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Wednesday, March 04, 2020

 

The Unholy Symmetrical Separation of Faith from Reason









THE UNHOLY SYMMETRICAL SEPARATION OF FAITH FROM REASON:
AN EXEGETICAL ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF THE DEFINITIVE FAITH PASSAGE IN HEBREWS 11:1 AND THE SURROUNDING CONTEXT


                                      By
                                  Dave Couric






  



                           Dallas Baptist University
                          College of Christian Faith
                         GREK 6301: Greek Exegesis III
                                   Dr. Bell
                                   Fall 1992





                                      
                       TRANSLATION: HEBREWS 10:35-11:3,6


            10:35Therefore, do not lose your confidence which has a great reward, 36for you need endurance so that you may receive the promise after having done the will of God.
37For yet in a very little while, the one coming will arrive and not delay.  38Now my[1] justified (one) will live by faith.  But if anyone withdraws, my soul is not pleased with him.

39However, we are not of those who withdraw to destruction but rather of those who have faith to the security of the soul.
            11:1Now faith is the certitude of things hoped for, the certainty of things not seen.  2For by this (faith), our ancestors were testified unto.  3By faith, we understand the universe to have been created by the spoken word of God so that what is seen has come into being from the invisible. . . . 6And without faith, it is impossible to please God because anyone approaching him must believe that he exists and is a rewarder of those seeking him out.


