Wednesday, August 19, 2020
Rhetoric: Good or Bad?
Dave Couric
Paper 1: Rhetoric: Good or Bad?
HUMA 5301: Foundations of Rhetoric (Dr. Kellner, UTA)
March 15, 1994
Not too long ago Louis Farrakhan, controversial leader of the Nation of Islam, illustrated with his comments (as reported in the local newspaper) precisely what Richard Lanham asserts about rhetoric. Though Lanham sees rhetoric as at least half of what it means to be human, he also argues that the reality, or "world view," of the person using rhetoric is very important to the ongoing rhetoric debate. In fact, he considers the content communicated as "good" or "bad," and not the rhetoric itself. Farrakhan confirmed this necessary distinction with his words in response to his aide's speech that, among other things, referred to Jews as "bloodsuckers of the black nation." Farrakhan supposedly reprimanded the aide, but then turned around and endorsed the content (though not the rhetoric) of the speech. The aide's rhetoric was arguably bad (he was shown on the news spouting anti-semiticism and general racism in the speech on a college campus), but the content was such that it would have made little difference about the rhetoric, in the final analysis.
"While I stood by the
truths that he spoke, I must condemn in the strongest terms the manner in which
those truths were represented," Farrakhan was reported to say. Whether the
aide's (or Farrakhan's, for that matter) rhetoric was good or bad really is not
the primary focus here even though "the manner" is where Farrakhan
tried to situate the controversy. What
people who heard this news were concerned about is the content of what both men
said. The point is that there is no "nice" way to say what the aide
said. No one was upset simply about the rhetoric, in this case. Everybody knew
what he was saying. People were in an uproar over the content, no matter what
the style. For Farrakhan to say he "stood by" the content while
condemning the rhetoric is virtually meaningless if he was supposed to be
rebuking an insubordinate in the wake of and to quell the controversy. He might
as well have stood up and simply repeated his aide's words all over again.
Lanham's view is that
traditionally rhetoric has been considered either good or bad: good when it is
not noticed and bad when it is "excessive." This judging of rhetoric
he sees as an error. For Lanham, rhetoric is neither good nor bad; it is the
reality (or conflicting realities) that causes the problem. Therefore, Lanham
argues for a suspension of judgment between the two sides that have battled for
prominence from ancient times: the philosopher and the rhetor. Both sides have
their own rhetoric, and both have their own (contradictory) philosophies.
Lanham proposes that both philosophies are human and should be held in tension
despite contradiction.
But perhaps rhetoric can
be either good or bad, and content (philosophy) can be either good or bad. Why
not both? The Farrakhan debacle seems to be a case of both, with content taking
extreme precedence. Lanham takes the "both/and" position on
philosophy and rhetoric each being half of humanity. So, in effect, he is
saying that one half, rhetoric, is neither good nor bad, but the other half,
philosophy, is good or bad, depending on perspective. Why is it that only half
of humanity can be considered good or bad? Could it be that Lanham himself has
not been able to maintain that suspension equally and indefinitely between two
poles of a contradiction as his theory advocates and has instead simply moved
to the rhetorical side alone?
Admittedly, in the case of Farrakhan and his aide, their rhetoric could
have contributed nothing to the content, as long as the audience understood
what they were saying about Jews. But if people can and do make choices about
the rhetoric they use, then it seems plausible that the choice of rhetoric is
based on what is best for the occasion.
If rhetoric is considered
as simply aesthetics, then it would be easier to argue that it is simply a
matter of taste, not good or bad. But Lanham himself chooses not to consider
rhetoric simply a matter of taste. That is because rhetoric would be defined
too narrowly if simply as aesthetics. Defined in a broader sense, rhetoric can
be considered good or bad when it includes not only aesthetics but ethics as
well. Still broader, rhetoric would also be epistemological. And at the
extreme, for those who consider "everything" to be rhetoric, the
ontological would be the final realm for rhetoric to overlap. So at its
broadest, rhetoric would cover the entire metaphysical spectrum.
Although Aristotle is the
representative of the "classical" or traditional position on the
subject and therefore would be expected to have a rather narrow conception of
rhetoric, precisely the opposite appears to be the case. While he may not go as
far as, say, Gorgias with an ontological view of rhetoric, Aristotle does seem
to hold a view that includes rhetoric in the epistemological, ethical, and
aesthetic realms. This is most clearly seen in the way Aristotle divides the
subjects of dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics, with a separate work on each. In
Rhetoric, e.g., he starts out by noting that dialectic is the counterpart to
rhetoric, presumably meaning dialectic is a subject treated separately and
prior to rhetoric. Then, of course, he wrote a treatise on poetics also.
However, within Rhetoric itself, there is an emphasis on the "three modes
of persuasion": logos, ethos, and pathos. Though he considers them in a
different order, these three parallel dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics, or
epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Therefore, it may be that Aristotle had
in mind a broader view of rhetoric than simply a volitional, or ethical,
persuasion, although ethos is the first and perhaps foremost mode in
Aristotle's exposition of the art of persuasion. Moreover, at this point
rhetoric has much to do with good or bad, at least as to the character of the
rhetor, if not the nature of his rhetoric.
The three elements in
speechmaking contribute something along these lines, too. A speaker is doing
something (volitional/moral) with a speech (intellectual) to elicit a response
from the audience (emotional). Furthermore, even the three divisions of
rhetoric, based on the three classes of hearers, have some kind of
correspondence to the modes of persuasion: forensic (logos), ceremonial
(ethos), and political (pathos).
If action is in rhetoric
and passion in poetics, then Aristotle must have had a view of rhetoric that
overlapped with poetics (and dialectic). Since actions can be good or bad, it
follows that rhetoric can also. Of course, that doesn't mean that content is
neutral. Content would most strictly fit in the category of dialectic, or
epistemology, as in the content of an argument. But since rhetoric overlaps
with dialectic and poetics to some extent, content and style in some sense are
both involved in the discipline of rhetoric. In Farrakhan's and his aide's
case, the content was bad and therefore provoked such a negative response; the
rhetoric was bad but largely beside the point.
Rhetoric and reality,
then, must be distinguished, even if not on the same basis as Lanham proposes.
Whereas he sees rhetoric as primary, perhaps it is the other way around, as the
philosophers say, and content is most important. Either way, rhetoric and
reality cannot be one and the same. If rhetoric is reality, then everything is
rhetoric. If everything is rhetoric, then nothing is rhetoric and the rhetors
are back to reality again. Or, to use the drama metaphor: When the rhetorical
"play" of life has no audience, is it really a play?
