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Thursday, February 27, 2020

 

Battle of the Brain: Paul Ricoeur's Dialectic Hermeneutics


Battle of the Brain: Paul Ricoeur's Dialectic Hermeneutics*
David R. Couric

Introduction
            At first glance it may not be apparent at all what the inscription at the top of the Dallas Morning News building, one of H.L. Mencken's famous sayings, and a line from the movie Cool Hand Luke have in common. But on closer inspection each of the three serves to illustrate a different aspect of something fundamental about the nature of reality, the dialectic.[i] The newspaper building in downtown Dallas has the following written on it: "Build the news upon the rock of truth and righteousness, conducted always upon the lines of fairness and integrity; acknowledge the right of people to get from the newspaper both sides of every important question."  Journalist Mencken is well-known for his adage that goes something like this: "To every complicated problem, there's a simple solution–and it's always wrong!"  Though he knew it was not true since the problem was one of authority and power rather than communication, what the warden character said to protagonist Paul Newman in the movie was (with southern accent): "What we have he-uh, is a fail-yuh to communicate."
            The inscription, famous saying, and movie line all have a paradoxical element that is basic to the kind of dialectic found in the context of hermeneutics, and life.  First, the inscription explicitly indicates that an issue generally has two sides. That the inscription says "both" rather than "all sides" seems significant in that most debates generally end with two basic opposing or conflicting views as advantages and disadvantages, pros and cons, are tossed about in discussion.  In other words, the two sides are distinct yet not entirely separate or independent of each other, which is often an unexpected occurrence. Second, the saying suggests that it is usually simplistic in a complex debate to just pick a side and go with it. Although the adage may be hyperbolic for effect, it seems to generally ring true. It often turns out, ironically, that the situation is not a simple either/or proposition but a both-and–not a contradiction or even a contrary where both sides might be wrong, but rather a paradox in which both sides indeed can and must be reconciled. What usually happens is that the two sides are brought together resulting in a perfect fit in the middle. Since both sides cannot be right in their extremes, there must be a balance in which both are right in moderation. That is, both are right, assuming that the dialectic is not a contradiction or a contrary but a "complementary," a paradox. Paradox in this sense means an apparent contradiction which turns out to be resolved. This could be distinguished, e.g., from a mystery on the one hand, which might be resolvable in principle but in fact is not, and a contradiction on the other hand, which is unresolvable period. Contrary is used as distinct from contradiction in that both sides of a contrary can be wrong and a third alternative, a tertium quid, right. In this context dialectic is apparently distinct from the way Hegel used it because the Hegelian thesis and antithesis in history were apparently considered contradictions that were somehow transcended by the synthesis.  The dialectic in hermeneutics is not that contradictory kind but a complementary type. It is a fitting together of two things, not a changing of two things into a third thing. Third, the movie line adds a paradoxical element in that it often turns out that two sides of a question fail to use terms univocally. Equivocation results in what is commonly referred to as a "matter of semantics." As two sides of a debate proceed, looking at the same thing from two different angles, one or both may simply not be tuned in to the same wavelength even for the sake of discussion and thereby miss the possible complementarity of two apparently conflicting views. Since there are two sides to every question, then, perhaps there is a parallel with the scientific fact that there are two sides to every brain. Paul Ricoeur certainly seems to be utilizing both sides of his brain in a balanced way in his attempt to make sense out of the state of hermeneutics. This is a welcomed and necessary corrective to the extremes found at opposite ends of the hermeneutical spectrum.


History of philosophical debate/dialectic thought
            All the way back to the earliest recorded information about philosophy, the dialectic has made its indelible mark. It is common knowledge in philosophy that the pre-socratics had something of a stalemate going on between the dynamic and static dimensions of reality. The whole history of philosophy, in fact, can be seen as one big dialectic between the empirical and rational thinkers. For example, Heraclitus and Parmenides are well-known for their emphases of the opposite extremes of the pole of knowledge. Heraclitus was on the dynamic, empirical side of change and motion, becoming, while Parmenides emphasized the static side of unchanging pure being. Apparently there was such a wide discrepancy that it gave rise to the sophistic movement of skepticism over the disagreement among philosophers. Then Plato came along and tried to bring the two sides together in a dialectic move. However, it seems that Plato favored Parmenides more than Heraclitus. So Aristotle did another dialectic maneuver and emphasized more of the empirical side in an attempt to be even more balanced. This seems to have gone on throughout history in a general sense as some, such as Augustine, favored Plato and some, such as Aquinas, gave the nod to Aristotle. Descartes and Hume continued the general trend as far as rationalism and empiricism are concerned. Kant did the famous dialectic synthesis in modern philosophy, and it does not seem to have stopped yet. From Kant a dispersement seems to have taken place as philosophers continue to debate between a more empirical versus a more rational approach. Now Ricoeur is doing the same thing when, e.g., he dialectically compares and contrasts Descartes and Nietzsche in Oneself As Another.

