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Sunday, March 08, 2020

 

St. Anselm of Canterbury: The Man and His Arguments









ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY:

THE MAN AND HIS ARGUMENTS

by

Dave Couric




















Dallas Baptist University

College of Christian Faith and Living

THEO 6301-Historical Theology

Dr. Edmund Lacy

Spring 1991

      "God is that being than which a greater being cannot be conceived."
      So is summed up the famous "ontological" argument for the existence of God,[1] set forth systematically for the first time in history by St. Anselm of Canterbury, noted philosopher-theologian and one of the most famous archbishops ever, who lived almost a thousand years ago in Europe and was "one great thinker during the Middle Ages."[2]
      Anselm, who crossed the Alps into France at the age of 23 in search of learning and then became a monk, sought to demonstrate the existence of God from the most fundamental of all concepts, the nature of being. "The word ontological derives from the two Greek words ontos, `being,' and logos, `knowledge.' Hence, the ontological argument is the proof from the knowledge of the nature of being."[3]
      The great medieval teacher (ca. 1033-1109), born of noble family in what is now northern Italy,[4] is probably known best for his demonstration of God's existence through what is generally regarded in philosophy as one of two "conclusive" arguments by those who offer proof of the deity: the ontological and the "teleologi­cal."  Anselm's main view, a priori--from the idea of God as perfect and necessary being--was fully expounded in his major work, Proslogion (or Proslogium, "Address"), a deductive discourse based on the doctrine of correspon­dence, which says truth corresponds to reality.  However, he also wrote another great work, Monologion, (also Monologium, "Monologue"), an inductive soliloquy from effect to cause, a form of the "cosmolog­ical" argument for the existence of God[5] and similar to the teleological, or a posteriori--from experience--predication.  The latter work on the nature and attributes of God offers two major arguments, the proofs from goodness and existence.
      Anselm, educated in the Benedictine order at the abbey of Bec in Normandy where he was elected prior and abbot before succeeding his teacher Lanfranc as archbishop of Canterbury in 1093,[6] is also well-known for his conception of the atonement of Christ, the satisfaction theory, a form of which has been considered the orthodox Christian doctrine throughout church history.  Anselm wrote Cur Deus Homo (Why God Became Man)[7] to explain the atonement, which was seen as an important doctrine to be understood during his time.  In that classic work, Anselm takes the position that only by becoming a man could God truly suffer for man.  "God became man--took human nature--precisely because in that nature He could suffer for sinful, suffering humanity.  As God, He cannot suffer; that is why He became man."[8]
      In addition, Anselm wrote major treatises on original sin and the freedom of the will as he sought to educate his generation on biblical anthropology[9] during the years in which Bec became the first seat of learning in Europe.

