Dave Couric
Thomist and Neo-Thomist Ethics
Philosophy 5391 (Dr. Mahoney, UTA)
Spring 1996
Paper #1
Aquinas's Ethics
Thomas Aquinas's ethics can be considered in relation to his Summa Theologiae (the context for his ethical philosophy), his conception of happiness, and his understanding of the virtues of the good life. The primary source for Aquinas's ethics is his magnum opus, the Summa, where he considers "Man's movement toward God by human actions in general" in the "first part of the second part" of the Summa, called the "prima secundae." Aquinas there outlines actually in great detail the (virtuous) means by which human beings attain their telos (happiness). Just as he elsewhere delineates first principles of thought (basically the laws of logic), in his discussion of ethics he makes his famous four-fold division of laws (eternal/natural/human/divine), which are first principles of action. In addition, Aquinas divides virtues into two classes, "cardinal" (natural) and "theological" (supernatural).
The Treatise on Happiness (Questions 1-21 of the first half of the second part of the Summa) begins by establishing that there is indeed one ultimate end, or telos, for human life in general. That end is happiness (TH, 13, Q.1, A.7). But here the further distinction between perfect and imperfect happiness comes into play. When Aquinas says the ultimate end of man is happiness, he apparently means perfect happiness, which is a gift (of special grace) that comes by way of the supernatural (theological) virtues, not the "natural powers" of human beings (TH, 60, Q.5, A.5). Therefore, perfect happiness is what is known in traditional theology as the "beatific vision," or seeing God face-to-face ("vision of the divine essence," TH, 38, Q.3, A.8). However, Aquinas allows for an "imperfect" happiness, too. That is the natural happiness that can be found in this life, by means of the natural (cardinal) virtues. Aquinas explains that "external goods" are required for this imperfect happiness but not for perfect happiness. External goods are material things that satisfy the bodily appetites, for example (TH, 51, Q.4, A.7). So when Aquinas answers in the negative the question "Can one be happy in this life?" he means one cannot be perfectly happy in this life, although imperfect happiness is attainable (TH, 56, Q.5, A.3). Since everyone desires happiness (TH, 65, Q.5, A.8), either perfectly or imperfectly, happiness fulfills the human telos.
The Treatise on Virtues (Questions 49-67) defines a habit in general as an intrinsic principle of human action as opposed to law and grace, which are extrinsic principles (TV, 1, Q.49, introductory paragraph). A habit is also defined as a "quality," which is one of Aristotle's famous "categories" (TV, 1, Q.49, A.1). Then the further distinction is made to include habit as a "species of quality" along with disposition (TV, 3, Q.49, A.2). A habit is considered a "completion of a power," and a good habit in particular as a "perfection of a power," perfection meaning a good completion (TV, 51, Q.55, A.1). So there are good habits (virtues) and bad habits (vices). And good habits are required in the attainment of happiness (TH, 63, Q.5, A.7).
Virtue is a subcategory under habit. The Latin word virtus can mean either "virtue" or "power," in which latter case a neutral sense is conveyed even to the point of possibly being a synonym for vice, although this is probably an extreme or rare usage (TV, 53, Q.55, A.3, n.22). A good habit, or "perfection of a power," is a virtue (TV, 53, Q.55, A.3). The essence of virtue, then, is the good completion of a habit.
The major or primary or principal virtues are the four cardinal (moral) virtues (prudence [also an intellectual virtue], justice, temperance, fortitude), pivotal virtues on which all others depend and which are acquired and lead to imperfect happiness (TV, 110, Q.61, A.2). The three theological virtues are faith, hope, and love -- which lead to perfect happiness and are infused (by God) rather than acquired (TV, 118, Q.62, A.1).
The determining factors in the number of cardinal and theological virtues are different in the former than they are in the latter. Theological virtues are such as a result of what Aquinas calls the "divine" law, that is, they are revealed through special revelation. And so Aquinas quotes "the apostle," Paul, in support of faith, hope, and charity (love) as the three ordered theological virtues (TV, 121, Q.62, A.3). The cardinal virtues are so numbered, for one reason, because of what Aquinas refers to as "rectitude of appetite," which "not only confers the faculty of doing well but also causes the performing of a good action." Some of the moral virtues, then, are cardinal virtues because they involve rectitude of appetite (TV, 109, Q.61, A.1). Another reason there are only four cardinal virtues might be that "they are related to specific matters, each of them to its own matter in which that general condition is principally exemplified, from which the name of the virtue is taken..." (TV, 114, Q.61, A.4). In other words, it is "in regard to their common formal notions" and "as each is denominated from what is primary in its respective matter" that the four cardinal virtues are what they are: the main ones (TV, 112, Q.61, A.3).
Aquinas seems to accept Aristotle's basic system of ethics, at least as far as the natural or imperfect happiness goes. Aquinas then goes beyond Aristotle to include the supernatural or perfect conception of happiness in a theological sense. In that way, Aquinas' telos is more ultimate than Aristotle's though both hold to teleological ethics. Aristotle's "unmoved mover" may attract all things by their very nature, but for Aquinas the human telos must end beyond humanity so that it becomes a human-divine telos, culminating in the final vision of God.
# posted by D.R. Couric @ 6:38 AM
