ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY:
THE MAN AND HIS ARGUMENTS
by
Dave Couric
Dallas Baptist University
College of Christian Faith and Living
THEO 6301-Historical Theology
Dr. Edmund Lacy
Spring 1991
"God is that being than which a
greater being cannot be conceived."
So is summed up the famous
"ontological" argument for the existence of God, set
forth systematically for the first time in history by St. Anselm of Canterbury,
noted philosopher-theologian and one of the most famous archbishops ever, who
lived almost a thousand years ago in Europe and was "one great thinker
during the Middle Ages."
Anselm, who crossed the Alps into France
at the age of 23 in search of learning and then became a monk, sought to
demonstrate the existence of God from the most fundamental of all concepts, the
nature of being. "The word ontological derives from the two Greek words
ontos, `being,' and logos, `knowledge.' Hence, the ontological argument is the
proof from the knowledge of the nature of being."
The great medieval teacher (ca.
1033-1109), born of noble family in what is now northern Italy, is
probably known best for his demonstration of God's existence through what is
generally regarded in philosophy as one of two "conclusive" arguments
by those who offer proof of the deity: the ontological and the "teleological." Anselm's main view, a priori--from the idea
of God as perfect and necessary being--was fully expounded in his major work,
Proslogion (or Proslogium, "Address"), a deductive discourse based on
the doctrine of correspondence, which says truth corresponds to reality. However, he also wrote another great work,
Monologion, (also Monologium, "Monologue"), an inductive soliloquy
from effect to cause, a form of the "cosmological" argument for the
existence of God and similar to the
teleological, or a posteriori--from experience--predication. The latter work on the nature and attributes
of God offers two major arguments, the proofs from goodness and existence.
Anselm, educated in the Benedictine order
at the abbey of Bec in Normandy where he was elected prior and abbot before
succeeding his teacher Lanfranc as archbishop of Canterbury in 1093, is also
well-known for his conception of the atonement of Christ, the satisfaction
theory, a form of which has been considered the orthodox Christian doctrine
throughout church history. Anselm wrote
Cur Deus Homo (Why God Became Man) to
explain the atonement, which was seen as an important doctrine to be understood
during his time. In that classic work,
Anselm takes the position that only by becoming a man could God truly suffer
for man. "God became man--took
human nature--precisely because in that nature He could suffer for sinful,
suffering humanity. As God, He cannot
suffer; that is why He became man."
In addition, Anselm wrote major treatises
on original sin and the freedom of the will as he sought to educate his
generation on biblical anthropology during
the years in which Bec became the first seat of learning in Europe.
His
arguments
Anselm's major contribution to historical
theology and philosophy is his development of what became one of the
traditional arguments for the existence of God, the ontological argument as
designated centuries later by Immanuel Kant, the classic phrase ("being
than which a greater cannot be conceived") of which was borrowed by Anselm
from Augustine ("something than which nothing more excellent or more
sublime exists"). This most fundamental theistic proof is
categorized under the Christian doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God,
"based on the maxim finitum non capax infinitum (the finite cannot
contain, or grasp, the infinite)."
According to proponents, the ontological
argument, from the idea of God, is not simply that if one can conceive of a
perfect being (or anything else), then it necessarily follows that such a being
exists, otherwise the conception itself would be impossible. This is the common error of those who would
quickly dismiss the entire argument as fallacious. Rather, the argument is that such a being
necessarily exists because the human mind cannot not conceive of such a being's
existence: it is impossible to truly have an idea of its nonexistence. The problem, so opponents of the argument
say, is that the whole argument may simply be begging the question, in which
case the agnostic philosopher Immanuel Kant was right in his critique of
Anselm's argument. Kant said conception
does not necessarily imply existence ("existence is not a
predicate").