      When Archie Bunker once said something like, "Faith is believing what everybody knows ain't true," he may have been exaggerating --- but not much, in light of the contemporary understanding of faith.  The famous "All in the Family" TV show character --- fictional though he is --- was simply reflecting a slightly hyperbolic variation of a prevailing view concerning the classic issue of the relationship of faith to reason.  In other words, people today generally presume that faith and reason have no relationship at all.
      Ironically, that particular "Bunkerism" was more in line with the thinking of Archie's son-in-law, "the Meathead," who represented the new generation's challenge of the old's traditional beliefs 20 years ago.  In his own, often-distorted way, Archie generally defended with a loosely-held understanding the traditional association of faith with reason.  For example, the two characters were discussing something one time when the subject of hell came up.  The Meathead promptly announced his disbelief in the hot place as a way of avoiding Archie's warning against going there.  Archie's classic reply along with the characteristic frustrated wave of the arm was, "Yeah --- well, buddy --- when you get to hell, then you can look around and say, `I don't believe in this place'!"  In this way, he was connecting belief with reality or evidence and thus ended the argument.  So Archie at once represented the majority view that faith has no relationship to reason with his dictum on faith, but he reversed roles and supported the minority today with his defense of the objective reality of hell.
      Actually, the majority view of faith and reason is not so new at all.  In the 17th century, Blaise Pascal[2] warned against two extremes: including reason only and excluding reason altogether.  Admitting reason only means to exclude faith from any association with reason.  This is the position Archie unwittingly and uncharacteristically took when he uttered his pronouncement on faith and also the posture of the Meathead on the existence of hell.  Philosophical naturalists and skeptics (analytic school) fall into this category since they usually see little value in faith --- except, of course, unstated faith in the natural, physical laws of science![3]
      Excluding reason altogether is another way faith and reason are separated.  This extreme that Pascal warned against is the attitude of those who would change Archie's dictum to something like, "Faith is believing anything you want to."  This position represents a variation on the prevailing view of the majority today, which says it does not matter what one believes, as long as one is sincere.  This is much like the philosophical existentialist who, rather than embracing reason and attempting to discard faith like the naturalist, instead embraces "faith" while discarding reason in the process.[4]
      In brief, there are actually two mutually exclusive prevailing views of those who would separate faith from reason.  People today usually take either one side or the other, as a result of "trickle down" philosophy from the ivory towers to the man in the street.  As recently as 20 years ago, it seems that the majority preferred the first view, represented by Archie Bunker on faith and by his son-in-law on hell.  These days, as the ivory tower philosophers' influence continues to be felt in the street, it seems there has been a shift to the other, opposite extreme represented by the climate of relativism which has reduced belief to mere preference.[5]  If Pascal was correct, both extremes are wrong because they both reductionistically separate faith and reason entirely.  The older and wiser way to look at faith and reason is to see the former as inseparable from the latter.
      If the Bible is at all authoritative anymore, even on matters of faith --- as well it should be --- then it is not necessary to look anywhere else than to the definition[6] of faith itself found in Hebrews 11:1. "Now faith is the certitude of things hoped for, the certainty of things not seen."  The extremist views of those who include reason only or exclude reason altogether might legitimately be defended on other grounds if not for two key words in that verse, which will simply not allow for an interpretation like that of the naturalist or the existentialist, both of whom presume that the esoteric, mystical notion of "faith" has absolutely nothing to do with objective reality, or the "real world."
      The first key Greek word used by the author of Hebrews to define faith is a predicate noun[7] which has been rendered "substance" (KJV), "assurance" (RSV/NASV), "reality" (Marshall), and "sure" (NIV).  This refers to the general subjective certitude that faith includes.  Were faith to only consist of this subjective element, the naturalist and existentialist might have a case for their respective systems.  But the other key word, also a predicate nominative,[8] can be translated "evidence" (KJV), "conviction" (RSV/NASV), "proof" (Marshall), and "certain" (NIV).[9]  This is the element of faith that corresponds to the general objective certainty that faith rests upon, i.e., reason.  Without this objective element, one would be trapped in the hopelessly impossible situation of moving from the illusion of certainty to the certainty of illusion, as some philosopher once put it.[10]  Therefore, reason is a part of faith, although faith is not a part of reason.  Faith is not a part of reason because faith is more than reason.  Faith includes reason but goes beyond it.  Faith, by definition, is inseparable from reason.  So the truth turns out to be precisely the opposite of Archie's (and society's) self-perpetuating myth that faith is believing without any regard to truth.  Quite to the contrary, faith is believing what is known to be true, based on evidence, because it is impossible for someone to really believe something known beforehand to be false, which Archie's dictum stipulates.  Not even Archie really believes something he himself knows is not true.  The heart simply cannot respond to what the mind rejects, at least not without defying the axiomatic and universally-practiced laws of logic by an irrational "leap" into the purely subjective --- which is what the existentialist by necessity ends up attempting to do since his system disallows a rational basis from which to act, theoretically.[11]
      To say that faith is inseparable from reason does not mean they are one and the same.  That would be a similar fatal error in the opposite direction on the magnitude of, or analogous to, the reduction of faith and reason to no relationship at all.  Faith is not reason, and reason is not faith.  Yet faith apart from reason is just as false as faith apart from works is true as the means of theological justification.  If faith and reason were like two sides of the same coin, they would be inseparable in a symmetrical manner.  That is, they would be equal aspects of the same thing, thus removing almost all distinction.  But they are not to be equated.  Instead, their relationship is more complex.  They are inseparable in an asymmetrical manner.  That means the relationship of faith to reason is different from the relationship of reason to faith.  They are related reciprocally in different ways.  Reason is not related to faith in the same way faith is related to reason.
      One way to view the difference between the two realms is to understand that reason is a logically necessary condition for faith but not a sufficient one.  That is, reason is a prerequisite for faith because the latter rests on the former.  Obviously, the converse is not true, so faith is not a necessary condition for reason.  The classic reformational view of the nature of saving faith corroborates the asymmetrical relationship of faith and reason.  The reformers from the 16th century explained faith as consisting of knowledge, assent, and trust (notitia, assensus, and fiducia), thus delineating the equivocal senses of faith, both narrow and broad.  So broadly defined, faith (trust) includes reason (assent) and revelation (knowledge).  Or, if knowledge and assent are lumped together as belief that (Latin fides), and trust is belief in (fiducia), then one must believe that something is true before believing in it.
      To explain the relationship of faith and reason as asymmetrical is to say that the structure of the two realms is hierarchical, as some philosophers have done for all of reality.[12]  With this in mind, it is not difficult to see the universality of hierarchy in human experience.  Language, e.g., is understood by most modern linguists as consisting of multiple levels of hierarchy from sound to form to meaning.  Sounds make up words, and words have meanings: not the other way around, since words without sounds (or letters) are impossible, e.g.[13]
      To separate faith from reason is to be left with only reason.  The same results if reason is separated from faith, hence reason has an independent existence, although faith does not.  Faith is, according to scripture, a special gift of God.  So in the narrow sense of the word, faith (trust) has no independent existence but is something added by God to what everyone already has, i.e., reason (knowledge and assent).  So in the strictest sense of the terms, all that can be offered the world is reason; God alone gives faith.  The naturalist ignores his need of the gift and goes on his way, and the existentialist tries to manufacture his own gift without benefit of a solid basis for it.[14]
      Based on the biblical definition of faith as including the objective certainty of invisible reality, the evidence for such must be understood as indirect.  In other words, the rational basis on which faith rests, and which is included in faith, is a logical inference from empirical evidence --- not direct empirical evidence itself.  It is indirect evidence for the invisible reality through the visible creation of the universe.[15]  When human beings see as it were the handwriting of God in nature, the logically compelling thing to do is to infer intelligence behind it, just as archeologists do when they find artifacts with unknown languages inscribed on them --- and just the opposite of what evolutionists do with scientific evidence and "chance."[16] So faith is directly related to reason while only indirectly related to empirical experience.  Otherwise, there would be no need of faith since we would "walk by sight" rather than faith if there were a direct link to the empirical.[17]
      Whether Archie and real-life people realize it or not, they have been subtly influenced to accept a myth as fact.  The myth is that faith can exist separately from reason.  That is, academia --- and often the church --- has led the common folks to think that what one believes ultimately has no basis in reality.  In other words, if something is accepted on faith, such as belief in God's existence, then it is not reasonable to think that it is necessarily real.  The myth, then, is an unholy lie in which two asymmetrically related truths are illegitimately divorced in a symmetrical way so that they supposedly exist independently and unrelatedly.  This is an egregious error compounded by its delusionary nature.  People are certainly free to embrace an illusion, but reality speaks volumes contrariwise.
      To return to the most famous verse in the Bible on what faith is,[18] Hebrews 11:1 might possibly be misconstrued on a surface reading to mean that faith is truly disconnected with all reality of this world simply because the second half of the definition of faith seems to point one beyond to the unseen realm ("things not seen").  Indeed, the first half of the verse does the same ("things hoped for").[19]  However, the third verse leads the interpreter away from the idea that faith is not related to this world when it clearly states that "what is seen" comes from "the invisible," i.e., "things not seen" in the first verse.  So there is a connection between the two realities, material and immaterial, both of which are true.  The certainty in what is seen is therefore extended to the things not seen since the former comes from the latter.