His arguments
      Anselm's major contribution to historical theology and philosophy is his develop­ment of what became one of the traditional arguments for the existence of God, the ontological argument as designated centuries later by Immanuel Kant, the classic phrase ("being than which a greater cannot be conceived") of which was borrowed by Anselm from Augustine ("some­thing than which nothing more excellent or more sublime exists").[10]  This most fundamental theistic proof is categorized under the Christian doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God, "based on the maxim finitum non capax infinitum (the finite cannot contain, or grasp, the infinite)."[11]
      According to proponents, the ontological argument, from the idea of God, is not simply that if one can conceive of a perfect being (or anything else), then it necessarily follows that such a being exists, otherwise the conception itself would be impossible.  This is the common error of those who would quickly dismiss the entire argument as fallacious.  Rather, the argument is that such a being necessarily exists because the human mind cannot not conceive of such a being's existence: it is impossible to truly have an idea of its nonexistence.  The problem, so opponents of the argument say, is that the whole argument may simply be begging the question, in which case the agnostic philosopher Immanuel Kant was right in his critique of Anselm's argument.  Kant said conception does not necessarily imply existence ("existence is not a predicate"). 
      If the "intellectual thesis of agnosticism" (it is impossible for finite beings to know anything of the infinite) is correct, then Kant and subsequent theistic opponents of the ontological argument are right and apologetics per se is a futile exercise, at least as a pre-evangelistic tool.[12]  Based on Romans 1:18-21, in which the apostle Paul says "what can be known about God is plain" since he has "shown it" through creation to all people, it can legitimately be argued that it is impossible for finite beings not to know something of the infinite.  What is rejected by Anselm's argument is the total incomprehensibility of God.  He is indeed incom­prehensible in an exhaustive sense, but not in a partial sense.  Of course, any infinite knowledge (through both general and special revelation) is only known by the finite as the infinite chooses to reveal it.
      Opinions vary as to the value of arguments to prove God exists, such as that of Anselm.  Cairns, representing a post-Kantian view, makes a case in point:  "Though these and other intellectual arguments for the existence of God do not conclusively demonstrate His existence, they have a cumulative value in showing an intelli­gent person that nothing is really explicable if God's existence is rejected."[13]  Nash asserts that the traditional arguments for the existence of God, specifically the cosmological, can at most lead us to a "finite First Cause," not necessarily to the perfect being of Christianity and Anselm.  If we "adopt only the stance of natural theology and admit no privileged information from any other source such as divine revelation," Nash writes apparently in support of Kant's thesis, "we cannot . . . know that the creator of this finite world is itself more than finite . . . ."[14]
      According to Nash, there are several versions of the ontologi­cal argument, but the few "sound" ones are too complicated for someone without an extensive background in philosophy to understand.  So he gives a simple version and then comments, "Even though humans can never fully comprehend the perfect essence of God, one thing is certain: if it is possible for us to think of a being greater than the being we call God, then the lesser of the two beings cannot be God."[15]  Of course, Anselm is not the only philosopher who used the argument, although he was the first.  "The ontological proof which was originally conceived by Anselm in the 11th century was revived in the 17th century by Descartes and Leibnitz."[16]
      On the incomprehensibility of God, Nash writes, "While God is that being than which a greater being cannot be conceived--while we will never be able to conceive of a being more perfect than God--our concept of God will never include all that he is,"[17] to which there seems no substantial disagreement on either side of the intramural debate.
      Even those who hold to the traditional theistic proofs concede that the ontological argument as expressed by Anselm and later by Descartes may have failed to state the argument fully.  However, they are quick to point out that both sides of the coin are implicitly there, if not explicitly stated as such:  "The principal objection offered to Anselm--that `idea' does not prove existence but only that existence is part of the idea--is effective; but only because Anselm may not have stated the argument fully.  The full argument would include the implicit observation that we cannot think of the nonexistence of God.  That proves God's existence, inasmuch as the inability to think of or conceive of an entity's nonexistence is the most compelling type of proof."[18]