If the "intellectual thesis of
agnosticism" (it is impossible for finite beings to know anything of the
infinite) is correct, then Kant and subsequent theistic opponents of the
ontological argument are right and apologetics per se is a futile exercise, at
least as a pre-evangelistic tool. Based on Romans 1:18-21, in which the apostle
Paul says "what can be known about God is plain" since he has
"shown it" through creation to all people, it can legitimately be
argued that it is impossible for finite beings not to know something of the
infinite. What is rejected by Anselm's
argument is the total incomprehensibility of God. He is indeed incomprehensible in an
exhaustive sense, but not in a partial sense.
Of course, any infinite knowledge (through both general and special
revelation) is only known by the finite as the infinite chooses to reveal it.
Opinions vary as to the value of arguments
to prove God exists, such as that of Anselm.
Cairns, representing a post-Kantian view, makes a case in point: "Though these and other intellectual
arguments for the existence of God do not conclusively demonstrate His
existence, they have a cumulative value in showing an intelligent person that
nothing is really explicable if God's existence is rejected." Nash asserts that the traditional arguments
for the existence of God, specifically the cosmological, can at most lead us to
a "finite First Cause," not necessarily to the perfect being of
Christianity and Anselm. If we
"adopt only the stance of natural theology and admit no privileged
information from any other source such as divine revelation," Nash writes
apparently in support of Kant's thesis, "we cannot . . . know that the
creator of this finite world is itself more than finite . . . ."
According to Nash, there are several
versions of the ontological argument, but the few "sound" ones are
too complicated for someone without an extensive background in philosophy to
understand. So he gives a simple version
and then comments, "Even though humans can never fully comprehend the
perfect essence of God, one thing is certain: if it is possible for us to think
of a being greater than the being we call God, then the lesser of the two
beings cannot be God." Of course, Anselm is not the only philosopher
who used the argument, although he was the first. "The ontological proof which was
originally conceived by Anselm in the 11th century was revived in the 17th
century by Descartes and Leibnitz."
On the incomprehensibility of God, Nash
writes, "While God is that being than which a greater being cannot be
conceived--while we will never be able to conceive of a being more perfect than
God--our concept of God will never include all that he is," to
which there seems no substantial disagreement on either side of the intramural
debate.
Even those who hold to the traditional
theistic proofs concede that the ontological argument as expressed by Anselm
and later by Descartes may have failed to state the argument fully. However, they are quick to point out that
both sides of the coin are implicitly there, if not explicitly stated as such: "The principal objection offered to
Anselm--that `idea' does not prove existence but only that existence is part of
the idea--is effective; but only because Anselm may not have stated the
argument fully. The full argument would
include the implicit observation that we cannot think of the nonexistence of
God. That proves God's existence,
inasmuch as the inability to think of or conceive of an entity's nonexistence
is the most compelling type of proof."
Although this criticism appears legitimate, it
is also true that Chapters 3 and 4 of Proslogium seem to include explicit
statements by Anselm of the proof of anything by its inconceivable
nonexistence. Regardless of whether Anselm stated the full
argument explicitly, the point is that by turning over the coin of God's
existence and nonexistence, "We yield by necessity to the impossibility of
the contrary." For what is the difference between conceiving
of God without existence and conceiving of a square without four sides, as
Norman Malcolm has pointed out? Both are logically impossible to think. So, perhaps self-existence is a
predicate. Necessary existence is an
attribute, or quality, in the case of a necessary being like God. In the final analysis, this is not really an
intellectual problem for Kant or anyone else.
He is not objective in his critique because it is a heart problem, a
problem of the will rather than the mind.
In effect, Anselm is saying that anyone
who thinks God may not exist has not even begun to understand the fundamental
concept of God. First of all, what
Anselm is not saying is that anything one can conceive of in the highest degree
must therefore exist in reality. He is
merely pointing out that "a being than which a greater cannot be
conceived" must exist in reality.
To Anselm, God was so great a being that to claim to conceive of his
nonexistence is tantamount to absurdity--that of affirming a nonexistent,
self-existent being. Similarly,
"square circle" is a statement with no corresponding conception in
mind or reality. It can be uttered but
not conceived. So what is inconceivable
cannot be real. God cannot not
exist. It is impossible that God does
not exist. Therefore, he exists.
