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Monday, March 02, 2020

 

The Cogito and the Complementarity of the Formal and Material Realms


Dave Couric
HUMA 5300-001: Conceptual Bases of the Humanities (Dr. Nussbaum, UTA)
October 27, 1994
Paper 1: The cogito and the complementarity of the formal and material realms

          Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote something to the effect that if an innocent bystander should happen upon a conversation in which one party is overheard to say, "I know that that is a tree," not to worry.  They're not nuts, Wittgenstein assured the eavesdropper, they're just doing philosophy.  It's in that spirit that the present subject is broached.[1]
          It's been said that back in the mid-sixties or so, it was difficult to find a copy of Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness.  So popular was the French existentialist philosopher's new book that apparently bookstores everywhere were out of it for a time.  How a book with a title like that aroused so much interest in the public mind would be an interesting topic to investigate.  Do people really sit around and contemplate the concept of nothingness, for example?  Surely only philosophers ever concern themselves with such things.
          The most famous question in the history of philosophy might be, "Why is there something rather than nothing?"  This form of the question may be traced back to Gottfried Leibniz, one of Rene Descartes' successors in the philosophical school of rationalism, although the question probably wasn't original with Leibniz.  The question assumes that something, rather than nothing, exists -- and therefore rules out the actuality that there could be nothing at all right now.  The question simply wonders aloud why things didn't turn out the other way around.  The possibility of nothing at all is affirmed.  The "innocent bystander" overhearing such a question would probably answer, "It doesn't matter.  Something exists -- period."  Perhaps such a response is appropriate.  Then maybe the conversation could move to another related question, "Is nothing(ness) logically possible?"  This seems to be a philosophical question more fundamental, than whether something exists, and therefore harks back to Descartes.
          The most famous statement in the history of philosophy is arguably "I think; therefore, I am," or the Latin cogito ergo sum.  The "cogito" appears in Descartes' Discourse on Method written 350 years ago.[2]  If nothing else about philosophy, this statement is familiar to the average person, so wide has been its spread of influence over the centuries.  Descartes' work seems to touch on both questions (perhaps most tellingly on the latter) of whether nothing is (formally) possible and whether something is (materially) real.
          The question about the logical possibility of nothing is highly debatable although most philosophers would probably answer in the affirmative.  The majority would insist that it's perfectly conceivable that nothing might have existed from all eternity instead of something.  The minority would probably say that to conceive of a state of nothingness is impossible even on logical grounds.  They might say that to conceive of nothing is to conceive of something since it's impossible to think about nothing.  Or on other grounds, since existence of self is undeniable, it makes no sense to consider the possibility of nothing.  In a sense the "innocent bystander" would be right that this debate about the possible existence of nothing is a moot point because both sides would go on to acknowledge the existence of something.  But when the concepts of logical necessity and possibility and their relationship to reality are in view, the questions of nothing and something indeed seem to make a big difference.
          The question of whether something is real seems to have been settled by Descartes and his cogito once and for all, although someone will consider almost anything as up for grabs.  Descartes seems to have established the existence of self as basically self-evident.[3]  One perhaps novel way of analyzing the cogito is by using the linguistic work of Austin and Searle, who developed the currently popular "speech-act" theory in modern linguistics.[4]  One of the emphases in this area is what is called "performative" language.  When Descartes uttered the conclusion of the cogito, "I am" (sum), he seems to be using performative language, which means that he is not only saying something, but he is at the same time necessarily doing (or being) it.  Therefore, it would be impossible for someone to make the statement about the existence of self without also existing in reality, an obvious enough observation.  A common example of performative language is the announcement by a minister at a wedding: "I now pronounce you man and wife."  Saying and doing (speech and act) become one, instead of being separate things as in the usual sense.[5]
          What does not appear as self-evident is Descartes' move from the existence of self to the existence of God, his ontological argument.[6]  A related question to this part of Descartes' work involves whether he, as a rationalist, meant to say or imply that the logically possible is real, or that the logically necessary is real.[7]