      The idea of a faith grounded in reason casts a different shadow on the interpretation of 11:2-3, which has perhaps been misunderstood by some or even taught in a misguided way.  Some familiar with the "Faith Hall of Fame" in the 11th chapter may have gotten the idea that "our ancestors" constantly took a leap of faith over and against their better judgment and that they were listed in the author's tribute based on willingness to act irrationally.  Similarly, some might think on the basis of the bold proclamation of 11:3 that believing in creation rather than evolution is "just a matter of faith."  Although the verse starts out "By faith. . ." comes the knowledge of creation, this should not be construed as a mystical act of the will that produces the result of simply believing.  In context, especially of 11:1, the faith that is the means to the end of the knowledge of the origin of creation is a rational and reasonable one based indirectly on "what is seen" and directly on the connection between "what is seen" and "the invisible," i.e., directly on "the spoken word of God."  So faith does not simply rest on the unknown, but rather indirectly on the empirical evidence and directly on the logical connection between the visible and invisible.[20]  Likewise, 11:6 reinforces the concept of faith defined broadly enough to include belief that as a prerequisite to belief in since it unambiguously asserts that faith, without which God is not to be pleased (cf. 10:38), is necessary "because anyone approaching him must believe that he exists and is a rewarder of those seeking him out."  It may be a coincidence, but more likely the additional element, beyond simply believing that God exists, corresponds to the full trust implicit in biblical faith.  The demons believe God exists, as James 2:19 points out, but they do not believe that he warrants their trust.[21]
      The expository discourse that begins at Chapter 11 is preceded by hortatory discourse[22] ending with the last part of Chapter 10, which introduces Chapter 11 on the theme of faith.[23]  The author is encouraging believers to press on and persevere to the end, ultimate salvation, which is the "great reward" of 10:35[24] and "the promise" of 10:36.[25]  After a quote without introduction in 10:37-38[26] (from the OT, Habakkuk 2:3-4) about among other things the apostasy potential found elsewhere in the book, the writer characteristically expresses optimism of himself and his readers in 10:39[27] such that the contrast is drawn between "those who withdraw to destruction" and "those who have faith. . . ."  That is, those who actually turn away for good commit apostasy in the sense that they were never true believers to begin with, the proof being their final apostate state.  This passage closely parallels other such sections in Hebrews as the controversial 6:4-6ff. where it seems that, whether apostasy is understood as the hypothetical, potential turning away of real Christians or the actual turning away of those who profess to be Christians but are not really, the conclusion is the same.  That is, in either sense of apostasy, there would be no coming back to repentance and faith.  So whether apostasy is possible or not depends on the sense of the word.  If it means true believers actually abandoning the faith permanently, then apostasy is impossible, considering the gracious activity of God.  But if it means a professing but not "possessing" believer (i.e., unbeliever) turning away from a hypocritical lifestyle as a so-called Christian, then it certainly is not only possible but to be expected of many.  So the church will always have "tares" in with the "wheat," but many of the former will leave never to return, thus proving their unregenerate state.
      Also within the quotation from the OT in 10:37-38 is the mention of faith.  "Now my justified [or righteous] (one) will live by faith" is one of four scriptural variations on the cardinal doctrine of the church since the 16th century reformation, including Habakkuk 2:4 where the text says, "But the righteous will live by his faith."  The other two occurrences are in the NT: Romans 1:17 and Galatians 3:11, both of which read the familiar "The righteous will live by faith."  Since the doctrine of justification by faith is mentioned in four different contexts in the Bible, the fact that it is considered in history as "the doctrine by which the church stands or falls" comes as no surprise, at least to Protestants who follow Luther in that respect.
      The contemporary assault on faith seems to be on at least two fronts, from the academy in general and some of the church in particular.  First, as noted earlier, there is an incipient aversion to the reasonable nature of biblical faith on the part of the external world outside of the church: the academy and on down to the secular masses.  And second, there seems to be a similar misunderstanding from within much of the church.  Internally, the polemic debates seem to stretch from broader soteriological concerns and then progress in a narrower direction to the pistological.  Take for example the current evangelical debate on the so-called "Lordship salvation" controversy.  Incidentally, this represents an instance of two things being inseparable in a symmetrical manner: Christ as Savior and Lord.  One without the other is impossible with the result that they are almost without distinction: the Lordship view.  However, the other view, i.e., "non-Lordship," would relate Savior and Lord as inseparable but asymmetrically: one may receive Christ as Savior (believer) without having him as Lord (disciple) but not vice versa for most within that camp.  This latter error could be called the unholy asymmetrical separation of Savior from Lord.[28]
      The way those who would divide the offices of Christ into a two-step process arrive at their incorrect position seems to involve a two-step error itself: a fragmented soteriology[29] and a truncated pistology, a false dichotomy on two fronts.  First, they ingenuously force a separation between justification and sanctification, as if the event of justification could occur without the process of sanctification starting at that point, in an unnatural effort to avoid all reference to works in salvation in the narrow sense of the word.  This results in an outright denial by some of the inevitability of good works following saving faith.  Second, their broad fragmentation of soteriology is followed by a narrower truncating of pistology since they further proceed to reduce justification to less than what it is, as a result of a deficient view of faith, again in an ill-conceived effort to avoid commitment as works-oriented.  This is the specific error concerning which the major battle has been fought in the controversy: the nature of saving faith.  In effect, faith in the broad sense is gutted, leaving only a "barren intellectualism," as mere knowledge and assent has accurately been called.  That is, the trust component, or commitment factor, of faith is rejected on the same grounds that justification is illegitimately divorced from sanctification: the unfounded and misguided notion of keeping works out of the equation of salvation, which becomes faith equals justification minus works rather than the biblical equation faith equals justification plus works.  So not only have they reduced the whole of salvation as a process of justification, sanctification, and glorification to only the first of these three distinct yet inseparable components, but they have gone on to divide justification itself, leaving only assent to knowledge.
      Also contributing to the truncating of pistology is the outright rejection of repentance as a fundamental aspect of faith.  Repentance must be included in the commitment factor, or trust element, of faith.  To repent is to have faith and vice versa.  Those who misunderstand repentance either redefine it in such a way that it is no more than intellectual assent, theorized out of practical existence, or else repentance is removed from faith entirely in which case barren intellectualism is still the result.[30]
      This system of slicing up Christianity into a Christian/Christian life, believer/disciple, or salvation/discipleship dichotomy apparently stems in part from the equivocal use of terms like cost.  For example, it seems an oft-repeated cliche that "salvation is free, but discipleship costs everything," as if one could earn the right to something after being given another thing.  The fact is salvation does indeed cost infinitely in a meritorious sense: it cost Christ's ultimate sacrifice.  And in that sense it costs the believer nothing: it is free.  But in another sense of cost, becoming and being a Christian costs a believer everything --- not that anything is earned in a meritorious sense but that everything changes, which is what the new life is all about.
      Another example of the assault on contemporary faith in a more general way is the continued efforts on the part of liberalism to discredit historic, biblical Christianity.  This influence has the unique position of exerting pressure both from within and without the church and the academy.  The paradoxical result is that whether the liberals are putting that pressure to conform to their bankrupt system on their "flocks" from the church's standpoint or the academy's, the effect is the same: unbelief.  So a blurring of distinction between the two institutions of the church and the academy is the net result.  In a sense, liberalism of all kinds does precisely what it collectively accuses conservatives of doing in instances such as the 1992 presidential campaigns.  At one point, Vice President Dan Quayle was ridiculed for criticizing, or "attacking," a "fictional character" when he took on Hollywood for promoting immoral values on TV.  He simply used a particular popular TV show, one that glamorized an unwed mother, as an example of the cultural values of those who produced the show.  The resulting deluge of publicity mocked the vice president as one who was so out of touch with reality that he did not know the difference between a real person and a fictional TV character, as if that were the point.
      Interestingly, though, attacking a "fictional God" is exactly what theological liberals seem to thrive on.  In other words, it is ironic that given the fact that they do not believe in the God of biblical Christianity, or "fundamentalism" as they like to call it, they still launch their crusades across the country in the media and in scholarship to discredit this God they do not believe in.  If the God of the Bible, both Old and New Testaments, has been manufactured by the repressive imagination of conservatives throughout history, why is it the liberals' everlasting duty to stamp out something that does not really exist in the first place?  The only conclusion to draw is the paradoxical one in which the liberals, rather than simply ignoring "fiction" as Quayle was advised to do, are willing to go as far as assuming some biblical premises of those they disdain in order to then argue against the biblical conclusions, as if people do not know that the biblical God and scripture either stand or fall together since there is a logical connection between them.[31]
      Although the future prospects do not look so good for the mystical drift of faith away from reason, there would be no better remedy for society's ills than a return to the tried and true balance that has for one reason or another been missing from popular theology and philosophy during the contemporary period of history.















SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Commentaries, books and reference works
Abbott-Smith, G. A Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament. Edinburgh: T&T   Clark, 1968.
Adler, Mortimer. Some Questions About Language: A Theory of Human Discourse and      Its Objects. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1976.
Attridge, Harold W. The Epistle to the Hebrews. ed. Helmut Koester.
      Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989.
Beekman, John, gen. ed. Exegetical Helps on the Epistle to the Hebrews. Mexico:      SIL, 1975.
Bruce, F.F. The Epistle to the Hebrews. New International Commentaries on the New Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990.
Bullinger, E.Y. Figures of Speech Used in the Bible.  Grand Rapids: Baker,
      1968.
Casserley, J.V. Langmead. Graceful Reason: The Contribution of Reason to       Theology. Greenwich, CN: Seabury, 1954.
Dana and Mantey. A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament. MacMillan,       1955.
Ellingsworth, Paul and Eugene A. Nida. A Translator's Handbook on the Letter to      the Hebrews. UBS, 1983.
Friberg, Barbara and Timothy, eds. Analytical Greek New Testament. Grand
       Rapids: Baker, 1981.
Geehan, E.R. ed. Jerusalem and Athens. Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1977.
The Greek New Testament. 3rd ed. United Bible Societies, 1975.
Hughes, P.E. A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. Grand Rapids:
      Eerdmans,   1977.
Kistemaker, Simon J. Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews. New Testament       Commentary. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984.
Kubo, Sakae. A Reader's Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and a       Beginner's Guide for the Translation of New Testament Greek. Grand
      Rapids: Zondervan, 1978.
Louw, Johannes P. and Eugene A. Nida. Greek-English Lexicon of the New
      Testament   Based on Semantic Domains. Vol. 1. New York: UBS, 1989.
Marshall, Alfred.  The NIV Interlinear Greek-English New Testament.  Grand     Rapids: Zondervan, 1976.
Mayers, Ronald B. Both/And: A Balanced Apologetic. Chicago: Moody, 1984.
Metzger, Bruce. A Textual Commentary of the Greek New Testament.  3rd ed.      London/New York: UBS, 1971/75.
Miller, Neva F. The Epistle to the Hebrews: An Analytical and Exegetical       Handbook. Dallas: SIL, 1988.
Moffatt, James. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the     Hebrews. ICC. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1968.
Nash, Ronald. Dooyeweerd and the Amsterdam Philosophy. Grand Rapids:     Zondervan, 1962.
____________. The Word of God and the Mind of Man. Grand Rapids: Zondervan,    1982.
Nestle-Aland.  Novum Testamentum Graece. 26th ed. Stuttgart:  Deutsche   Bibelstiftung, 1979.
Nicoll, W.R., ed. The Expositor's Greek Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
      1970.
Pascal, Blaise. The Thoughts of Blaise Pascal. ed. Brunschvicg. Garden City,
      NY: Doubleday, n.d.
Rienecker, Fritz. A Linguistic Key to the Greek New Testament. ed. Cleon
      Rogers. Grand Rapids: Regency, 1980.
Robertson, A.T. and W. Hersey Davis. A New Short Grammar of the Greek New      Testament. 10th ed. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977.
Sire, James W. The Universe Next Door. 2nd ed. Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1988.
Westcott, B.F. The Epistle to the Hebrews. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973.
Yeager, R.O.  The Renaissance New Testament. Vol. 16. Gretna, LA: Pelican,
      1985.