Anselm and Descartes start with the
concept of God in their formulations of the ontological argument. In other words, given the idea, or concept,
of God, it is unthinkable that he does not exist. However, some argue that implicit within the
concept of God, which stays in the realm of idea, is the other side of the
coin, that is, the explicit observation that conclusively demonstrates, or
proves, that God exists: our inability
to not think of God. "We are simply
saying that the ultimate proof of both [Anselm's and Descartes' arguments] is
that that which we cannot not think is the proof of the actual existence of
anything." In other words, what we must by nature think,
without choice and universally, must in reality be true.
The
authors cite Jonathan Edwards as best representing their position, earlier
stated as "we cannot conceive of nonbeing." We cannot think of nonbeing for if we did, it
(nonbeing) would be, thus our conception would not be nonbeing, but being after
all, which is contradictory. Also
anticipating Edwards, they write, "Once we think of the possibility of
God, everything is proven. To think of being is to know being. We are conscious of being. However we think, we cannot think anything
but being. We are immediately aware of
Him. The awareness of being is even
logically prior to our awareness of ourselves.
To be aware of ourselves, we must be aware of being which pervades our
being and all other beings. Before we
are aware of the world, we are aware of Being which pervades all other
beings. Pure being must uphold and
sustain `beings,' finite limited, creaturely beings. Even before being aware of the laws of logic,
we are aware of being because logic has being before it has the form of its
being."
The point is, we cannot go from nonbeing
to being. We start with being, not
ourselves. As Carl F.H. Henry once put
it, we cannot go from "non-God to God," which
seems to be identical in concept with "nonbeing to being," even
though Henry is classified ultimately as a "fideist" in Classical
Apologetics. The book claims that although Henry
criticizes presuppositionalism to an extent, he nevertheless falls into that
category of fideism by failing to embrace reason as having an indispensable and
independent role in the unregenerate mind, which is said to lead to
anti-intellectualism. In short, the proponents of the ontological
argument are not saying God exists because we have an idea of him. They are saying that because we cannot
conceive of the nonexistence of infinite being, God must exist. "It [perfect being] exists not because
we have an idea of it, but because we cannot not have an idea of it . . . . We
cannot think of pure nonbeing or nothing."
Edwards put it (in his work on freedom of the will) like this: "That there should be nothing at all is
utterly impossible."
Other conservative Christian apologists
take an alternate view. For example,
Norman Geisler apparently can conceive of nothing when he writes, "It is
logically possible there is no God." If the statement "nothing exists"
is logically possible, then he is right and the ontological argument, along with
all its implications, falls. However, if
it is irrational to propose the nonexistence of everything, then the Anselmian
proof, or at least some form of it, stands as logically necessary and
conclusive. To conceive of nothing is
literally, or logically, impossible.
Therefore, "what is contradictory [the thought of nothing] could
not possibly be true," as Geisler points out elsewhere in his book. To say "nothing exists" is the same
as "the nonexistence of everything ontologically is logically possible,"
which is an internally inconsistent and incoherent statement that violates the
law of noncontradiction.
Geisler later states, "For the
rational is not the real and neither is the rationally inescapable the real . .
. ." But the correspondence theory of truth states
that whatever is true is real because truth corresponds to reality. If the "rationally inescapable" is
true, then it is real. Again, Geisler
insists, ". . . it is a logical possibility that nothing ever existed
including God. For the nonexistence of
everything is a logically conceivable state of affairs." He argues that God's existence is only a
conceptual necessity, not an actual one.
But with God, there is only pure actuality, no potentiality. Then, a few pages later, in discussing
"The Principle of Causality Is Justifiable," Geisler says, ". .
. I am a possible existence, that is, one that exists but might possibly not
exist. But whatever is only in
potentiality to being must have a cause.
For the potential is not the actual; no potential can actualize itself .
. . . Hence, whatever exists but might not exist is caused to exist by
another." So the question remains: How can God, actual
existence that he is, possibly not exist?
