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Thursday, August 20, 2020

 

As If Aristotle Invented It

Dave Couric

Paper 2: As If Aristotle Invented It

HUMA 5301: Foundations of Rhetoric (Dr. Kellner, UTA)

April 5, 1994

Whenever a person decides to criticize another, the critic often runs the risk of falling into the trap of becoming guilty of doing the very thing being criticized.  For example, letters to the editor make a case in point.  A letter writer may be offended by something another (earlier) writer had said about a particular incident or subject.  But in responding to a perceived injustice, the second writer to the editor might end up sounding a lot like the person who is being complained about.  This is a common occurrence and usually is difficult to avoid while still managing to get "two cents worth" out there in the marketplace of ideas, the letters section.  One writer might rail against something or someone in "judgment," and the next letter comes back with "You shouldn't judge so-and-so like that," with the further implication "You fool!" tacked on even if not explicitly written.  Hence there is often the ironic situation in which whoever accuses someone else of something might be guilty of the very same thing in the process, not precluding this paper itself, of course.  Be that as it may, Kenneth Burke (in the same paragraph) seems to do the very thing he criticizes, in A Grammar of Motives, excerpted in The Rhetorical Tradition (994).

What Burke does is "smash and abolish [an] idol," or at least that looks like his intention. In this particular case the idol Burke attempts to smash and abolish is the famous first law of logic, the "law of contradiction" (A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same relationship/respect/sense).  But when Burke uses the image "smash and abolish [an] idol," he is actually referring to writers he intends to criticize for their "air of much relentlessness."  In the context of introducing the five key terms of "dramatism," his method of describing human motivation using the metaphor of drama, Burke makes the point (in the preceding paragraph) that there is a necessary ambiguity in terminology about motives.  However, he acknowledges that there are those who would object to this ambiguity and seek to remove or avoid it, those "with terministic ideals of symbolic logic and logical positivism."  This generic writer is "a perfectionist." Since ambiguity cannot be avoided, Burke accepts ambiguous terms that nevertheless "clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities arise."  Or perhaps he wants to use clear terms that show where the ambiguity comes from rather than terms that somehow escape ambiguity altogether.

It is at this point that Burke makes the statement which, ironically, seems to foreshadow what he himself does later in the same paragraph with the law of contradiction. Burke writes, “Occasionally, you will encounter a writer who seems to get great exaltation out of proving, with an air of much relentlessness, that some philosophic term or other has been used to cover a variety of meanings, and who would smash and abolish this idol.” Here the "idol" Burke refers to is the idol of a one-to-one correspondence between terms and their meanings, which is apparently what the goal of the logical positivists, for example, was in their efforts to avoid ambiguity.  Assumedly, Burke would defend the notion that by necessity natural languages must use terms with multiple possible meanings, which are then distinguished by context, because of the impractical situation of having to deal with an unmanageable number of vocabulary words if each term in English, for example, only had one meaning.  Burke goes on to give the motive for such a writer's obsession with smashing the idol of ambiguous terminology: "it happens to be associated with some cultural or political trend from which the writer would dissociate himself."  Here Burke says the person who objects to a word on the basis or charge of ambiguity is ambiguous herself if the objection is made because of ideology.  Burke thinks that all terms can be attacked equally, including whatever term the objector prefers to use.  When any term is used twice, for two different situations, "a certain margin of ambiguity" is the result, Burke explains that it is simply because "the two subjects that are given the identical title" are not the same.  So when a person charges ambiguity in someone else's terminology, she is guilty of the same thing herself every time she applies one term to two situations.  This is the proverbial "pot calling the kettle black."

Going back to the beginning of the paragraph, if the first sentence is construed as logic's first law, then the last part of the paragraph might be seen as Burke's "disposal" of it. Rather than disposing of a philosophic term and its various corresponding meanings as the "writer" Burke criticizes attempts to do, he would be disposing of a philosophic principle and its various applications.  If not disposing of the principle, Burke is "transforming" it, which is what he does with ambiguity. Transforming ambiguities rather than trying to get rid of them is Burke's stated aim.  Thus, employing a volcano analogy, he seeks to transform the law of contradiction, presumably the greatest ambiguity of all:

Distinctions, we might say [highly speculative, admittedly], arise out of a great central moltenness where all is merged [unity as origin of diversity].  They have been thrown [ambiguous Heideggerian passive voice] from a liquid center to the surface, where they have congealed.  Let one of these crusted distinctions return to its source, and in this alchemic center it may be remade, again becoming molten liquid [no distinctions at this point], and may enter into new combinations [equals A and non-A], whereas it may be again thrown forth as a new crust [non-A], a different distinction [non-A].  So that A may become non-A. But not merely be a leap from one state to the other [at the same time]. Rather, we must take A back into the ground of its existence, the logical substance [Burke later criticizes the use of this word in this way] that is its causal ancestor, and on to a point where it is consubstantial with non-A [where everything is one, monism, and the law of contradiction is no longer operative]; then we may return, this time emerging with non-A instead [two ambiguities, A and non-A, become one ambiguity?].

The question is, does it make sense to talk about a volcano-like place where there are no longer any distinctions and the law of contradiction apparently does not apply?  Is it possible? Is it coherent?  It seems that Burke is imagining such a monism as a way of avoiding the ambiguity of pluralism.  This is the oldest problem in philosophy, "the one and the many."  But coherency is the problem.  If the last "non-A" in the paragraph is changed to "A," does it change the sense at all?  Since A and non-A were said to be consubstantial (identical) in the first half of that sentence, what difference would it make to return once again emerging with A instead of non-A?  If the two distinctions are "melted down," then how would Burke know he is emerging with non-A?  He might say that it is precisely the point that he is emerging with A and also that he is emerging with non-A. But the point of the principle of contradiction is that it cannot be both. A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same relationship, even at the center of a volcano.  Either he is emerging with A, with non-A, or more likely with a third alternative, B, since he speaks of transformation.  To be sure, B is non-A, but in principle B was never A.  So A cannot "become" B.  If Burke could get to a point where the law of contradiction does not apply, then the problem he would have is that the law would both apply and not apply at the same time and in the same sense, and that is absurd.  To be human is to live with and by this principle concerning coherency.  If someone tries to say she lives outside it, then the question is whether she can be outside and inside at the same time and respect since there is supposed to be no law restraining her.  Someone may object with the famous example of the "liar's paradox."  But then the question is, is the paradox both an exception to the law of contradiction and not an exception at the same time and in the same relationship? 

Of course many people disdain such "mind games" as futile. But accepting limits on possibilities seems more human than not.  Aristotle was not the one who decided that the principle of contradiction is part of being human.  He just noticed the fact in the same way Heidegger, for example, emphasized the finitude of humanity and encouraged everyone to accept it as an ultimate principle.  Would anyone argue against the finitude of humanity? Perhaps, but not many.  To be fair, Burke might have argued that he by no means intended to smash or abolish the law of contradiction.  But it is hard to imagine what he meant if not to somehow get beyond that principle, to somehow get free of it as if it were a kind of artificial restraint thrust on humanity from within.  The law certainly does not clear up all ambiguities, but without it, there is nothing but ambiguity.

New Dallas Cowboys Coach Barry Switzer, on Good Morning America the other day, was asked what he thought about all that had been going on in Dallas, especially concerning the former coach, Jimmy Johnson. While expressing sympathy for the Johnson, Switzer's reply was, "One thing is for certain.  Nothing stays the status quo. Change is certain."  Whether he knew it or not, that is exactly what Heraclitus, the presocratic philosopher, meant when he said, "Whatever is, is changing" in dialectic response to his contemporary Parmenides’s maxim "Whatever is, is."  Now Parmenides’s statement may have its own problems, but they are not with the law of contradiction.  But Heraclitus and Switzer have a problem with coherency in their statement.  If the statement "Whatever is, is changing" is true, then the statement does not change.  But according to the statement, everything changes, which would include the very principle they are espousing.  The law of contradiction simply shows that their statement cannot be both true and not true at the same time and in the same relationship.  To make any statement at all, then (even rhetorical), is to assume this fundamental metaphysical principle of nature, without which no communication is possible.  There is no real "civil disobedience" with this law.  It cannot be repealed.  It enforces itself.  Humanity is free within it but not free to be without it.*

*The professor paid me a compliment on this assignment with something to the effect of what Agrippa said to Paul, “Almost thou persuadest me.”

 


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