Ricoeur's dialectic hermeneutics
            Paul Ricoeur is well-known for bringing together diverse opinions on a variety of subjects, taking a mediating position on a myriad of issues. Not only does he use this dialectic approach in his own writings, but others always sum up Ricoeur's work with some kind of dialectic description. For example, Ricoeur's hermeneutics is referred to as one of "suspicion and retrieval," words which may have come from a dialectic attempt by Ricoeur to harmonize Habermas and Gadamer. Habermas seems to want to outright reject prejudice (suspicion) while Gadamer wants to wholly accept prejudice (retrieval).  Of course, it is not clear that either one is necessarily right. Prejudice is real, but it also is not a very good thing. While admitting bias up front, the interpreter can still try to overcome prejudice and be as objective as possible. Even though what really happened in history, e.g., may not be known for sure, it is still the responsibility of the historian to try to determine what really happened, rather than just giving in to his prejudices completely. 
            Moreover, one of Ricoeur's major dialectic emphases is a sort of current event in the ongoing thought dialectic in philosophy. He is working with the two major contemporary schools of philosophy: the analytic school and the existential school he calls "phenomenological and hermeneutical."[ii] Or, better yet, perhaps phenomenology itself is the dialectic between the analytic and existential schools. For instance, Ricoeur uses the narrative nature of Dasein to connect the two schools. Ricoeur's own description of hermeneutics over 20 years ago seems to best sum up his efforts even today: "Hermeneutics seems to me to be animated by this double motivation: willingness to suspect, willingness to listen; vow of rigor, vow of obedience."[iii]
            Kurt Mueller-Vollmer[iv] sees Ricoeur's approach as a restatement of Dilthey's idea of "hermeneutic primacy of the written word." Dilthey, according to Mueller-Vollmer, is the watershed between 19th and 20th century hermeneutics since he expanded the horizon, so to speak, by which hermeneutics takes in not only language but life itself.  Ricoeur's model of textual interpretation is used as the foundation for "a general hermeneutics of the human and social sciences," a narrower view of interpretation than Dilthey's explication–the latter of which included "all phenomena, nonverbal as well as verbal." In fairness it should be noted that Ricoeur seems to have done just such a broad application in his new book, Oneself As Another. In fact, by the end of the book he is expounding a "hermeneutics of acting man," which moves squarely into the ethical arena. Speech-act theory plays an important role in understanding Ricoeur's hermeneutics since he wants to work out the teleological implications of what it is to be a self among other selves. One important area in this regard is the relationship of language to epistemology and ethics. While it is tempting to posit a necessary relation equally between the two, it seems more plausible to put language, at least in its normal use, in the area of epistemology. Only "performative" language seems to, by definition, move directly and wholly into the domain of ethics. In other words, saying something is not doing it unless it is performative, such as the pronouncement of a minister at a wedding: "I now pronounce you man and wife." To say that all speech, then, is an act seems to overstate the case and at the same time lose the real difference in the distinction between performative and other language, although there may be some other exceptions to the general rule that speech does not equal act.  Indeed, language also moves its user in the direction of ontology since it sharpens ontology rather than blurring it. Situated between ontology and ethics, language points in both directions, sometimes even overlapping the categories to form a cohesive metaphysical unit.  Language is like the thread that runs through the fabric of metaphysics. While there is certainly movement in the direction of action in the role of language expressing epistemology, it seems far-fetched to take the next step and say language always is action, which would land it squarely in ethics. Language is, though, in the context of human behavior since language is language only in context, according to Robert E. Longacre.[v] Knowledge of action, however, simply is not action–unless, of course, Plato and Socrates were right about knowing the good and doing it.  Therefore, talking about doing something falls short of actually doing it.
            Richard E. Palmer[vi] presents Ricoeur as one who has come along to mop up the mess left between the iconoclastic "demystifiers" of myths and symbols and the recollective "demythologizers." Ricoeur is the only one that can find the best of both worlds in a nasty situation, especially with the former group. Even though this "cultural" hermeneutic application of the earlier Ricoeur was to the interpretation of symbols, it still illustrates the fact that he has always been sensitive to the dialectic process. Palmer points out that Ricoeur's work has in large measure been a call back to the text after the hermeneutic pendulum had swung from author to interpreter over the last two centuries. But today Ricoeur puts the job of interpretation squarely between the text and the interpreter. At any rate, what is especially intriguing is Palmer's explanation of how Ricoeur deals with what he saw almost 30 years ago as two strands of modern hermeneutics. The dialectic is set up between the Bultmannian and Freudian schools, the one that "deals lovingly with the symbol in an effort to recover a meaning hidden in it" and the other which "seeks to destroy the symbol as the representation of a false reality." Though hermeneutics is generally understood to be the system of getting from, in psychoanalytic terms, the surface "manifest content" to the "latent" meaning underneath the surface (the unconscious), Ricoeur apparently interprets the latter school of demystification as first of all, not accepting the reality of anything under the surface, and second, not trusting the veracity of the surface reality either. Therefore, "true thinking was an exercise in `suspicion' and doubt" for the demystifiers. They wanted a new hermeneutic that did away with the symbols they considered illusory. The problem is, finding a new system to interpret the surface reality does nothing to change that manifest content of the world. The symbols stay the same whether the interpretive system does or not. Thus Freudian hermeneutics seems an exercise in futility. As a result of these two antithetical hermeneutical approaches of "recovery of meaning" versus "iconoclasm," in which the symbol or text is treated as either "a window to a sacred reality" or "a false reality that must be shattered," Ricoeur faced a major dialectic. Interestingly, though, he did not, at least at that time, bring the two sides together to meet somewhere in the middle. In this case perhaps the negative school was beyond reach for Ricoeur.  So, rather, he applied the positive approach to the negative one itself. That is, "Ricoeur's own approach to Freud is itself a brilliant exercise in the [demythologization] type of interpretation," Palmer observes. In a sort of golden rule kind of move Ricoeur plays the dialectician in embracing "both the rationality of doubt and the faith of recollective interpretation." One wonders whether Freud would have returned the favor, and how, had he the opportunity to do so.