       Although this criticism appears legitimate, it is also true that Chapters 3 and 4 of Proslogium seem to include explicit statements by Anselm of the proof of anything by its inconceiv­able nonexistence.[19]  Regardless of whether Anselm stated the full argument explicitly, the point is that by turning over the coin of God's existence and nonexistence, "We yield by necessity to the impossibility of the contrary."[20]  For what is the difference between conceiving of God without existence and conceiving of a square without four sides, as Norman Malcolm has pointed out?[21]  Both are logically impossible to think.  So, perhaps self-existence is a predicate.  Necessary existence is an attribute, or quality, in the case of a necessary being like God.  In the final analysis, this is not really an intellectual problem for Kant or anyone else.  He is not objective in his critique because it is a heart problem, a problem of the will rather than the mind.
      In effect, Anselm is saying that anyone who thinks God may not exist has not even begun to understand the fundamental concept of God.  First of all, what Anselm is not saying is that anything one can conceive of in the highest degree must therefore exist in reality.  He is merely pointing out that "a being than which a greater cannot be conceived" must exist in reality.    To Anselm, God was so great a being that to claim to conceive of his nonexis­tence is tantamount to absurdity--that of affirming a nonexistent, self-existent being.  Similarly, "square circle" is a statement with no correspond­ing conception in mind or reality.  It can be uttered but not conceived.  So what is inconceivable cannot be real.  God cannot not exist.  It is impossible that God does not exist.  Therefore, he exists.
      Anselm and Descartes start with the concept of God in their formulations of the ontological argument.  In other words, given the idea, or concept, of God, it is unthinkable that he does not exist.[22]  However, some argue that implicit within the concept of God, which stays in the realm of idea, is the other side of the coin, that is, the explicit observation that conclusively demon­strates, or proves, that God exists:  our inability to not think of God.  "We are simply saying that the ultimate proof of both [Anselm's and Descartes' arguments] is that that which we cannot not think is the proof of the actual existence of anything."[23]  In other words, what we must by nature think, without choice and universally, must in reality be true.
       The authors cite Jonathan Edwards as best representing their position, earlier stated as "we cannot conceive of nonbeing."[24]  We cannot think of nonbeing for if we did, it (nonbeing) would be, thus our conception would not be nonbeing, but being after all, which is contradictory.  Also anticipating Edwards, they write, "Once we think of the possibility of God, everything is proven. To think of being is to know being.  We are conscious of being.  However we think, we cannot think anything but being.  We are immediately aware of Him.  The awareness of being is even logically prior to our awareness of ourselves.  To be aware of ourselves, we must be aware of being which pervades our being and all other beings.  Before we are aware of the world, we are aware of Being which pervades all other beings.  Pure being must uphold and sustain `beings,' finite limited, creaturely beings.  Even before being aware of the laws of logic, we are aware of being because logic has being before it has the form of its being."[25]
      The point is, we cannot go from nonbeing to being.  We start with being, not ourselves.  As Carl F.H. Henry once put it, we cannot go from "non-God to God,"[26] which seems to be identical in concept with "nonbeing to being," even though Henry is classified ultimately as a "fideist" in Classical Apologetics.[27]  The book claims that although Henry criticizes presup­positionalism to an extent, he nevertheless falls into that category of fideism by failing to embrace reason as having an indispensable and independent role in the unregenerate mind, which is said to lead to anti-intellectualism.[28]  In short, the proponents of the ontological argument are not saying God exists because we have an idea of him.  They are saying that because we cannot conceive of the nonexistence of infinite being, God must exist.  "It [perfect being] exists not because we have an idea of it, but because we cannot not have an idea of it . . . . We cannot think of pure nonbeing or nothing."  Edwards put it (in his work on freedom of the will) like this:  "That there should be nothing at all is utterly impossible."[29]
      Other conservative Christian apologists take an alternate view.  For example, Norman Geisler apparently can conceive of nothing when he writes, "It is logically possible there is no God."[30]  If the statement "nothing exists" is logically possible, then he is right and the ontological argument, along with all its implications, falls.  However, if it is irrational to propose the nonexistence of everything, then the Anselmian proof, or at least some form of it, stands as logically necessary and conclusive.  To conceive of nothing is literally, or logically, impossible.  Therefore, "what is contradictory [the thought of nothing] could not possibly be true," as Geisler points out elsewhere in his book.[31]  To say "nothing exists" is the same as "the nonexistence of everything ontologically is logically possible," which is an internally inconsistent and incoherent statement that violates the law of nonc­ontradiction.
