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Sunday, August 23, 2020

 

Subject and Object

 

Dave Couric

PHIL 5392-501 (Dr. Reeder, UTA)

October 26, 1993

Longer Essay: Subject and Object

Mention something about subject and object to the man in the street, and he will immediately think of the structure of a sentence, perhaps recalling a distant grammar lesson from his school days. That is to say, the only knowledge about subject and object the average person has would be in a linguistic context. Although both are nouns ("person, place, or thing"), the subject in traditional grammar is commonly thought of as the "who or what is doing something" in the sentence, as opposed to the object as "what (or who) is having something done to it." Of course, the third major part of a sentence usually goes between the subject and object in English: the verb, or "what the subject is doing (to the object)." At first glance there would seem to be little connection between the linguistic subject and object and the philosophical concept of subject-object, involving the same terms, though in a different context. One possible connection, nevertheless, between subject and object in linguistics and that of philosophy is the generalization that personhood is associated with the subject on both counts, that is, always in philosophy and sometimes in linguistics. One other apparent parallel between the two disciplines is found in the relation of the verb to the other two sentence constituents. In language, the verb of action links the subject and object. In a similar way, it could be said that there is interaction between subject and object in the philosophical sense. One fine distinction may be that in the linguistic case, the direction of the action is always the same, from the subject to object, and not vice versa. In philosophy, though, this does not appear to always be the case since the object may impose itself on the passive subject. The very fact that there are parallels between language and philosophy supports the contention that language reflects reality. Indeed, it may be that language is the key element that differentiates a philosophical subject from an object in the first place. But everyday people are not at all aware of a fundamental and classical issue in philosophy, that of the relationship between subject and object. It is simply something that average people naturally take for granted until such time that they are brought into an awareness of the issue in context of philosophical study. The relation of subject to object could be otherwise broadly stated as "the relationship between me and everything else." Each person is always a subject, whatever else a subject may entail. Anything other than a person is always an object, whatever else an object may be. However, to complicate matters, every subject can also be considered as an object, in relation to any other subject and from that other subject's lone perspective. Subjects are objects at the same time but not in the same relationship, to avoid an outright contradiction while maintaining a genuine paradox. Setting aside for the moment the paradoxical way in which subjects can be objects, or persons can be things (yet more than things), the issue is precisely how a knowing subject (universally) relates to a known object, the knower to the "knowee." Are the two inseparable or not? Which is prior or comes first? Which is primary or most important? Philosophers have wrestled with such questions and more throughout history.

The history of philosophy indicates that in a general sense the object was the preferred area of study by philosophers up to the modern period. At the time of Descartes there was a shift in interest from the object to the subject, of knowledge. So generally speaking there has historically been much more intense effort of thought in the area of ontology than in epistemology. When Descartes came along in the 17th century, the turn inward occurred. It seems that before the modern era the subject was generally assumed to be self-evident and not in need of as much scrutiny as the object. Now the reverse appears to be the case.  Whereas the subject was defined in relation to the object, i.e., epistemology was perhaps subsumed under ontology, 20th century philosophy almost does the opposite, defining the object in terms of the subject. Which one takes precedence seems to be the crux of the matter, along with the nature of the relation between them. The history of hermeneutics, e.g., follows a similar, though more complex, pattern as that of philosophy.  From ancient times to the end of the 19th century, the theory of interpretation, primarily involved language, since Schleiermacher represents the capstone of philological hermeneutics. Beginning with Dilthey and continuing with Husserl, the focus in hermeneutics apparently became epistemology. Then, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur moved into the area of ontology in their hermeneutics. What complicates the process of historical development is that while hermeneutics follows the progression of philosophy in studying the object first (which for hermeneutics was a text, or language), and then moves to the subject (the interpreter, or epistemology) at the turn of the century, the final shift to ontology, led by Heidegger, is not a return to the object per se, but rather a probing deeper into the nature of the subject, primarily. That is, Heidegger, e.g., tends to be more interested in the "ontology of epistemology" in a way, or the ontology of the subject in relation, of course, to the object, or world. In a sense, this is seen as a corrective for what is considered the error of Descartes, who is blamed for pushing thought too far in the direction of the subject, to the exclusion of the object.  Along comes Hume, who swings the philosophical pendulum all the way back the other way and practically denies the subject altogether. Kant tries to mediate between and synthesize the two, the subject as a unit of senses and intellect and the object as data upon and with which the subject interacts, and it seems that the rest who have come after him continue to attempt the same. Husserl would add that objects are not just a series of sense data because by "apperception" the subject interacts with nonsensory parts of objects in space. Since objects are perceived as more than sense data, they are therefore "complete." Heidegger wants a return to ontology but not in the traditional sense because that would simply be a preoccupation with the object all over again. He seems to be advocating what amounts to an ontological analysis of the subject, Dasein. Phenomenology, then, is a method of concretely and experientially describing what the subject is and how an object appears to the subject, in order to get at the meaning of being or existence.