Articles
Boice, James. "To God Be the Glory: A Christian Worldview." Bible Studies      Magazine 24/12 (December 1992) 10-11.
Blomberg, Craig L. "Degrees of Reward in the Kingdom of Heaven?" JETS 35/2     (June 1992) 159-72.
Clark, Gordon. "Veridicalism and Presuppositionalism: A Review Article." JETS 24/2 (June 1981) 163-71.    
Gerstner, John. "Reason or Faith: Which Comes First in the Plan of Salvation?"       Tabletalk 15/7 (July 1991) 6-7.
Hendel, Ronald S. "When God acts immorally --- is the Bible a good book?" Bible       Review (June 1991).
King, Marchant A. "Let's Study Hebrews 10." Moody Monthly (September 1982) 94.
Mayers, Ronald B. "Both/And: The Uncomfortable Apologetic."  JETS.  23/3       (September 1980) 231-41.
Melvin, Ann. "How did we get into this `belief' thing?" Dallas Morning News    (September 5, 1992) 31A.
Pink, Arthur. "Lord and Saviour." Free Grace Broadcaster 141 (July 1992) 8.
Siegfried, Tom. "Scientist finds special meaning in search for universe's      secrets." Dallas Morning News (August 10, 1992) 9D.
Sproul, R.C. "The Rational God of Our Reasonable Faith." Eternity (April 1988)       60.