            Anthony C. Thiselton[vii] discusses extensively the "multidisciplinary" hermeneutical theory of Ricoeur. The negative and positive poles in Ricoeur's dialectic are obvious in the terms used and the overall description of his hermeneutics as that of "suspicion and retrieval." According to Thiselton, "Ricoeur examines the contribution of Freudian categories as methodological tools of suspicion and criticism. But he also seeks to retrieve the creative power of symbols, metaphors, and narratives in texts." Ricoeur is also credited with the intent "to shift the focus of attention from whatever lies `behind' the text to what occurs `in front of' the text," which of course is the fusion of horizons. In this way Ricoeur is more interested in the present relevance of texts as the important emphasis in hermeneutics.  Rather than what the text means, Ricoeur is concerned with what it does, which is apparently a significant development in the area of recent literary theory. "Destroy" and "retrieve" become the operative words in the dialectic process that Ricoeur uses to both "[press] into service of hermeneutics the critical tools of Freudian theory" and "recover the power of symbols, metaphor, and narrative." Thiselton explains the negative suspicion pole as the "task of `doing away with idols,' namely becoming critically aware of when we project our own wishes and constructs into texts, so that they no longer address us from beyond ourselves as `other.'" The positive retrieval pole "concerns the need to listen in openness to symbol and to narrative and thereby to allow creative events to occur `in front of' the text, and to have their effect on us."
            Thiselton again explains in a separate chapter Ricoeur's bi-polar hermeneutics as "a metacritical discipline, which embodies the unmasking function of explanation and the creative function of understanding." This is later referred to as the double function of hermeneutics: "the hermeneutics of suspicion which unmasks human wish-fulfillments and shatters idols, and the hermeneutics of retrieval which listens to symbols and to symbolic narrative discourse." Thiselton credits Ricoeur with maintaining something that Gadamer failed to do. That is, "unlike Gadamer . . . Ricoeur seeks to bring together the two dimensions of `explanation' and `understanding.'  He recognizes that explanation alone can be reductive, but that understanding alone remains vulnerable to uncritical individual or corporate illusion or self-deception . . . . Gadamer has as a matter of principle left no metacritical or even critical procedure for testing the validity of traditions in effective-historical consciousness." This point of distinction between Ricoeur and Gadamer is also discussed by David Jasper[viii]: "For Gadamer we must choose between truth or method. Ricoeur, on the other hand, suggests not an opposition, but a dialectical relationship . . . between explanation (method) and understanding (truth) which enable us more adequately to describe the tension between self and other, and to remain responsible to . . . explanatory methods." 
            While Thiselton clearly supports Ricoeur's dialectic approach and even sees his axiom of "rigor" and "obedience" as "the heart of hermeneutical theory," there is one red flag that is raised by Thiselton based on Austin and Searle's speech-act theory: a failure of Ricoeur to distinguish sufficiently between history and fiction, resulting from too little emphasis on the author and his illocutionary stance and a confinement of consideration to only the intratextual perlocutionary dimension. In other words, perhaps Ricoeur has failed to recognize the illocutionary force of an utterance in front of the text, which can only be determined at the level of context, not meaning.  By restricting the focus to the text with a practical insistence that the reference of the text is only in front of it, Ricoeur seems to be leaving out part of the extralinguistic "pragmatics," which is a step beyond linguistics and necessarily involves considerations prior to the text. Therefore, it seems that the text's horizon overlaps both the author's and the interpreter's horizons so that the fusion of the text and interpreter includes at least a portion of the author's horizon. Citing Recanati, Thiselton says Ricoeur's textual world is like the world of the stage in a play: "as an audience we may be moved and transformed by the play, but we cannot ask critical questions about its function and truth without breaking its spell, and looking behind the lines of the characters." Theoretically, the emphasis Ricoeur places on explanation and a hermeneutic of suspicion should take care of this problem, Thiselton claims, but practically Ricoeur's views of history and language "reduce and subordinate the role of this critical dimension in his narrative theory."
            This criticism of Ricoeur, however, does nothing to obviate the role of dialectic in his approach. The major dialectic in the later Ricoeur is apparently the one he is attempting to work out in Oneself As Another: the problem of identity, or self-identity. He explores the continuity of the self and its two paradoxical parts: the one that essentially remains the same (idem) and the one that changes (ipse) through time. The key to this paradox seems to be in the words through time. That is, identity is not a contradiction because the self remains the same but does not remain the same, i.e., changes but does not change, in the same relationship but not at the same time. In other words, time is the necessary factor for change. Because of the linguistic nature of human beings, for Ricoeur hermeneutics is self-interpretation. By interpreting self, understanding occurs and changes self, hence the ontological emphasis of 20th century hermeneutics is maintained by Ricoeur. He seems to be saying that language does not just have a functional existence but an ontological status, hence the "house of being" metaphor is employed to indicate the independent, ontological existence of language. Since language does not have a dependent, practical use only, it is autonomous, hence the semantic autonomy of the text in Ricoeur's approach. This is autonomy of written text since the shift in degree from spoken to written text is a difference in kind for Ricoeur. Though this seems plausible enough, the question that arises is whether the autonomous text alone has any personal element left in its being. It would seem that a text entirely separate from its author would no longer be personal in the sense that the interpreter is encountering a work of a person much like himself. A fusion of a person's horizon with simply a text's horizon would be an impersonal thing and seems less significant than a joining of two persons' horizons through the medium or mediator of the text, which seems to have a different kind of ontological status than that of persons. Since the author's being may somehow be permanently fused into the text, the new fusion when the text is read may more likely be between the beings of author and interpreter in the text. Losing the personal element by rejecting the "meeting of the minds" concept seems a high price to pay. Ricoeur may not object to this since he is inclusive in his emphasis not on the lone subject but on subjects interacting intersubjectively in the world, with language and text being the common bond since language is crucial to the notion of self and character, "the other as oneself and oneself as another." In this sense Ricoeur is advocating the democratization of self in which all selves are created equal, a movement away from the two ego-poles of author and interpreter. Hopefully, though, Ricoeur has not gone so far as to mean that language is life, or life is language, which would seem reductive, but rather with Longacre would agree that language and life, though distinct, cannot be separated ultimately. Life may be a text in some sense, but certainly actions go beyond thought and speech and therefore language–even though actions are ontological. To take language as the substructure rather than the superstructure seems to concede too much to linguistic structuralism, which seeks to conform all thought and action to language itself.
            Another major dialectic that Ricoeur deals with, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences[ix], is that of "appropriation and distanciation." These represent the polar experience of "subjectivizing" something for oneself and then "objectivizing" it in order to relate it to others. Ricoeur warns that on the far side of distanciation in the extreme is the objectivism of absolute authorial intent and in the other direction beyond appropriation is the subjectivistic reader-response error.