      Geisler later states, "For the rational is not the real and neither is the rationally inescapable the real . . . ."[32]  But the correspondence theory of truth states that whatever is true is real because truth corresponds to reality.  If the "rationally inescap­able" is true, then it is real.  Again, Geisler insists, ". . . it is a logical possibility that nothing ever existed including God.  For the nonexistence of everything is a logically conceivable state of affairs."[33]  He argues that God's existence is only a conceptu­al necessity, not an actual one.  But with God, there is only pure actuality, no potentiality.  Then, a few pages later, in discussing "The Principle of Causality Is Justifiable," Geisler says, ". . . I am a possible existence, that is, one that exists but might possibly not exist.  But whatever is only in potentiality to being must have a cause.  For the potential is not the actual; no potential can actualize itself . . . . Hence, whatever exists but might not exist is caused to exist by another."[34]  So the question remains: How can God, actual existence that he is, possibly not exist?  He would have to be a potential being, according to Geisler's own account.  Elsewhere, the author argues that ". . . reason is only capable of demonstrating what is possible, not actual.  Reason can only rule out beliefs or systems that are inherently inconsistent."[35]  But in the case of God alone, reason demonstrates eternal Reason, the logos of John 1.  Indeed, it is those who take logic to the extreme of positing the possible nonexistence of the necessarily existent God who are elevating reason to a rationalistic level--not so with those who stop short of the notion that nothing can really be conceived.
      The standard argument, then, against Anselm seems to be that tautologies yield no information about existence in reality.  As Colin Brown writes, "...merely to define a thing does not mean to say that it exists.  Definitions do not tell us anything about reality, unless they are confirmed by observation."[36]  However, definitions do tell us something about reality in at least one sense.  The three sides of a triangle tell us that in reality a four-sided triangle cannot exist.  Neither is it possible to posit in reality the nonexistence of God, a necessary being.
      In Kant's classic Critique of Pure Reason, the work that began his self-described "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy and theology, he makes the assertion that existence is not a predicate, or property, of anything, including God.  However, Descartes insisted that existence is a quality only of God, not objects.[37]  Perhaps Descartes was right and existence is a predicate only in the case of God, who is existence per se, or necessary being.  Here alone, "existence and essence are conjoined."[38]        Kant simply makes the arbitrary decision to throw the proverbial baby out with the bath water as explained by Stumpf:  "Moreover, to deny that God exists is not simply to deny a predicate but to abandon the subject and thereby all the predicates that go with it, and `if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction; for nothing is then left to be contradicted.'"[39]  Kant obviously sees no contradiction in the conception of nothing, as he writes, ". . . for there is nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming a contradiction."[40]  Kant is apparently able to conceive of nothing, without contradiction, even though to conceive is to be, the opposite of nothing, or nonbeing.  To claim to conceive of that which is inconceivable, nothing, is absurd and of course contradic­tory.  In the context of the preceding quote from Kant, he is explaining how it is possible, in his mind, to dismiss the subject, "God," and the predicate, "necessary being," not indepen­dently which he admits would contradict-- but together, in which case he sees no contradiction since there would be "nothing left."  He goes on to declare, "And so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being.  Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates; how then can there be any room for contradiction?"[41] 
      So, by throwing the baby (God) out with the bath water (existence and all other predicates), Kant thinks God out of existence!  Surely he is not thinking of Anselm's "being than which a greater is inconceivable."  Kant's god is too small.  The critic of pure reason fails in his attempt to critique it.  The celebrated Kantian argument against the "celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme Being . . ." (Kant's words) is therefore ". . . insufficient . . ." itself![42]
      In brief, if God is to be conceived, only the greatest possible existent being will suffice in real correspondence to the mind's image.  Furthermore, the proof is in the absolute necessity of yielding to the impossibility of the contrary.  If the only way to conceive of God not existing is to do the impossible by conceiv­ing of nonbeing, then the only alternative is that it is logically impossible for God not to exist, which means he must and does in fact exist in reality.  Therefore, the ontological argument is valid insofar as it proves God cannot not exist.  This negative type of proof, in turn, demonstrates that the only other option is conclu­sively true.  When the fool of Psalms 14 and 53 says in his heart, "There is no God," he does so with fallacious logic in his mind, not just on the basis of the teleological or cosmological arguments, but most fundamentally on the ontological level.