Unpublished material
Bell, Jr. W.E. "Some Additional Thoughts on the Lordship Question." Graduate   Greek class (Dallas: DBU, Fall 1992).
Lloyd, Linda Kathryn. "A Discourse Analysis of Hebrews."  M.A. (linguistics)   thesis, Dallas: UTA/SIL, 1976.
Spencer, Stephen. "A Comparison and Evaluation of the Old Princeton and Amsterdam Apologetic." Th.M thesis, Grand Rapids Baptist Seminary, 1980.




    [1]The only text critical problem of significance in this selected section of Hebrews occurs here where there are three major variant readings: without my, with my after faith, i.e., my faith in English, and as the Greek text has been edited to include my following justified one, i.e., my justified one in English.  None of these variants is supported by all three main textual traditions, or families.  For example, the Western text is split between the first and second variants, the Majority supports the first, and the Alexandrian the third, although manuscript B is not included.  Therefore, the first variant seems to have just about as much weight externally as the others and makes the most internal sense in translation because it matches the other two times the same OT quote is used in the NT: Romans 1:17 and Galatians 3:11.  On the other hand, since God is apparently speaking in this OT reference, the fact that he goes on to say in the first person "my soul is not pleased with him" might justify the use of "my justified one will live by faith," on internal grounds.  UBS gives the decision to include my, the third variant, a C rating, which indicates some uncertainty or disagreement on the part of those who comprised the committee on the Greek text as to the strength of all the alternatives.
    [2]The Thought of Blaise Pascal (New York: Doubleday, n.d.) no.253, cited by Ronald B. Mayers, "Both/And: The Uncomfortable Apologetic," JETS 23/3 (September 1980) 236.  Pascal also explains the relationship of faith to sense perception: "Faith indeed tells what the senses do not tell, but not the contrary of what they see.  It is above them and not contrary to them," Ibid., no.265.
    [3]On the self-refuting and inherently contradictory nature of skepticism in general, J.V. Langmead Casserley, Graceful Reason (Greenwich, CN: Seabury, 1954) comments: "No matter how we define meaningless, it remains true that we can only describe a statement or an idea as meaningless if we are in a position to perceive its meaning" (38-9).  He prefers the term nonsense rather than meaningless "for it is only because we know the meaning of phrases that we see them to be nonsense" (38).  This seems to be a rather strong indictment of the current so-called "linguistic" philosophers who claim that "religious language" or "God-talk" is "meaningless" in the same way that positivists and other phenomenologists did in the recent past.  Casserley goes on to say, "I am convinced that to delimit and restrict the scope of human reason by a self-critical rational activity is a mistaken and self-contradictory enterprise.  Reason cannot trace its own boundaries without transcending its own boundaries.  In other words, the so-called [Kantian] critical philosophy is continually guilty of arguing `in a circle'" (66-7).  However, Casserley is quick to point out that he is not talking about certainty in his critique of Kantian thought and in proving the existence of God.  He holds to probability at best as to the rational strength of the cosmological argument, e.g. (67).  Good theistic arguments "taken together. . .indicate that it is extremely probable that the theistic philosophy is the one which is, at least, most significantly gravitating in the direction of truth" (99-100) and a "high degree of probability is in effect almost indistinguishable from sheer certainty" (123), in defense of arguing for theism.
      Casserley, an Episcopal/Anglican, cites the confusion between the effect of sin on human reason and the effect of finitude as the distinction missed by some of his reformed colleagues, probably the fideists or presuppositionalists arising from the Amsterdam philosophy of the Dutch Calvinists.  He interprets Calvin as making the distinction between finitude and sin while emphasizing properly the latter as the cause of the marring of the imago Dei: ". . .although we are incapable of knowing everything about anything because our minds are finite, yet we have no warrant whatever for believing that there is any reality which is entirely and in principle unknowable" (emphasis added, 106).  This cuts through the phenomenologists' Kantian wall of separation between the noumena and phenomena.
      On the question of suspending judgment on the existence of God, Casserley adds that if the cases for and against the existence of God were evenly balanced, then it might be legitimate.  But, "there are no positive arguments for atheism, corresponding to the positive arguments for theism.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how there could be.  A positive argument for a negative conclusion is in the very nature of the case a rare thing" (106).  Sounds similar to: "You can't prove a universal negative."  Also, atheists normally present arguments against arguments for the existence of God.  They apparently do not, however, simply present arguments against the existence of God.  As C.S. Lewis found in his own life, even the ability to deny God's existence comes from God: ". . .atheism turns out to be too simple.  If the whole universe has no meaning, we should never have found out that it has no meaning: just as, if there were no light in the universe and therefore no creatures with eyes, we should never know it was dark."   Mere Christianity (New York: MacMillan, 1958) 42, cited by James Boice, "To God Be the Glory: A Christian Worldview," Bible Studies Magazine 24/12 (December 1992) 10-11.
    [4]That two of the "big guns" of modern philosophy together led to the two major phenomenological schools of philosophical thought extant today can be demonstrated with reference to the difference of Hume and Kant on the limits of human reason: "While Hume regarded faith as nonrational because it was based on custom or instinct, Kant believed that faith could be grounded in practical reason," according to Ronald Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982) 28n.
    [5]As recently as this fall, one of the local Dallas newspaper columnists reflected on just such a scenario.  Ann Melvin, "How did we get into this `belief' thing?" Dallas Morning News (September 5, 1992) 31A, sees the "warm, cuddly feeling" and "warm and fuzzy" approach to "our gravest responsibility and lifelong quest" of choosing the recipient of personal faith as entirely inadequate and "indicates an alarmingly diminished scope of the human spirit. . . .that reduce[s] our very humanity."  She attributes much of the problem to "a failure of language" which results in meaningless "psychobabble" in the media, political candidates, writers, teachers, and leaders who shape not only public policy but also private opinion.
    [6]Although the assertion that Hebrews 11:1 defines faith may be challenged, "the emphatic position of the word may suggest a `definition style' (s. Michel)," according to Fritz Rienecker, A Linguistic Key to the Greek New Testament, ed. Cleon Rogers (Grand Rapids: Regency, 1980) 360.
    [7]The word _πόστασις means documented "attestation" which provides evidence of ownership, according to Rienecker, 360.  It also means "title deed" in G. Abbott-Smith, A Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1968) 463.  This word is further explained as referring to "the apprehension of the reality by the individual.  It denotes the subjective certitude provided by the Holy Spirit," in Mayers, ". . .: The Uncomfortable Apologetic," 237.