He would have to be a potential being, according to Geisler's own
account. Elsewhere, the author argues
that ". . . reason is only capable of demonstrating what is possible, not
actual. Reason can only rule out beliefs
or systems that are inherently inconsistent." But in the case of God alone, reason
demonstrates eternal Reason, the logos of John 1. Indeed, it is those who take logic to the
extreme of positing the possible nonexistence of the necessarily existent God
who are elevating reason to a rationalistic level--not so with those who stop short
of the notion that nothing can really be conceived.
The standard argument, then, against
Anselm seems to be that tautologies yield no information about existence in
reality. As Colin Brown writes,
"...merely to define a thing does not mean to say that it exists. Definitions do not tell us anything about
reality, unless they are confirmed by observation." However, definitions do tell us something
about reality in at least one sense. The
three sides of a triangle tell us that in reality a four-sided triangle cannot
exist. Neither is it possible to posit
in reality the nonexistence of God, a necessary being.
In Kant's classic Critique of Pure Reason,
the work that began his self-described "Copernican Revolution" in
philosophy and theology, he makes the assertion that existence is not a
predicate, or property, of anything, including God. However, Descartes insisted that existence is
a quality only of God, not objects. Perhaps Descartes was right and existence is
a predicate only in the case of God, who is existence per se, or necessary
being. Here alone, "existence and
essence are conjoined." Kant
simply makes the arbitrary decision to throw the proverbial baby out with the
bath water as explained by Stumpf:
"Moreover, to deny that God exists is not simply to deny a
predicate but to abandon the subject and thereby all the predicates that go
with it, and `if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no
contradiction; for nothing is then left to be contradicted.'" Kant obviously sees no contradiction in the
conception of nothing, as he writes, ". . . for there is nothing at all,
and therefore no means of forming a contradiction." Kant is apparently able to conceive of
nothing, without contradiction, even though to conceive is to be, the opposite
of nothing, or nonbeing. To claim to
conceive of that which is inconceivable, nothing, is absurd and of course
contradictory. In the context of the
preceding quote from Kant, he is explaining how it is possible, in his mind, to
dismiss the subject, "God," and the predicate, "necessary
being," not independently which he admits would contradict-- but
together, in which case he sees no contradiction since there would be
"nothing left." He goes on to
declare, "And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary
being. Annihilate its existence in
thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates; how then
can there be any room for contradiction?"
So, by throwing the baby (God) out with
the bath water (existence and all other predicates), Kant thinks God out of
existence! Surely he is not thinking of
Anselm's "being than which a greater is inconceivable." Kant's god is too small. The critic of pure reason fails in his
attempt to critique it. The celebrated
Kantian argument against the "celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument
for the existence of a Supreme Being . . ." (Kant's words) is therefore
". . . insufficient . . ." itself!
In brief, if God is to be conceived, only
the greatest possible existent being will suffice in real correspondence to the
mind's image. Furthermore, the proof is
in the absolute necessity of yielding to the impossibility of the
contrary. If the only way to conceive of
God not existing is to do the impossible by conceiving of nonbeing, then the
only alternative is that it is logically impossible for God not to exist, which
means he must and does in fact exist in reality. Therefore, the ontological argument is valid
insofar as it proves God cannot not exist.
This negative type of proof, in turn, demonstrates that the only other
option is conclusively true. When the
fool of Psalms 14 and 53 says in his heart, "There is no God," he
does so with fallacious logic in his mind, not just on the basis of the
teleological or cosmological arguments, but most fundamentally on the
ontological level.
The atonement seems to overshadow
Anselm's thinking in the area of theology.
Witness his famous argument that for man's redemption there must be that
satisfaction "which God only can, and man only should, make;"
therefore, "it is needful that it should be made by one who is both God
and man."
Anselm's tendency to place a great deal of
emphasis on the atonement is not unlike that of the New Testament itself, which
central theme is the person and work of Christ as reflected in Paul's writing
in I Corinthians 2:2 that he "decided to know nothing among you except
Jesus Christ and him crucified" (RSV).