      The atonement seems to overshadow Anselm's thinking in the area of theology.  Witness his famous argument that for man's redemption there must be that satisfaction "which God only can, and man only should, make;" therefore, "it is needful that it should be made by one who is both God and man."[43]
      Anselm's tendency to place a great deal of emphasis on the atonement is not unlike that of the New Testament itself, which central theme is the person and work of Christ as reflected in Paul's writing in I Corinthians 2:2 that he "decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and him crucified" (RSV).  Further­more, Matthew 1:21 reveals the central concern and mission of Christ:  ". . . for he will save his people from their sins" (RSV).[44]
      According to Cairns, "Anselm's view of the Atonement was commer­cial, but his view dominated orthodox thinking until the time of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century; and it ended the patristic view of the Atonement as a ransom paid to Satan."[45]  Berkhof sums up Anselm's understanding of the atonement thusly:  "The alpha and omega of the position of Anselm is the absolute necessity of the atonement for the redemption of man . . . . He finds the ultimate ground for it in the honour of God."[46]  Al­though Anselm improves on the patristic view, his explanation of the atonement falls short of the reformers' position, Berkhof explains.  "The theory of Anselm marks an important advance in the development of the doctrine of the atonement.  Its real value lies in the fact that it establishes the objective character of the atonement and bases its necessity on the immutable nature of God, which makes it impossible that He should permit the violation of His honour to go unpunished.  It is defective, however, as compared with the later penal substitutionary doctrine, . . . . This is really the Roman Catholic idea of penance applied to the work of Christ . . ."[47]
      The Anselmian satisfaction theory of the atonement includes the biblical concept of propitiation, as Gerstner explains in comparing Jonathan Edwards' nearly identical view:  "According to Anselm, sin is dishonoring the majesty of God, the sovereign, so satisfaction must be offered.  Christ, through his death and suffering, offers satisfaction to the offended God."[48]  John Calvin echoes the general Anselmian position when the Genevan pastor writes of the work of Christ:  "But because the righteous curse prevents our access to [God], and God in his character of Judge is offended with us, --in order that our Priest may appease the wrath of God, and procure favour for us, there is a necessity for the intervention of an atonement . . . . by the sacrifice of his death, he has abolished our guilt, and made satisfaction for our sins."[49]
      Historically, the church has viewed the atonement on the cross as crucial, which comes from the Latin word for cross.  It is necessary that atonement be made because of the penalty for sin and impending judgment.  Although God's wrath is directed toward us in sin, his love for us moved him to place that anger on Christ at the cross in substitution for us and in satisfaction of the requirement that our sins be punished.  The "ransom," God the Son, is paid to God the Father, not Satan, as erroneously thought by some in early church history.  Christ is the substitute, paying our debt.  It is we who should have faced the unmitigated wrath of God, but it is Christ who actually did so on the cross as Galatians 3:13 points out:  "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, for it is written: `Cursed is everyone who is hung on a tree'"(NIV).[50] 
      Whether the atonement was a conditional one dependent upon the response of the individual has been the subject of debate within the church at least since the fifth century when Augustine and Pelagius argued over the design of the atoning work of Christ.  Both viewed it as sufficient for all, but efficient for those who are saved.  However, the Augustinians have seen the atonement as limited, intended only for those who will believe, while the Pelagians' view is universal in that the atonement was to make it possible for each individual to choose as an exercise of free will, thereby appropri­at­ing the atonement as effective.[51]
      The contemporary alternative to the historic, orthodox position is probably represented well by Paul Newman, secretary for interfaith dialogue for the United Church of Canada, who sees the atonement as "royal metaphor," rather than a "basically unbiblical" view of substitution to satisfy God's requirement of punishment for sin.  Atonement, for Newman, is an understanding of Jesus as a "representative," not substitutionary, figure.  He asserts, "Jesus' self-sacrifice was catalytic `royal' action that represents all who identify with it."[52]