    [8]This word, _λεγχoς, is a hapax legomenon which was used in papyri of legal proofs of an accusation, according to Rienecker, 360.  Abbott-Smith, 141, gives the sense of "proof, test."  The word "pertains to the factual basis of evidence and conviction upon which the subjective certitude is based. . . .Biblical faith is thus both belief and trust, both objective and subjective, both rationally propositional and existentially personal," according to Mayers, 237.  He clarifies a long-standing distortion of Augustine's position by quoting from On the Predestination of the Saints, Chapter 5, in which the saint says: "Therefore, understand in order to believe; believe in order to understand. . . .Understand in order that you may believe my word; believe in order that you may understand the word of God."  Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews, ed. Helmut Koester (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989) 308, says as much: "Faith, in other words, involves both affective-volitional and cognitive elements; it is obedient fidelity and trusting belief at the same time and both components are essential."
    [9]Perhaps the most technically precise understanding of these terms of faith is that faith is the assurance of the reality of future things, the conviction based on the proof of unseen things, in an expanded translation provided by Neva F. Miller, The Epistle to the Hebrews: An Analytical and Exegetical Handbook (Dallas: SIL, 1988) 326.  So faith is philosophically balanced by the subjective assurance of the objective ontological reality and the subjective conviction of the objective epistemological proof.  F.F. Bruce, The Epistle to the Hebrews, NIC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990) 277, points out the source of alternative renditions for the first key word reality: in Hebrews 1:3, the word is used in the objective sense of Christ being the "image of God's hypostasis," but in 3:14, believers' subjective apprehension of that reality is in view, hence the various translations.  Bruce prefers the latter choice for 11:1; likewise for Simon J. Kistemaker, Exposition to the Epistle to the Hebrews, NTC (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984) 311.
    [10]This leads to the same quagmire one is left in with an anecdote on skepticism, cited by Casserley, 104: "One is reminded of the sceptical father to his son.  `My boy, always be doubtful about everything.  Only a fool is ever certain of anything.'  `Are you quite sure that's true, father?' replies the son.  `Yes, my boy, I'm absolutely certain of it.'"
    [11]This is not a denial of the idea of mysteries in faith.  As R.C. Sproul, "The Rational God of Our Reasonable Faith," Eternity (April 1988) 60, has pointed out: "We do not understand a mystery.  We cannot understand a contradiction.  Because we do not understand something does not mean we cannot understand it.  But even God cannot square a bona fide contradiction."
    [12]According to the philosophical systematization of Herman Dooyeweerd, e.g., reality is hierarchical: different aspects are related in an asymmetrical manner.  "This means that if X is related to Y in a certain way, then Y cannot be related to X in the same way," explains Ronald Nash, Dooyeweerd and the Amsterdam Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962) 50.  "The lower (substratum) spheres are a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the later (superstratum) spheres" of reality.
    [13]Mortimer Adler provides insight into language and its objects in answering the question, "How is the perceptual object related to the really existing thing which causes our perception of that object?"  In other words, what is the relationship of the "perceptible thing" and the "perceptual object" to each other?  Adler's answer is that the thing that can be perceived and our perception of it as an object cannot be explained unless it is understood that ". . .two modes of being of one and the same entity are existentially inseparable in an asymmetrical manner" (emphasis added).  Some Questions About Language (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1976) 114.  By analogy, then, faith and reason exist as one entity but in a complementary rather than identical fashion.
    [14]The distinct reactions of the naturalist and existentialist can be illustrated by two 19th century poems of Stephen Crane, cited in James W. Sire, The Universe Next Door 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 1988) 96 and 13, respectively: I saw a man pursuing the horizon;/Round and round they sped./I was disturbed at this;/I accosted the man./"It is futile," I said,/"You can never ---"/"You lie," he cried,/And ran on. (from The Black Riders and Other Lines, 1895); A man said to the universe:/"Sir, I exist."/"However," replied the universe,/"The fact has not created in me/A sense of obligation." (from War is Kind and Other Lines, 1899).
    [15]Miller, 328, sounds a similar note: "Faith enables the spiritual data being communicated through revelation to enter in and convince the mind just as surely as sense data, when accepted by the mind, produce a demonstration of what is going on in the physical world."
    [16]To avoid the inevitable conclusion of creation, there is almost no extreme to which scientists will not go.  For example, the appeal to quantum physics is popular and results in such statements as the following by Dr. Rocky Kolb, a cosmologist with the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in Batavia, IL.  In answering the question, "Why is there a universe?" he says, "I don't know. . . .it's impossible to have nothing. . ."  Then he concludes that since certainty is not permitted by quantum physics, "in a universe of nothingness, without space and time, a universe like the one we know is bound to spontaneously appear," as paraphrased by a reporter, Tom Siegfried, editor of the Dallas Morning News science section, "Scientist finds special meaning in search for universe's secrets" (August 10, 1992) 9D.
    [17]Pascal seems to have held the balance between faith and reason about as well as can be expected as he notes in Pensees 564: "The prophecies, the very miracles and proofs of our religion, are not of such a nature that they can be said to be absolutely convincing.  But they are also of such a kind that it cannot be said that it is unreasonable to believe them.  Thus there is both evidence and obscurity to enlighten some and confuse others.  But the evidence is such that it surpasses, or at least equals, the evidence to the contrary; so that it is not reason which can determine men not to follow it, and thus it can only be lust or malice of heart.  And by this means there is sufficient evidence to condemn, and insufficient to convince; so that it appears to those who follow it, that it is grace, and not reason which makes them follow it; and in those who shun it, that it is lust, not reason, which makes them shun it" (emphasis added), cited by Mayers, Both/And: A Balanced Apologetic (Chicago: Moody, 1984) 122, 143.  So the evidence for biblical truth is "sufficient to condemn" but not "convince" everyone.  That is, it is proof without persuasion.  Pascal rightly points out that believers acquiesce in the evidence because of something more than reason, namely grace (as a gift).  And unbelievers reject the evidence --- not on grounds of reason or insufficiency, but because of something less: their own "lust," or pride, in willful, stubborn suppression of the truth.