          This distinction seems to be very important in assessing whether Descartes is a "hyper-rationalist," in a negative, perhaps Hegelian sense, or not.  It's one thing to say that the logically conceivable must therefore be real and quite another to say that what is impossible not to conceive is real.  The former would entail the actual existence of unicorns, for example, but the latter is simply affirming that logical necessity guarantees reality.  It seems that Descartes had logical necessity in mind and not just logical possibility when he wrote about the relation of reason to reality.  This seems to be a point that both Hume and Kant, as subsequent critics of Descartes, entirely missed.  Their criticisms appear to be based on the assumption that mere logical possibility was in view in the case of Descartes.[8]
          Thus Descartes' proposition "I am" is not just undeniable as to its validity; it's undeniably true since its formal validity cannot be affirmed apart from it being materially true.  There is no logical alternative, so the proposition is necessarily true.[9]  In performative language the formal and material meet so that there is a complementarity going on between the two.  Assuming that formal validity can refer to possibility as well as necessity or even probability, material truth will follow accordingly.
          This is to say that the abstract formal and concrete material realms have a certain kind of relationship.  What is formally true (valid) may or may not be materially true.  However, the reverse is a different story.  What is materially true cannot be formally false (invalid), or at least that seems to be a necessary conclusion.  Reality may be more than rational, i.e., transrational, but it's certainly not irrational.  The real is necessarily rational although the rational is not necessarily real.  The former is simply a rational view while the latter would normally be considered a rationalistic, or "hyper-rational," position.
          The proposition "I am" or "I exist" or "I am existing" or "I am an existing being" cannot be denied without self-refutation.  A statement that can't be denied is necessarily true because one must be affirming in practice what one is denying in theory in order to deny a statement that can't be denied and therefore make a self-referentially absurd statement.  The point is that an undeniable statement means the proposition can't be denied in practice.  Almost anything can be denied in theory, at least in a forced and temporary way.  The question is whether something can be practiced consistently with its theoretical formulation, which is just another way of finding a complementarity between the formal and material realms.
          One objection to the assertion that the rationally inescapable is real is that the whole thing could never get off the ground unless something is indeed real.  Therefore, to rely solely on the formal side of the argument would not be enough.  The material side, that something is real, is necessary to prove that the logically necessary necessarily exists in reality.  This point is well taken theoretically, but practically it seems moot.  If nothing exists -- even given that the rationally inescapable is real -- then it certainly follows that nothing is real, not even the rationally inescapable.  However, Descartes seems to have at least established the fundamental truth that something exists -- if nothing else, self.  Thus it seems rationally inescapable that the rationally inescapable is real since in fact something does exist after all.  So the only way to overturn the argument that the reality of the object of a logically necessary concept is guaranteed is to establish that nothing exists -- quite an impossible feat for any existing being, needless to say.[10]
          Another way to express the complementarity of the formal and material is with the use of the terms coherence and correspondence, common to theories of truth.  The former, an epistemological concept, is a necessary condition for the latter, an ontological notion.  Likewise, correspondence to reality is a sufficient condition for coherence logically.  Thus the proper theory of truth would seem to necessarily include both aspects in order to be complete.  "Co(here)rrespondence" would be an accurate term to coin in naming this kind of "empirico-rational" theory of truth.  Historically, the theory known as the "correspondence" theory may have entailed the concept of coherence as a necessary condition.  If not, it must be deemed weak and inadequate.  Without both, the system fails.
                   Truth, then, is both an ontological and epistemological notion, corresponding to reality on the one hand and, logically prior to that, cohering conceptually on the other.  Validity and truth go hand in hand.  Truth cannot be locked away in some epistemological vacuum in the name of "subjectivity."  As John Searle has pointed out, "the existence of subjectivity is an objective scientific fact."[11]  Anything less is subjectivism.  That means truth is an objective fact, at least in regard to its ontological dimension.  But since correspondence necessarily presupposes coherence, it must be just as true to say truth is objective epistemologically -- as long as it both coheres with logic and corresponds to reality.  Kant would probably have agreed with the assertion that truth is even if what truth is remains unknown.  Otherwise, he would never have said there was anything at all outside of the phenomenal realm.[12]  Reason tends to demand that truth in general is objective.  What, if any, particular truths are objective is another matter altogether.



