Saturday, August 22, 2020
Detour: Deconstructing along the Anti-Formalist Road
Dave Couric
Professor: Dr. Kellner (UTA)
HUMA 5301: Foundations of Rhetoric
April 26, 1994
Paper 4: Detour: Deconstructing along the Anti-Formalist
Road
Depending on perspective, abortion opponents are variously described as "anti-abortion," "anti-choice," or "pro-life" while abortion proponents are called "pro-abortion," "anti-life," and "pro-choice." Likewise, philosophy has been considered "anti-rhetoric," and rhetoric "anti-philosophy," depending on which side is doing the talking at the time. The same goes for formalism, or foundationalism. Philosophers, for the most part, have historically been formalists or foundationalists whereas rhetors are anti-formalists or anti-foundationalists. The formal, or foundational, refers to the existence of an objective, universal basis upon which all argument rests. To reject the existence of an absolute basis for truth is to make the claim of an anti-formalist, or anti-foundationalist, as Stanley Fish does in his chapter titled "Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road." Though he states that "anti-foundationalism can be asserted as absolutely true," he goes on to qualify the word absolutely as relative to time and perhaps place (30).
In the course of two paragraphs (29-30) at the end of his introduction, Fish takes the opportunity to answer a common objection to "anti-foundationalist thought." It is probably safe to say that the validity of his book's thesis as well as the rest of what he has to say depends on whether he is successful in answering this objection. The objection "is that the anti-foundationalist position cannot itself be asserted without contradiction." It is interesting to note from the start that both foundationalists and anti©foundationalists are concerned with avoiding self-contradiction, or at least Fish is one anti-foundationalist who is. Otherwise, he would not have bothered to include these two important paragraphs as one of two final points he makes in the introduction. What it means is that if the anti-foundationalist position is self-contradictory, then there is no legitimate basis for arguing that rhetoric rather than philosophy (logic) is the foundation for all theory. That is, Fish and other rhetors have a "life-and-death" stake in successfully arguing that anti-foundationalism can be asserted without contradiction. Already there is a conceptual problem here, incidentally, because rhetoric is adhering to logic when the former is supposed to be the basis of the latter.
Nevertheless, Fish goes on
to explain the objection raised by some philosophers to the rhetoricians
(anti©foundationalists): If taken seriously, the philosophers say,
anti-foundationalism is a foundation and so "undoes the very position it
supposedly proclaims." Fish answers this objection by appealing to
"the nature of the anti-foundationalist claim." He says those who
make the objection misunderstand the nature of the claim, "which is not
that there are no foundations. . ." Anti-foundationalism, then, is a kind
of foundationalism. Fish says that there are always some foundations. The
disagreement is in the nature of those foundations. Anti-foundationalists like
Fish say the nature of the foundations is "local and temporal" rather
than universal (global) and eternal. They are "established by
persuasion" on a "cultural and contextual" basis rather than
"from a point above history and culture." So the rhetors are against
certain kinds of foundationsn but not all foundations. The opposition (philosophers) has mistaken
the anti-foundationalists, Fish argues, for "no-foundationalists"
when in reality they are "different-foundationalists." One way to
describe the difference might be between absolute (eternal) foundations and
relative (temporal) foundations. The anti-foundationalists, of course, are
against the former kind only.
At this point, Fish makes an important statement about the origin of foundations: "Anti-foundationalism, then, is a thesis about how foundations emerge. . ." He goes on to say that they emerge locally and temporally (contextually, culturally), "and are always vulnerable to challenges from other localities and other times." Here is where Fish answers most specifically the common objection that anti-foundationalism is self-contradictory, a charge (if substantiated) he recognizes as fatal to his position. He says the anti-foundationalist thesis that all foundations are relative is itself relative, yet it is "absolutely true" at the present time. "This vulnerability also extends, of course, to the anti-foundationalist thesis itself," Fish admits, "and that is why its assertion does not involve a contradiction, as it would if what was being asserted was the impossibility of foundational assertion; . . ." So he is not saying that foundational assertion is impossible. That would be a contradiction because it would be the same as saying no foundations exist. And anti-foundationalists are not saying that no foundations exist. They are saying that no permanent foundations exist. If they said no foundations at all are possible, then they would not even have their own temporary (rhetorical) foundation. But the question remains: How can an anti-foundationalist, speaking from a relative foundation, generalize to the conclusion that all foundations are relative? They are indeed asserting "the impossibility of [absolute] foundational assertion."
So the
anti-foundationalists must leave room for challenges to their thesis itself,
which means "anti-foundationalism can without contradiction include itself
under its own scope and await the objections one might make to it; . . ."
This idea that "anti-foundationalism can . . . include itself under its
own scope" sounds skewed, incidentally. What would it mean to have a
relative principle that applies to itself? A temporary law that is subject to itself?
Anyway, even though anti-foundationalism must leave itself open to attack, Fish
says, it must also "successfully" meet and turn back objections. So
the question in the final analysis is whether Fish successfully answers the
objection that anti-foundationalism is self-contradictory. If he does not, then
his position must be deemed untenable.
The grand conclusion Fish
makes concerning the common objection is: "anti-foundationalism can be
asserted as absolutely true since (at least for the time being) there is no
argument that holds the field against it [assuming he has been
successful]" (30). The major problem in this statement is with the word
absolutely. What he means is relatively. This is an example of equivocation. He
wants to use the stronger term in order to head off the charge that
anti-foundationalism cannot assert anything about foundations, or the lack
thereof. But what does "absolutely true" mean in a conceptual scheme
in which only truth relative to time and place exists? It must mean "relatively
true." One thing is for sure: He cannot mean that the truth of the
assertion of anti-foundationalism extends beyond a culturally relative vantage
point. That would make him a foundationalist of the sort he eschews. So the
truth of anti-foundationalism is relative to history and culture, not absolute
in any normal sense of the word. If it is relative, it is relative "for
the time being" and always. Therefore, anti-foundationalism cannot be
asserted as absolutely true, in the usual sense, without undercutting its own
thesis, which is that foundations are relative rather than absolute. There is
an argument that "holds the field against"
anti-foundationalists. It is the old
nemesis Fish is trying to refute: foundationalism which says foundations
"simply are," to use Fish's own words. These foundations of logic,
such as non©contradiction and causality, must be affirmed in order to deny
them, which is the absurdity of any attempt to relativize truth. To argue about
what truth is in particular instances is understandable, but to argue about
whether truth is at all seems to be on the level of a man who thinks he is a
poached egg.
Going down the anti-formalist road is simply an academic detour. Inevitably, one is led right back to the formalist road from which all begin. Anti-formalism is a temporary, purely theoretical, diversion that eventually gives way to the practical necessity of living life on common ground for both foundationalists and anti-foundationalists alike. If the anti-foundationalists were right, there would be no way know it. For one cannot, from a subjective (intracultural) foundation, extrapolate (to the assertion) that everybody is in a similar boat. Rather, everybody is in the same "boat." If there is no objective (intercultural) foundation for knowledge, then no one could look around and notice that fact because everybody would be stuck, so to speak, in a particular cultural context, blind to the rest of reality. There would be no cross-cultural knowledge at all, no communication or translation whatsoever without a common basis for it. Rather, the fact that there is cross-cultural knowledge proves there is an objective foundation for it. There is no possible world without logic, which is a necessary condition for any possible world, at whatever stage of development. The law of noncontradiction, e.g., applies universally whenever something is, even to a world without people. Being itself cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same relationship. It simply is. The anti-foundationalists can try and chip away at the foundation, but the foundation remains regardless of their best efforts to rid themselves of it.