    [18]The Greek noun itself, πίστις, is related to the verb πείθω, "to persuade," rather than πιστεύω, "to have faith," according to Abbott-Smith, 362.
    [19]"Things hoped for" and "things not seen" translate two parallel present passive participles that modify the same noun in agreement, "things."  So the participles are adjectival attributive with a verbal sense since they have no article.
    [20]The word voo_μεv ("we understand") comes from a verb which has the connotation of mental rather than sense perception, according to Rienecker, 360, and so indicates a rational rather than empirical basis for the faith that is emphasized sentence-initially.  The present sense of the verb may signal the ongoing, universal understanding that is evident in creation.  The content of what "we understand" is in the infinitive κατηρτίσθαι, which is a substantival object.  The perfect passive tense of the infinitive puts the focus on the present result: the creation of the world, or universe generally, is something that should be obvious to all in the here and now and may include the idea of God's sustaining power.  The means of this incredible display of power is "the spoken word of God," the first Greek word being instrumental of means and the second, ablative of source.  In the complicated second half of 11:3, there is an articular infinitive of result joined with a preposition: ε_ς τ_. . .γεγovέvαι ("so that . . . has come into being"), according to R.O. Yeager, The Renaissance New Testament, Vol. 16 (Gretna, LA: Pelican, 1985) 368.  Then, following the article, is μ_, which "goes with the participle [φαιvoμέvov] not the infinitive" in A.T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament, 10th ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977) 392, but with the infinitive in Alfred Marshall, The NIV Interlinear Greek-English New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976) 882.  Ditto for Rienecker, 360, citing Hughes.  Either way, the visible comes from the invisible, not vice versa.  The infinitive is a perfect because of the present result of the existence of things.  Both participles in this verse are present adjectival substantival.  The first is also an ablative of source since the visible arises from the invisible.
    [21]In 11:6, "to please" translates the aorist _vαρεστ_σαι, which is a substantival subject infinitive of which the preceding word ("impossible") is the predicate adjective.  The following aorist infinitive, πιστε_σαι, is a substantival object of the verb δε_ ("to be necessary").  Two adjectival substantival present participles in this verse are πρoσερχόμεvov and _κζητoo_σιv, "anyone approaching" and "those seeking (him) out," respectively.
    [22]Linda Kathryn Lloyd, "A Discourse Analysis of Hebrews," M.A. (linguistics) thesis (Dallas: SIL/UTA, 1976) 5.
    [23]Marchant A. King, "Let's Study Hebrews 10," Moody Monthly (September 1982) 94.
    [24]The reward is the motivation for the command in this verse to "not lose your confidence."  The verb _πoβάλητε is an aorist subjunctive used with μ_ to signal prohibition; in other words, the verb is functioning as an imperative.
    [25]This verse emphasizes the endurance needed in order to receive the promise.  The word for endurance is the first in the main clause which is further modified by a _vα adverbial purpose clause (lit. "For you have need of endurance in order that. . .you may receive the promise").  Or, perhaps it is also a result clause, "sub-final," in the terminology of Yeager, 361, who cites Burton, New Testament Moods and Tenses, 148, with the idea of "intended result."  There is another qualification to receiving the promise of ultimate salvation, and that is "after you have done the will of God" or "after having done the will of God."  The participle πoιήσατες is an aorist modifying the verb receive, so it is an adverbial temporal participle with an antecedent sense of action such that the action of the participle is done before that of the verb which it modifies.  Also, the sense of the aorist is probably culminative since the promise is fulfilled after the event of having done God's will.
    [26]10:37 contains the common messianic "the one coming" or "he who comes" participle _ρχόμεvoς, a present deponent.  This is an adjectival substantival participle since there is no noun in agreement.  10:38 has the classical justification formula in which "by faith" seems best taken as an ablative of means so that faith is the means God uses in bringing spiritual life.  In the next line, __v with the subjunctive aorist verb withdraw is a third-class conditional, which leaves open the possibility of a "tare" withdrawing permanently or one of the "wheat" withdrawing temporarily.  However, the next verse addresses the contextual situation.
    [27]"However, we. . ." shows that the writer expects no such apostasy since the pronoun is first in the sentence and his audience is further characterized as "of faith," genitive of description.
    [28]Even the order of the two words in scripture seem to contradict the non-Lordship view: "In every passage of the NT where these two titles occur together, it is `Lord and Saviour,' and never `Saviour and Lord,'" observes Arthur W. Pink, "Lord and Saviour," Free Grace Broadcaster 141 (July 1992) 8.
    [29]Craig L. Blomberg, "Degrees of Reward in the Kingdom of Heaven?" JETS 35/2 (June 1992) 159, cites a similar development that he calls "justification by faith and sanctification by works" in which the two doctrines ironically become contrary ones when the former is all of God but the latter is all the Christian's doing: the doctrine of degrees of reward in heaven.
    [30]W.E. Bell, Jr. "Some Additional Thoughts on the Lordship Question," Greek class (Dallas: DBU, Fall 1992).  Hence "repentant faith or faithful repentance is the only way to salvation," writes John H. Gerstner, "Reason or Faith: Which Comes First in the Plan of Salvation?" Tabletalk 15/7 (July 1991) 6-7.
    [31]Reading Ronald S. Hendel, "When God acts immorally --- is the Bible a good book?" Bible Review (June 1991), about God being an accomplice to Abel's murder because God rejected Cain's offering for no explained reason, gives a conservative the strange sensation that a powerful battle is going on at a different level from the surface.  Here is an SMU theology professor writing for a respected, albeit somewhat liberal, magazine, who by his very title of the article places himself in an impossible situation. ("Many of the characters in the Bible --- including God --- sometimes act in ways that transgress the moral code that the Bible espouses.")  He has to either argue that the problem is with God, or it is with the Bible.  But he manages to conclude that it is with both: God and his book are good --- just not perfect.  They both make mistakes that Hendel says he is willing to "forgive."  After an elaborate analysis of the text, he is only left with the unstated notion that his own sense of morality is superior to any god of such a text.  It is as if lurking behind the rhetoric is the awful goal of enticing as many others out there to join up in the march ever downward to theological degradation.  Like in the last verse of Romans 1, those who participate in the sins Paul lists in that immediate context are never willing to indulge alone, but even encourage others to sin also.


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