Furthermore, Matthew 1:21 reveals the central concern and mission of
Christ: ". . . for he will save his
people from their sins" (RSV).
According to Cairns, "Anselm's view
of the Atonement was commercial, but his view dominated orthodox thinking
until the time of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century; and it ended the
patristic view of the Atonement as a ransom paid to Satan." Berkhof sums up Anselm's understanding of the
atonement thusly: "The alpha and
omega of the position of Anselm is the absolute necessity of the atonement for
the redemption of man . . . . He finds the ultimate ground for it in the honour
of God." Although Anselm improves on the patristic
view, his explanation of the atonement falls short of the reformers' position,
Berkhof explains. "The theory of
Anselm marks an important advance in the development of the doctrine of the
atonement. Its real value lies in the
fact that it establishes the objective character of the atonement and bases its
necessity on the immutable nature of God, which makes it impossible that He
should permit the violation of His honour to go unpunished. It is defective, however, as compared with
the later penal substitutionary doctrine, . . . . This is really the Roman
Catholic idea of penance applied to the work of Christ . . ."
The Anselmian satisfaction theory of the
atonement includes the biblical concept of propitiation, as Gerstner explains
in comparing Jonathan Edwards' nearly identical view: "According to Anselm, sin is dishonoring
the majesty of God, the sovereign, so satisfaction must be offered. Christ, through his death and suffering,
offers satisfaction to the offended God." John Calvin echoes the general Anselmian
position when the Genevan pastor writes of the work of Christ: "But because the righteous curse
prevents our access to [God], and God in his character of Judge is offended
with us, --in order that our Priest may appease the wrath of God, and procure
favour for us, there is a necessity for the intervention of an atonement . . .
. by the sacrifice of his death, he has abolished our guilt, and made
satisfaction for our sins."
Historically, the church has viewed the
atonement on the cross as crucial, which comes from the Latin word for
cross. It is necessary that atonement be
made because of the penalty for sin and impending judgment. Although God's wrath is directed toward us in
sin, his love for us moved him to place that anger on Christ at the cross in
substitution for us and in satisfaction of the requirement that our sins be
punished. The "ransom," God
the Son, is paid to God the Father, not Satan, as erroneously thought by some
in early church history. Christ is the
substitute, paying our debt. It is we
who should have faced the unmitigated wrath of God, but it is Christ who
actually did so on the cross as Galatians 3:13 points out: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of
the law by becoming a curse for us, for it is written: `Cursed is everyone who
is hung on a tree'"(NIV).
Whether the atonement was a conditional
one dependent upon the response of the individual has been the subject of
debate within the church at least since the fifth century when Augustine and
Pelagius argued over the design of the atoning work of Christ. Both viewed it as sufficient for all, but
efficient for those who are saved.
However, the Augustinians have seen the atonement as limited, intended
only for those who will believe, while the Pelagians' view is universal in that
the atonement was to make it possible for each individual to choose as an
exercise of free will, thereby appropriating the atonement as effective.
The contemporary alternative to the
historic, orthodox position is probably represented well by Paul Newman, secretary
for interfaith dialogue for the United Church of Canada, who sees the atonement
as "royal metaphor," rather than a "basically unbiblical"
view of substitution to satisfy God's requirement of punishment for sin. Atonement, for Newman, is an understanding of
Jesus as a "representative," not substitutionary, figure. He asserts, "Jesus' self-sacrifice was
catalytic `royal' action that represents all who identify with it."
Anselm views original sin as
"that of the individual in the present condition of things." The medieval teacher distinguishes between
original sin and later actual sin, as Berkhof explains: "Original sin therefore has its origin
in a sin of nature, while later actual sin is altogether individual in
character."
As to why only the first sin of Adam is
imputed to his posterity, and not his later sins, Berkhof writes, ". . .
in Adam the guilt of nature, that is, original sin, rests upon the guilt of the
individual, while in his posterity the guilt of the individual rests upon the
guilt of nature."
