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Tuesday, August 25, 2020

 

Fusion of Horizons as Hans‐Georg Gadamer's Central Problem in Hermeneutics

 

Dave Couric

PHIL 5392: Philosophical Hermeneutics (Dr. Reeder, UTA)

November 9, 1993

Short Essay 2: Fusion of Horizons as Hans‐Georg Gadamer's Central Problem in Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics is a significant part of the life of all people even though most may not have consciously formulated any specific theory of interpretation. The practice of interpretation is something that goes on every day, whether in spoken or written form. The process of assimilating information via language is going on at least in everyone's head if not mouth. How this sharing of objects of knowledge between subjects takes place is the concern of hermeneutics. In other words, hermeneutics is the discipline that studies how understanding occurs. Understanding and interpretation are almost synonymous terms that present great difficulty in sorting them out semantically. On the one hand, understanding seems to have an inherently passive sense to it while interpretation is the opposite with an intrinsic active connotation, in which case understanding could be logically prior to interpretation in the process of coming to know. Understanding, that is, would be something that happens to a reader/hearer, and interpretation would be what the recipient of a message then does as a result, the verbalizing, in thought or speech, of what is understood. On the other hand and from another angle, interpretation might be something a reader/hearer does in order to subsequently understand, in which case the objective interpretation would be a necessary condition for the subjective understanding. So the active effort to interpret is initiated for the purpose of receiving an understanding in return. Interpretation would then be what one does, and understanding what one gets as a reward. In this way, understanding becomes the culminating effect or goal of hermeneutics.  At any rate, these two terms are so closely related that defining them is tenuous. Gadamer, in fact, makes little, if any, distinction between interpretation and understanding. As it does with other 20th century philosophical hermeneuts, the latter term takes center stage in Gadamer's hermeneutics, reflecting a general historical trend in which hermeneutics has evolved from the science of interpretation to the art of understanding.

The ambiguous relationship of interpretation and understanding serves to point out the general problem, in hermeneutics, of how any understanding at all can take place between subjects, especially those who are removed from each other in terms of time and space. Normally, the area of intense scrutiny in the study of hermeneutics is not communication between two living subjects, but rather between one living subject, the interpreter, and an object of language (or art) that originated from a subject who may or may not be living, and who may or may not be available to consult. That is, the problem of hermeneutics is the relationship between the subject doing the interpreting and the text or work of the subject who is the author.  The quest for meaning, then, drives the issue of hermeneutics along.  Rather than stressing the need to "walk in the author's shoes" as Schleiermacher did, Gadamer places the emphasis away from the author (assuming that person is out of the picture) and directly between the text and interpreter. Whether Gadamer strikes the proper balance between the two seems to be a matter of much debate. Somehow understanding indeed does occur between the text and interpreter although it does not seem possible for a total or complete fusion of horizons to take place any more than one can actually trade places with the author.

Borrowing from R.G. Collingwood, Gadamer asserts that every author answers a question with his text, and every text poses a question to the interpreter of it. So for every statement there is a prior question to which that statement is the answer. A text is the answer to a question of the author, and an interpretation is an answer to the question of that text. The central problem of hermeneutics, then, is to figure out what question the text is posing to the interpreter, which presumably is the same question that the author was answering in the text.  The interpretation must be a proper answer to the question. Gadamer calls this process of understanding, the meeting of question and answer, a "fusion of horizons," a conscious act in which the past context fuses with the present context, the meaning of the text (or work of art) with the interpreter, with (aesthetic) understanding being the result. Therefore, understanding occurs when the horizon of the text becomes one with the horizon of the interpreter, when the world of "back then" unites with the world of "right now," forming something altogether new. More precise, it is the being of the text (language is the "house of being") that the interpreter encounters, which accounts for the general shift in hermeneutics from epistemology to ontology. A text has an ontological status since the author expresses being in the text as that being appears and reveals itself to him and later to the interpreter, too. Furthermore, the being of the text and the being of the interpreter apparently change in the act or experience of understanding, which is really an interaction between two subjects, for Gadamer. This seems to be the point at which the possibility of one versus many interpretations comes to the fore. If both the text and interpreter are changed in the fusion, then can the text be said in its "semantic autonomy" to have the potential for an infinite number of interpretations similar to how a language can generate a potential infinite number of sentences?  In other words, if two interpreters come up with the same interpretation, would the text itself change identically in each case?  Another important question to ask in this context is, does the text itself change ontologically over time? For that matter, does a snapshot picture change over time?  If so, then the bottom line is that time changes everything.

Traditionally, the maxim "one interpretation, many applications" has been invoked often in hermeneutics. In that sense, there is only one correct meaning of a text, the author's meaning. But that one meaning can then be applied to various situations and under varying circumstances.  One meaning (or being) theoretically but many practically is saying that what the text meant was one thing; what it means is more than one thing. Hirsch echoes this sentiment in his distinction between meaning (of the author) and significance (for the interpreter). Today, hermeneuts do not appear to be concerned with the theoretical meaning of a text in the traditional sense. They are engaged in an analysis of the practical meaning only. What it meant to the author is not as important as what it means to the interpreter.  Obviously, the concern naturally moves in the direction of the interpreter since the author is usually not around. The controversy in hermeneutics, between the "old" school and the "new," revolves around this pendulum swing from author to text to interpreter, from Hirsch to Gadamer and, in the extreme, Derrida.

For the sake of debate, there are certain parameters which must be agreed to, or else communication itself is at stake and will grind to a halt. For example, using truth as a parallel, it would seem that unless two interpreters of the same text can agree that truth is, without necessarily agreeing what truth is, no legitimate discussion can ensue. As a bare essential the existence of truth seems to be a prerequisite to any dialogue about meaning even if no consensus on the nature of truth can be reached. In other words, the law of noncontradiction must be assumed before any real communication can take place. Analogically, there must be agreement that there is a best interpretation of a text even though the interpreters may never find it, or know that they have. Agreeing that there is one true interpretation is not to say what the right one is. Moreover, that two contradicting or mutually exclusive interpretations cannot both be the correct meaning must be assumed, though both may certainly be wrong. Otherwise, anyone on the other side of an argument could be forced to entertain the absurd, indeed impossible, notion of a situation in which that supposed argument is put forth as materially true (in practice) without the prior necessity of being formally true (in theory). What is real must be logical. At least there can then be some intelligent debate as to what alternative interpretations should be allowed and what is too far off the mark as, e.g., in deconstructionism. In this way, there is room for many interpretations (applications) while maintaining some sort of restraint on radical relativism. The difference between deconstructionists and everyone else to the right of them seems to be simply that the former have no desire to be objective at all while the latter, recognizing of course the subjective element involved, at least strive for some sort of objectivity in order to avoid subjectivism. So one must believe that a degree of objectivity is possible before that person will want to move in that direction.

The fluidity of language and the fact that historicity effects change in the fusion of horizons need not imply, on the one hand, absolute freedom to come up with any interpretation whatsoever, nor should there always have to be, on the other hand, total conformity of meaning among interpreters. As long as words and therefore texts do have meaning, interpreters are going to debate what that meaning is. The day that language loses its meaning altogether is the day that hermeneutics no longer deals with the reality behind the rhetoric but simply symbolism without substance.


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