeen, Texas, a few years ago.  The people in the cafeteria, when a deranged man ran his truck through the glass and started shooting people dead inside, had no trouble at all distinguishing appearance from reality.  It was all "too" real, much like the tornado that recently swept through DeSoto and Lancaster, Texas. 
            If reality is not what is leaving one with impressions, then appearances are.  But if appearances only are leaving one with impressions, then whence cometh the idea of reality?  The appearances would be the reality, and one would be left with reality alone.  The problem with the illusion argument is simply that someone must always be having the illusion, by definition.  If someone is having the illusion, that someone is not part of it.  When a skeptic in effect says, "We need to move from the illusion of certainty to the certainty of illusion," perhaps it is time to stop arguing with him. . .
            With the power of both the senses and the intellect working together, both the empirical and rational (dual criterion for truth) in complementarity rather than tension or conflict, certainty in any practical sense whatsoever is attainable.  However, limited to mere sense perception, "certainty" is reduced to doubt, or probability at best.  As empirico-rational creatures, skeptics are attacking themselves by using reason, albeit their "moderate" version, to argue (incoherently in the final analysis) against reason, or at least a high(er) view of it.  The senses are reliable as far as they go; logic is more than reliable enough to ascertain truth, which is knowledge -- not omniscience.
            If the senses were the only source of knowledge and empiricism were the basis of argument, the skeptics might be right.  But since there is other than empirically-based knowledge, i.e., knowledge of the thinking self, the argument by the skeptics (which is actually against empiricism) fails.  Furthermore, the self can be no other than the ontological self.  This means that the existence of self, which leads to thought, is more than a formal validity; it is a material truth, supported by experience and reason.
            Something is, or can be, known after all.

                                                          


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnes, Jonathan. "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist." Elenchos 4 (1983) 5-43.
Burnyeat, M.F. "Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?" Doubt and Dogmatism. Ed.          Schofield, Burnyeat, and Barnes. Oxford, 1980. 20-53.
Frede, Michael. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Minneapolis, 1987.
Long, A.A. Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. 2nd ed. California,         1974/86.
Long, A.A. and D.N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers I. Cambridge, 1987.
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism in Sextus Empiricus I. Trans. R.G. Bury.          Loeb Classical Library. London: Heinemann, 1933/61.
Stough, Charlotte. "Sextus Empiricus on Non-assertion."  Phronesis 29 (1984)      137-64.




    [1]Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis, 1987), chapters 10, 11: "The Skeptic's Beliefs" and "The Skeptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge," 179-222.
    [2]Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in Sextus Empiricus I, trans. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 1933/61) 9, puts it this way: "The main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; . . ."  The question remains: what proposition does the skeptic oppose to his "main basic principle"?  M.F. Burnyeat, "Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?" Doubt and Dogmatism, Ed. Schofield, Burnyeat, and Barnes (Oxford, 1980) 52, makes a similar suggestion: ". . . contrary claims are indeed equal [according to Sextus].  And my question is: How can Sextus deny that this is something he believes [true]?"  Jonathan Barnes, "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist," Elenchos 4 (1983) 5, defines epoche ("suspension of judgment"), despite the title of the article, as "a standstill of the intellect, as a result of which we neither deny nor affirm anything," citing Sextus.  Barnes may be excused for his own assertions concerning skepticism throughout the article, but Sextus, as the representative of skepticism, puts himself in an awkward position by undertaking the task of setting forth so lucidly the content of skepticism, which obviously contains many assertions.  Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers I (Cambridge, 1987) 472, assert the position of the Pyrrhonist Aenesidemus: "You can adopt a non-assertive frame of mind; what you cannot straight forwardly do is assert that."
    [3]Essays, chapter 11: "The Skeptic's Two Kinds of Assent," 201-22.  The thesis that Frede sets forth is that confusion with regard to and dismissal of skepticism from ancient times to this day are caused by a wrong reading of history on the subject, and that, if corrected by distinguishing the skeptic's "two kinds of assent," the historian or philosopher can come to a better understanding of what skepticism is all about, i.e., concern with the attitude toward belief (assent) rather than the problem (question) of the possibility of knowledge.  Thus Frede adjusts the traditional skeptical thesis "nothing is, or can be, known" to "(one is left with) the impression that nothing is, or can be, known," and this impression that knowledge is apparently impossible allows the skeptic to avoid (traditionally understood) belief by positing two kinds of assent, the first in such a way as to allow the skeptic to stop short of truth value.
    [4]A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (California, 1974/86) 90.  Arguing against the Stoic conception of apprehension as assent to a sense-impression, Arcesilaus rather asserts that assent is always to a proposition.  How the Stoics' lekta concept relates to this is not discussed by Long in this context.  Charlotte Stough, "Sextus Empiricus on Non-assertion," Phronesis 29 (1984) 163, remarks: "That which is distinctively `sceptical' in [the Pyrrhonist's] way of life, the attitude of mind that makes him a sceptic, can only be given in propositional form" (emphasis added).
    [5]Essays, 221: "In short, I see no reason why a classical skeptic should accept the global contrast between appearance and reality."


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