Thus, Anselm's view of sin appears to be a
thoroughly biblical one. Adam's first
sin resulted in the punishment of death, which was then passed on to all people
since we were considered guilty in Adam.
In this way, a distinction is made between the "first sin" of
Adam and Eve and "original sin," which is the state of depravity
passed on to everyone as a result of that first sin. "Original sin is the sin nature, whereby
I am wholly inclined to rebellion against God." Just as Adam's representative disobedience
brought God's death sentence to us, so Christ's obedience brought us God's
justification and resurrection life, which is greater than our sin nature.
Along the same lines of reasoning as that
for original sin, Anselm did not accept the popular definition of freedom of
the will: the power of sinning or
not sinning. On his view, the more power
not to sin, the more freedom. Berkhof
notes, "He held that the will which, of itself and without external
compulsion, is so strongly determined to the right as to be unable to desert
the path of rectitude, is freer than the will which is so feebly determined to
the right as to be able to depart from the way of righteousness."
Consequently, Anselm did not look at the
fall as a free act: ". . . not an
act of genuine freedom," Berkhof says.
"They sinned, not because of their freedom, but in spite of it, . .
. . The true end and destination of the will is not to choose either good or
evil, but to choose the good."
Again, Anselm seems right on target
concerning the freedom of the will. Of
course, he is emphasizing the freedom to choose good, which could only come
after conversion, through the power of the Spirit. As for the unregenerate, we would prefer
Jonathan Edwards' view that fallen man is always free to do what he wants. The problem is that we only want to sin,
until God intervenes graciously and changes our depraved hearts. Therefore, we can say that our sin nature
severely limits our freedom, and only by supernatural means may we do truly
righteous acts.
The man
In biographical summary, Anselm's tenure
as archbishop was characterized by a strong emphasis on the church's rights
over and against the king of England. As
evidenced by his appeal to rational demonstration, Anselm stood against the
anti-intellectualism of his day. He is
considered the father of scholasticism since his emphasis on the reasonableness
of faith led to and anticipated the scholasticism of the 12th and 13th
centuries as represented mainly by Thomas Aquinas. Although Anselm held firmly to the maxim
credo ut intelligam ("I believe in order that I may understand"), he
nevertheless placed a great deal of emphasis on the complementary relationship
of faith and reason, where "faith provides conclusions which reason,
assured of their truth, can often prove necessary . . . . Anselm's arguments,
therefore, are meant as compelling to any rational mind. To judge them on purely intellectual grounds
is to judge them as Anselm would have had them judged."
Anselm's theology, which central theme was
the relation of creatures to the creator, was in the Augustinian tradition with
an apologetic accent. His systematic
method was characterized by "a subtle analysis of Christian doctrines . .
. designed to demonstrate the logical coherence of the Christian faith." The radical distinction between philosophy
and theology later characteristic of scholasticism was not prevalent in
Anselm's time. "Taken as a whole,
Anselm's work can be said to move from what we should readily identify as
philosophical to more specifically Christian and theological themes . . . .
From start to finish," however, "his speculative thought is an
analysis of the logical structure of Christian faith, rather than an attempt to
discover religious truth by philosophical argument." To Anselm, no doubt, a distinction between
"religious" and "philosophical" truth would have been
superfluous.
Standing at the juncture of the Great and
Little St. Bernard routes, Anselm's hometown of Aosta, Lombardy, in the
Piedmont region of northwest Italy, was a strategic center of importance. His parents were of nobility: mother
Ermenberga of the Burgundian family, who owned considerable property in Aosta,
and father Gondolfo, a Lombard nobleman.
Anselm's monastic life was opposed by his father, who from the beginning
wanted his son to go into politics. At
the same time, Anselm received the best in classical schooling and was one of
the foremost Latinists of his day as evidenced by his clear and precise
writing. In his later years, Anselm's
health was poor, perhaps due to such intense study throughout his life.