Battle of the brain
            The fact that there are two sides to the human brain indicates a dialectic of sorts. At the risk of a reductive move in which all ideas of history can suddenly with one fell swoop be slapped into one side of philosophers' collective brain or the other, it seems that in effect this is exactly what can be done to make sense of it all. At least by way of and for the sake of illustration --- while admittedly at the risk of vast oversimplification–the brain, even if the two sides concept turns out to simply be another metaphor, seems to hold the key to this universal dialectic tendency. This is not a physicalist maneuver. Even if the two sides of the brain schema were not scientific, the fact is that the illustration serves its purpose anyway. Since the right side of the brain is the empirical, sensory half, and the left side is the rational, logical half, the debate on major issues, and even the minor ones, comes down to which side of the brain is being favored. While Ricoeur may not put it in those terms, it does seem that the struggle of opposing views has some relationship to the kind of thinkers involved and whether they are the artist or the scientist type.  Science, incidentally, is one of the best and most comprehensive examples of the brain dialectic. Although scientists are mistakenly thought of as being all empirical, in reality they must use the left side of their brain more because deduction is just as involved in the scientific method as induction. Besides, induction itself involves reasoning from the particular to the general. Scientists use the rational to set up an experiment, induce from the empirical evidence, and then deduce their hypotheses and theories. So while the right side of a scientist's brain is used to take in the sense data, the left side takes over from there in the processes of induction and deduction.