      Anselm views original sin as "that of the individual in the present condition of things."[53]  The medieval teacher distinguish­es between original sin and later actual sin, as Berkhof explains:  "Original sin therefore has its origin in a sin of nature, while later actual sin is altogether individual in character."[54] 
      As to why only the first sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, and not his later sins, Berkhof writes, ". . . in Adam the guilt of nature, that is, original sin, rests upon the guilt of the individual, while in his posterity the guilt of the individual rests upon the guilt of nature."[55] 
      Thus, Anselm's view of sin appears to be a thoroughly biblical one.  Adam's first sin resulted in the punishment of death, which was then passed on to all people since we were considered guilty in Adam.  In this way, a distinction is made between the "first sin" of Adam and Eve and "original sin," which is the state of depravity passed on to everyone as a result of that first sin.  "Original sin is the sin nature, whereby I am wholly inclined to rebellion against God."[56]  Just as Adam's representative disobedience brought God's death sentence to us, so Christ's obedience brought us God's justification and resurrection life, which is greater than our sin nature.

      Along the same lines of reasoning as that for original sin, Anselm did not accept the popular definition of freedom of the will:  the power of sinning or not sinning.  On his view, the more power not to sin, the more freedom.  Berkhof notes, "He held that the will which, of itself and without external compulsion, is so strongly determined to the right as to be unable to desert the path of rectitude, is freer than the will which is so feebly determined to the right as to be able to depart from the way of righteous­ness."[57]
      Consequently, Anselm did not look at the fall as a free act:  ". . . not an act of genuine freedom," Berkhof says.  "They sinned, not because of their freedom, but in spite of it, . . . . The true end and destination of the will is not to choose either good or evil, but to choose the good."[58] 
      Again, Anselm seems right on target concerning the freedom of the will.  Of course, he is emphasizing the freedom to choose good, which could only come after conversion, through the power of the Spirit.  As for the unregenerate, we would prefer Jonathan Edwards' view that fallen man is always free to do what he wants.  The problem is that we only want to sin, until God intervenes graciously and changes our depraved hearts.  Therefore, we can say that our sin nature severely limits our freedom, and only by supernatural means may we do truly righteous acts.