In 1056, Anselm left Aosta to enter the
Norman Benedictine monastery of Bec, which was located between Rouen and
Lisieux in Normandy, France. He had
heard about the teacher Lanfranc, who was later archbishop of Canterbury after
the Norman conquest of England in 1066.
Anselm stayed at Lyons, Cluny, and Avranches for a few years until
Lanfranc returned from Rome to the abbey.
After taking his monastic vows in 1061, Anselm distinguished himself and
became prior, then abbot in 1078. Bec
then became the center of monastic learning as Anselm far excelled
Lanfranc. Anselm wrote Monologion at the
request of fellow monks, then Proslogion, which was originally titled Faith
Seeking Understanding.
Anselm was named archbishop of Canterbury
when he founded the priory at Chester on visits to the abbey's English lands
given through benefactions of William I the Conqueror. William II (Rufus) named Anselm archbishop,
which gave him a chance to try and reform the English church. Anselm at first refused consecration until
William restored Canterbury lands and acknowledged Urban II, then opposed by
the antipope Clement III. Near death,
William agreed, and Anselm was consecrated on December 4, 1093. However, when William recovered from his
illness, he demanded money, which Anselm refused to give. As a result, William would not allow Anselm
to get official papal approval in Rome for the archbishopric appointment. William wanted complete domination of the
church. The symbol of papal approval,
the "pallium," was in dispute, and the English bishops sided with the
king, against Anselm. Finally, the king
let Anselm leave for Rome, but immediately seized the lands again. Anselm presented grievances against the king
to the pope, defended the traditional doctrine of Filioque ("and from the
son") against the Greeks, and was active in the sessions of the Council of
Bari (1098) which reapproved the decrees against lay investiture. That same year Anselm went to the village of
Liberi, near Capua, and completed Cur Deus Homo before attending a council at
the Lateran Easter 1099.
Meanwhile, Henry, brother of William
Rufus, seized the throne when William was murdered in 1100. Henry was subsequently supported by Anselm
until the archbishop was exiled over a disagreement on investing prelates with
the spiritual insignia of their office.
The dispute was settled in 1107 at the synod of Westminster. Anselm spent the last two years of his life
in peace and died on April 21, 1109, perhaps at Canterbury in Kent,
England. He was probably canonized in
1163, when Archbishop Thomas Beckett referred Anselm's cause to Rome. Declared a doctor, or teacher, of the church
in 1720 when Clement XI extended his mass and office to the whole church,
Anselm's feast day is April 21.
According to A.H. Strong, Anselm was a
"pious" soul in an age of "papal darkness." Strong points this out in his systematic
theology, that Anselm and others continued to hold fast to the biblical
doctrine of justification by faith alone, by quoting from a tract that Anselm
wrote for the consolation of the dying:
"Question.
Dost thou believe that the Lord Jesus died for thee? Answer.
I believe it. Qu. Dost thou thank him for his passion and
death? Ans. I believe it." And then Anselm addresses the dying man: "Come then, while life remaineth in
thee: in his death alone place thy whole
trust; in naught else place any trust; to his death commit thyself wholly; with
this alone cover thyself wholly; and if the Lord thy God will to judge thee,
say, `Lord, between thy judgment and me I present the death of our Lord Jesus
Christ; no otherwise can I contend with thee.'
And if he shall say that thou art a sinner, say thou: `Lord, I interpose the death of our Lord
Jesus Christ between my sins and thee.'
If he say that thou has deserved condemnation, say: `Lord, I set the death of our Lord Jesus
Christ between my evil deserts and thee, and his merits I offer for those which
I ought to have and have not.' If he say
that he is wroth with thee, say: `Lord,
I oppose the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thy wrath and me.' And when thou has completed this, say
again: `Lord, I set the death of our
Lord Jesus Christ between thee and me.'"
See Anselm, Opera (Migne), 1:686, 687.
The above quotation gives us reason to believe that the New Testament
doctrine of justification by faith was implicitly, if not explicitly, held by
many pious souls through all the ages of papal darkness.
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