Conclusion
            In light of the ebb and flow, the pull and tug, in the history of thought it seems only reasonable (left-brainish) to affirm the wisdom of at least the attempt of Ricoeur to move in the direction which he has taken in hermeneutics. His premise about the nature of the dialectic is sound even if one disagrees with some of the conclusions drawn from his handling of the data of hermeneutics. Striking the proper balance in such a difficult field as hermeneutics is like walking a tightrope–one wrong move and it is a long way down and back up again. Or, to change the metaphor (or is it?), getting both sides of the brain to work in perfect harmony is probably impossible, given the trail of excesses in the history of thought. But that does not mean the attempt should not be made. The beauty of the potential harmony alone should be enough to incline even the most skeptical (right-brainish?) to think twice (both sides now) before ever jumping to a half-brain conclusion again!


  

Endnotes




    [i] One dictionary arrives at the term dialectic in this context in its ninth definition: "juxtaposition or interaction of conflicting ideas, forces, etc."  The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Second Edition Unabridged (New York: Random House, 1987) 547.
    [ii]Oneself As Another, Kathleen Blamey, trans. (University of Chicago, 1992) 113.
    [iii]Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (Yale, 1970) 27.
    [iv]The Hermeneutics Reader (Continuum, 1992) 27.
    [v]The Grammar of Discourse (Plenum, 1983) 337.
    [vi]Hermeneutics. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Northwestern University, 1969) 43-45.
    [vii]New Horizons in Hermeneutics (Zondervan, 1992) 5, 14, 26, 344-78, 372.
    [viii]"The Limits of Formalism and the Theology of Hope: Ricoeur, Moltmann, and Dostoyevsky," Literature and Theology I (1987) 4, cited by Thiselton, 348.
    [ix]John B. Thompson, ed./trans. (Cambridge, 1981), chapters four and seven.

  
Bibliography

Longacre, Robert E. The Grammar of Discourse. Plenum, 1983.

Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt. ed. The Hermeneutics Reader. Continuum, 1992.

Palmer, Richard E. Hermeneutics. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Northwestern University, 1969.

Ricoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation.   Yale, 1970.

_____________. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. John B.   Thompson, ed./trans. Cambridge, 1981.

_____________. Oneself As Another. Kathleen Blamey, trans. University of Chicago, 1992.

Thiselton, Anthony C. New Horizons in Hermeneutics. Zondervan, 1992.



*This paper was written for a UTA doctoral humanities class in 1993. Couric (couric@dcccd.edu) is retired from the Dallas College district and still works part-time as a professional support staff writing instructional specialist in the Ink Spot Academic Center for Writing on the Mountain View campus.











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