The man
      In biographical summary, Anselm's tenure as archbishop was characterized by a strong emphasis on the church's rights over and against the king of England.  As evidenced by his appeal to rational demonstration, Anselm stood against the anti-intellectualism of his day.  He is considered the father of scholasticism since his emphasis on the reasonableness of faith led to and anticipated the scholasticism of the 12th and 13th centuries as represented mainly by Thomas Aquinas.  Although Anselm held firmly to the maxim credo ut intelligam ("I believe in order that I may understand"), he nevertheless placed a great deal of emphasis on the complementary relationship of faith and reason, where "faith provides conclusions which reason, assured of their truth, can often prove necessary . . . . Anselm's arguments, therefore, are meant as compelling to any rational mind.  To judge them on purely intellectual grounds is to judge them as Anselm would have had them judged."[59]
      Anselm's theology, which central theme was the relation of creatures to the creator, was in the Augustinian tradition with an apologetic accent.  His systematic method was characterized by "a subtle analysis of Christian doctrines . . . designed to demonstrate the logical coherence of the Christian faith."[60]  The radical distinction between philosophy and theology later characteristic of scholasticism was not prevalent in Anselm's time.  "Taken as a whole, Anselm's work can be said to move from what we should readily identify as philosophical to more specifically Christian and theological themes . . . . From start to finish," however, "his speculative thought is an analysis of the logical structure of Christian faith, rather than an attempt to discover religious truth by philosophical argument."[61]  To Anselm, no doubt, a distinction between "religious" and "philosophical" truth would have been superfluous.
      Standing at the juncture of the Great and Little St. Bernard routes, Anselm's hometown of Aosta, Lombardy, in the Piedmont region of northwest Italy, was a strategic center of importance.  His parents were of nobility: mother Ermenberga of the Burgundian family, who owned considerable property in Aosta, and father Gondolfo, a Lombard nobleman.  Anselm's monastic life was opposed by his father, who from the beginning wanted his son to go into politics.  At the same time, Anselm received the best in classical schooling and was one of the foremost Latinists of his day as evidenced by his clear and precise writing.  In his later years, Anselm's health was poor, perhaps due to such intense study throughout his life.
      In 1056, Anselm left Aosta to enter the Norman Benedictine monastery of Bec, which was located between Rouen and Lisieux in Normandy, France.  He had heard about the teacher Lanfranc, who was later archbishop of Canterbury after the Norman conquest of England in 1066.  Anselm stayed at Lyons, Cluny, and Avranches for a few years until Lanfranc returned from Rome to the abbey.  After taking his monastic vows in 1061, Anselm distinguished himself and became prior, then abbot in 1078.  Bec then became the center of monastic learning as Anselm far excelled Lanfranc.  Anselm wrote Monologion at the request of fellow monks, then Proslogion, which was original­ly titled Faith Seeking Understanding.
      Anselm was named archbishop of Canterbury when he founded the priory at Chester on visits to the abbey's English lands given through benefactions of William I the Conqueror.  William II (Rufus) named Anselm archbishop, which gave him a chance to try and reform the English church.  Anselm at first refused consecration until William restored Canterbury lands and acknowledged Urban II, then opposed by the antipope Clement III.  Near death, William agreed, and Anselm was consecrated on December 4, 1093.  However, when William recovered from his illness, he demanded money, which Anselm refused to give.  As a result, William would not allow Anselm to get official papal approval in Rome for the archbishopric appointment.  William wanted complete domination of the church.  The symbol of papal approval, the "pallium," was in dispute, and the English bishops sided with the king, against Anselm.  Finally, the king let Anselm leave for Rome, but immediately seized the lands again.  Anselm presented grievances against the king to the pope, defended the traditional doctrine of Filioque ("and from the son") against the Greeks, and was active in the sessions of the Council of Bari (1098) which reapproved the decrees against lay investiture.  That same year Anselm went to the village of Liberi, near Capua, and completed Cur Deus Homo before attending a council at the Lateran Easter 1099.
      Meanwhile, Henry, brother of William Rufus, seized the throne when William was murdered in 1100.  Henry was subsequently supported by Anselm until the archbishop was exiled over a disagreement on investing prelates with the spiritual insignia of their office.  The dispute was settled in 1107 at the synod of Westminster.  Anselm spent the last two years of his life in peace and died on April 21, 1109, perhaps at Canterbury in Kent, England.  He was probably canonized in 1163, when Archbishop Thomas Beckett referred Anselm's cause to Rome.  Declared a doctor, or teacher, of the church in 1720 when Clement XI extended his mass and office to the whole church, Anselm's feast day is April 21.[62]
      According to A.H. Strong, Anselm was a "pious" soul in an age of "papal darkness."  Strong points this out in his systematic theology, that Anselm and others continued to hold fast to the biblical doctrine of justification by faith alone, by quoting from a tract that Anselm wrote for the consolation of the dying:

"Question.  Dost thou believe that the Lord Jesus died for thee?  Answer.  I believe it.  Qu.  Dost thou thank him for his passion and death?  Ans.  I believe it."  And then Anselm addresses the dying man:  "Come then, while life remaineth in thee:  in his death alone place thy whole trust; in naught else place any trust; to his death commit thyself wholly; with this alone cover thyself wholly; and if the Lord thy God will to judge thee, say, `Lord, between thy judgment and me I present the death of our Lord Jesus Christ; no otherwise can I contend with thee.'  And if he shall say that thou art a sinner, say thou:  `Lord, I interpose the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between my sins and thee.'  If he say that thou has deserved condemnation, say:  `Lord, I set the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between my evil deserts and thee, and his merits I offer for those which I ought to have and have not.'  If he say that he is wroth with thee, say:  `Lord, I oppose the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thy wrath and me.'  And when thou has completed this, say again:  `Lord, I set the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thee and me.'"  See Anselm, Opera (Migne), 1:686, 687.  The above quotation gives us reason to believe that the New Testament doctrine of justification by faith was implicitly, if not explicitly, held by many pious souls through all the ages of papal dark­ness.[63] 





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Geisler, N.L. Christian Apologetics. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976.
____________. Introduction to Philosophy. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980.
Gerstner, J. Jonathan Edwards: A Mini-Theology. Wheaton: Tyndale, 1987.
Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn. Buffalo,     NY: Prometheus, 1990.
Livingston, J.C. Modern Christian Thought. New York: MacMillan,    1971.
Morey, R.A. The Saving Work of Christ: Studies in the Atonement.   Sterling, VA: GAM Printers, 1980.
Morris, L. The Cross in the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,       1965.
Nash, R.N. Faith and Reason. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988.
Newman, P.W. "Identifying with Jesus: Atonement as Royal Metaphor."      The Christian Century 108.4 (January 30, 1991) 115-17.
Sproul, R.C., J. Gerstner and A. Lindsley. Classical Apologetics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984.
___________. Tabletalk (December 1990) 30-37.
___________. Tabletalk (February 1991) 23.
Stewart, D. Exploring the Philosophy of Religion. Englewood Cliffs,      NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2nd ed., 1988.
Stumpf, S.E. Philosophy: History and Problems. McGraw-Hill, 4th ed.,     1989.


    [1]R. N. Nash, Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith  (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1988) 124.
     [2]L. Berkhof, The History of Christian Doctrines (Grand Rapids:  Baker, 1937) 142.
     [3]S.E. Stumpf, Philosophy: History and Problems (McGraw-Hill, 4th ed., 1989) 859.
     [4]E. E. Cairns, Christianity through the Centuries (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1954/1981) 234.
     [5]Ibid.
     [6]Ibid.
     [7]Ibid.
     [8]R.C. Sproul, J. Gerstner, and A. Lindsley, Classical Apologet­ics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984) 98.
     [9]Berkhof, 142.
     [10]Stumpf, 141.
     [11]Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, 79.
     [12]Ibid., 94.
     [13]Cairns, 235.
     [14]Nash, 124.
     [15]Ibid., 168.
     [16]J.C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought (New York: MacMillan, 1971) 65.
     [17]Nash, 170.
     [18]Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, 101.
     [19]L.R. Bush, ed., Classical Readings in Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Academie/Zonder­van, 1983) 252-54.
     [20]Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley, 102.
     [21]Ibid.
     [22]Ibid., 104.
     [23]Ibid.
     [24]Ibid., 100.
     [25]Ibid., 101.
     [26]Personal conversation, 1990.
     [27]Ibid., 337.
     [28]Ibid., 338.
     [29]Ibid., 108.
     [30]N.L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976) 44.
     [31]Ibid., 42.
     [32]Ibid., 251.
     [33]Ibid.
     [34]Ibid., 254.
     [35]N.L. Geisler, Introduction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980) 112.
     [36]C. Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1968) 21.
     [37]D. Stewart, Exploring the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2nd ed., 1988) 71.
     [38]Ibid.
     [39]Stumpf, 312.
     [40]I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1990) 333.
     [41]Ibid.
     [42]Ibid., 337.
     [43]Anselm, Cur Deus Homo? II:6, The Ancient and Modern Library of Theological Literature edn., p. 67, as cited by L. Morris, The Cross in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965) 288.
     [44]R.A. Morey, The Saving Work of Christ:  Studies in the Atonement (Sterling, VA:  GAM Printers, 1980) vii-viii.
     [45]Cairns, 235.
     [46]Berkhof, 172.
     [47]Ibid., 173.
     [48]J. Gerstner, Jonathan Edwards: A Mini-Theology (Wheaton: Tyndale, 1987) 59.
     [49]J. Calvin, A Compend of the Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. H.T. Kerr (Philadelphia:  Westminster, 1964) 80.
     [50]R.C. Sproul, Tabletalk (December 1990) 30-37.
     [51]Ibid.
     [52]P.W. Newman, "Identifying with Jesus: Atonement as Royal Metaphor," The Christian Century 108.4 (January 30, 1991) 115-17.
     [53]Berkhof, 142. 
     [54]Ibid., 143.
     [55]Ibid.
     [56]R.C. Sproul, Tabletalk (February 1991) 23.
     [57]Berkhof, 144.
     [58]Ibid.
     [59]R.E. Allen, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: MacMillan, 1967) I:128.
     [60]E.R. Fairweather, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 129.
     [61]Ibid.
     [62]Encyclopaedia Britannica (William Benton, 1969) I:1014-15.
     [63]A.H. Strong, Systematic Theology (Old Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell, 1907) 849, as cited by Gerstner, 71-2.


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