    [1]This is not to imply that the subject is less than serious.  For what could be more serious, at least to philosophers, than the topic of validity/logic and truth/reality?
    [2]Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, Trans. Donald A. Cress (Hackett, 1980) part four, 17.  ". . . it was necessary that I . . . be something," Descartes wrote in the sentence before the cogito.
    [3]The cogito could be taken as an enthymeme, or as the minor premise and conclusion of a modus ponens syllogism, although Descartes apparently said it was not.  The implied major premise would then be "If I think, then I am."  This cannot be actually denied, but perhaps the redundancy of being in the "I" in both the antecedent and consequent keep the proposition from being logically necessary.  In fact, the cogito's possibly tautological nature may be illustrated by the joke about a "red-neck" place in the southern U.S. where the following was found posted on a school wall: "I chew; therefore, I am."
    [4]This theory is given much credence in the linguistics master's program at UTA, especially in the fairly new study of discourse analysis.
    [5]Performative language may be one exception to the general rule that the formal and material are usually separate realms.
    [6]At one point his argument sounds more like the cosmological when, after establishing that something exists, he seems to adopt the premise that contingent existence is dependent on necessary existence: ". . . if there are bodies in the world, or intelligences, . . . then being ought to depend on God's power, inasmuch as they cannot subsist without God for a single moment."  Method, part four, 19.  Previously, Descartes argued that there has to be more in the cause than in the effect when he wrote that "it is no less a contradiction that something more perfect should follow from and depend upon something less perfect than that something can come from nothing, . . . ," 18.  Interestingly, Hume seems to have argued almost the opposite a century or so later in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Ed. Eric Steinberg (Hackett, 1977) 93, where he wrote in section 11, "When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect."  So Descartes seems to be saying there has to be more in the cause than in the effect while Hume comes close to saying there can't be more in the cause than in the effect.
    [7]For example, Descartes said, ". . . the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true,. . .," also in part four of Method, 18.  He also made some qualifications to reason: ". . . reason does not suggest to us that what we thus see or imagine is true" and "reason also suggests to us that our thoughts are unable all to be true," 21.
    [8]This may be far-fetched, but it seems fair to wonder whether this distinction between the logically necessary and the possible would have made any difference in their critique of not only Descartes but also Anselm on the ontological argument.
    [9]Although Hume's insight over against Descartes was that causal statements are not necessarily true because they are deduced, or induced, from experience, the cogito might be an exception to that.  Existence, that is, causes thought.
    [10]That the logically necessary must exist in reality seems to be the only logically possible conclusion to take since to assert any possibility that the rationally inescapable is not real would still entail applying logic to reality, which would be self-contradictory.
    [11]Minds, Brains, and Science, (Harvard, 1984) 25.  Then on the same page, as if to head off a retort by the deconstructionist school, Searle states, "If the fact of subjectivity runs counter to a certain definition of `science,' then it is the definition and not the fact which we will have to abandon."
    [12]What's unclear about Kant's "two worlds" view is whether the noumenal realm is unknown or unknowable.  Apparently it's the latter, which means the noumenal is unknowable in principle.  It would seem to make more sense, however, to say the noumenal is simply unknown -- although there may be other grounds for criticizing this idea that the "intelligible world" is unknown.  Just because something is not known doesn't mean it cannot be, or so it seems.  Otherwise, how can Kant say anything at all about something that is utterly unknowable?  In addition, by placing (only?) freedom in the noumenal realm, Kant seems to be eliminating any theoretical basis for meaningful ethics.  So only sentiment remains to give any foundation to morality, thus his practical argument from justice.  If freedom must be assumed, as Kant says in the third section of Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals [1785], Trans. James W. Ellington (Hackett, 1981) 50, then perhaps it's a candidate for logical necessity.  Since reason requires freedom, why can't the former apply to the metaphysical object of the latter concept?


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