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Wednesday, August 19, 2020

 

Rhetoric: Good or Bad?

Dave Couric

Paper 1: Rhetoric: Good or Bad?

HUMA 5301: Foundations of Rhetoric (Dr. Kellner, UTA)

March 15, 1994

Not too long ago Louis Farrakhan, controversial leader of the Nation of Islam, illustrated with his comments (as reported in the local newspaper) precisely what Richard Lanham asserts about rhetoric. Though Lanham sees rhetoric as at least half of what it means to be human, he also argues that the reality, or "world view," of the person using rhetoric is very important to the ongoing rhetoric debate. In fact, he considers the content communicated as "good" or "bad," and not the rhetoric itself. Farrakhan confirmed this necessary distinction with his words in response to his aide's speech that, among other things, referred to Jews as "bloodsuckers of the black nation." Farrakhan supposedly reprimanded the aide, but then turned around and endorsed the content (though not the rhetoric) of the speech.  The aide's rhetoric was arguably bad (he was shown on the news spouting anti-semiticism and general racism in the speech on a college campus), but the content was such that it would have made little difference about the rhetoric, in the final analysis.

"While I stood by the truths that he spoke, I must condemn in the strongest terms the manner in which those truths were represented," Farrakhan was reported to say. Whether the aide's (or Farrakhan's, for that matter) rhetoric was good or bad really is not the primary focus here even though "the manner" is where Farrakhan tried to situate the controversy.  What people who heard this news were concerned about is the content of what both men said. The point is that there is no "nice" way to say what the aide said. No one was upset simply about the rhetoric, in this case. Everybody knew what he was saying. People were in an uproar over the content, no matter what the style. For Farrakhan to say he "stood by" the content while condemning the rhetoric is virtually meaningless if he was supposed to be rebuking an insubordinate in the wake of and to quell the controversy. He might as well have stood up and simply repeated his aide's words all over again.

Lanham's view is that traditionally rhetoric has been considered either good or bad: good when it is not noticed and bad when it is "excessive." This judging of rhetoric he sees as an error. For Lanham, rhetoric is neither good nor bad; it is the reality (or conflicting realities) that causes the problem. Therefore, Lanham argues for a suspension of judgment between the two sides that have battled for prominence from ancient times: the philosopher and the rhetor. Both sides have their own rhetoric, and both have their own (contradictory) philosophies. Lanham proposes that both philosophies are human and should be held in tension despite contradiction.

But perhaps rhetoric can be either good or bad, and content (philosophy) can be either good or bad. Why not both? The Farrakhan debacle seems to be a case of both, with content taking extreme precedence. Lanham takes the "both/and" position on philosophy and rhetoric each being half of humanity. So, in effect, he is saying that one half, rhetoric, is neither good nor bad, but the other half, philosophy, is good or bad, depending on perspective. Why is it that only half of humanity can be considered good or bad? Could it be that Lanham himself has not been able to maintain that suspension equally and indefinitely between two poles of a contradiction as his theory advocates and has instead simply moved to the rhetorical side alone?  Admittedly, in the case of Farrakhan and his aide, their rhetoric could have contributed nothing to the content, as long as the audience understood what they were saying about Jews. But if people can and do make choices about the rhetoric they use, then it seems plausible that the choice of rhetoric is based on what is best for the occasion.

If rhetoric is considered as simply aesthetics, then it would be easier to argue that it is simply a matter of taste, not good or bad. But Lanham himself chooses not to consider rhetoric simply a matter of taste. That is because rhetoric would be defined too narrowly if simply as aesthetics. Defined in a broader sense, rhetoric can be considered good or bad when it includes not only aesthetics but ethics as well. Still broader, rhetoric would also be epistemological. And at the extreme, for those who consider "everything" to be rhetoric, the ontological would be the final realm for rhetoric to overlap. So at its broadest, rhetoric would cover the entire metaphysical spectrum.

Although Aristotle is the representative of the "classical" or traditional position on the subject and therefore would be expected to have a rather narrow conception of rhetoric, precisely the opposite appears to be the case. While he may not go as far as, say, Gorgias with an ontological view of rhetoric, Aristotle does seem to hold a view that includes rhetoric in the epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic realms. This is most clearly seen in the way Aristotle divides the subjects of dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics, with a separate work on each. In Rhetoric, e.g., he starts out by noting that dialectic is the counterpart to rhetoric, presumably meaning dialectic is a subject treated separately and prior to rhetoric. Then, of course, he wrote a treatise on poetics also. However, within Rhetoric itself, there is an emphasis on the "three modes of persuasion": logos, ethos, and pathos. Though he considers them in a different order, these three parallel dialectic, rhetoric, and poetics, or epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Therefore, it may be that Aristotle had in mind a broader view of rhetoric than simply a volitional, or ethical, persuasion, although ethos is the first and perhaps foremost mode in Aristotle's exposition of the art of persuasion. Moreover, at this point rhetoric has much to do with good or bad, at least as to the character of the rhetor, if not the nature of his rhetoric.

The three elements in speechmaking contribute something along these lines, too. A speaker is doing something (volitional/moral) with a speech (intellectual) to elicit a response from the audience (emotional). Furthermore, even the three divisions of rhetoric, based on the three classes of hearers, have some kind of correspondence to the modes of persuasion: forensic (logos), ceremonial (ethos), and political (pathos).

If action is in rhetoric and passion in poetics, then Aristotle must have had a view of rhetoric that overlapped with poetics (and dialectic). Since actions can be good or bad, it follows that rhetoric can also. Of course, that doesn't mean that content is neutral. Content would most strictly fit in the category of dialectic, or epistemology, as in the content of an argument. But since rhetoric overlaps with dialectic and poetics to some extent, content and style in some sense are both involved in the discipline of rhetoric. In Farrakhan's and his aide's case, the content was bad and therefore provoked such a negative response; the rhetoric was bad but largely beside the point. 

Rhetoric and reality, then, must be distinguished, even if not on the same basis as Lanham proposes. Whereas he sees rhetoric as primary, perhaps it is the other way around, as the philosophers say, and content is most important. Either way, rhetoric and reality cannot be one and the same. If rhetoric is reality, then everything is rhetoric. If everything is rhetoric, then nothing is rhetoric and the rhetors are back to reality again. Or, to use the drama metaphor: When the rhetorical "play" of life has no audience, is it really a play?

 


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