To return to language, it seems that philosophy is generally metaphysics, which may include language as an important component in addition to the traditional categories of ontology, epistemology, ethics, and perhaps some others such as aesthetics. Language, while not usually included in the major subdivisions of philosophy or metaphysics, may be the connection between epistemology and ethics. For example, a being (as such, simply an ontological object) thinks (as an epistemological subject), speaks (via language as communication), and acts (as an ethical being). Not that a being cannot act without speaking (or thinking) first, but maybe speech expresses prior formal thought while material action demonstrates that same formal thought. The material practice is the application of the formal theory while communication is a sort of middleman. These categories would then include "I say" after "I am" and "I know" and before "I do." Hence, such common expressions as "in word and deed," "practice what you preach," "walk the talk," and "do what you say" seem to follow from a prior ontology and epistemology. So the relationship of language to metaphysics looks to be important in context of the subject-object issue. The subject would apparently be merely an object without at least the potential for language. If Descartes's main concern in the Meditations is taken as establishing the proposition that "existence precedes thought," or that existence is a necessary condition for thought ("If I think, then I am"), it might be that he has not necessarily separated entirely the subject from the object. Instead, he has in one sense established the subject as a prior object, which would presumably entail at least the body as object if not anything else in the world.  In the sixth meditation, e.g., he is adamant to argue for the soul as distinct from the body, yet not separate, since he writes of the ". . .fusion of the mind with the body." In his estimation a human being is a composite of soul ("thinking and not an extended being") and body ("only an extended being which does not think"), which appears to translate to a composite of subject and object.  Since a subject is at once both a subject and an object, depending on perspective, Descartes may not have been the symmetrical extreme opposite of Hume after all. Of course, it could be that Hume allowed for subject in some sense, at least as a "bundle of perceptions."  In a takeoff on Berkeley, Descartes might be characterized as either saying "To be is to be conceived" (object) or "To be is to conceive" (subject). Heidegger, in contrast, relates the subject in a mutually dependent way with the object, which is the world of the subject, hence "Being-in-the-world." He makes it clear in Being and Time that "subject and Object do not coincide with Dasein and the world" because the subject is Dasein plus its world. The subject necessarily involves the object (world), which is quite a step further than it appears Descartes is willing to go. Heidegger's background, or "horizon," stretches to cover a lot more ground than just a mere body.  In effect he is searching for what the subject is in context of the object.  However, since every object appears in relation to the subject rather than isolated, it could be said that the object is in context (horizon) of the subject. Somehow this is a relation of subject to object not in the construction of subjective idealism, in which the subject imposes on and makes an object be what it is or have the essential features that it does, but rather the subject is in a relation of constitution with the object, which imposes itself on the subject. Husserl, e.g., does not locate the causal source, or origin, of objects in the subject. Heidegger and Husserl both seem to want to see the subject as most fundamental but tend to disagree about whether it is facticity of being or consciousness, respectively, of the subject that makes it most basic. Husserl says consciousness does not exist independently of the world; therefore, objects in that sense do not exist independently of the subject and vice versa. The subjectivity of knowing, incidentally, is a problem that grew out of the introduction of secondary qualities. The objective primary qualities became the only real ones, and subjective secondary qualities of sense perception could no longer be considered real. The paradox is that subjectivity is involved in science because interpretation by the subject is a necessary part of the process of knowing the object. The subjectivity of knowing is handled in phenomenology by doing a "phenomenology of phenomenology," which is a description of a description in general and of the ways the subject undergoes changes. Husserl safeguards his emphasis on consciousness with his insistence on intersubjectivity, in order to avoid a pure consciousness parallel to Kant's pure reason. Intersubjectivity is set forth as a test for objectivity. Husserl's objective truth is eidetic and transcendental, tested intersubjectively.  For Husserl, objective equals intersubjective. He certainly never equates the subject with the object although there is a close connection. The subject is "me" while the object is "not me but before me." Perhaps he means that objects are intersubjective because they appear before subjects. Objectivity or intersubjectivity, then, is in subjectivity and vice versa.  Somehow, in phenomenological reduction or description, Husserl seeks to understand both. The paradox of subjectivity is that at one level the subject is an object in the world, along with everything else, but at another the subject is "constituting" objects, a "thing in the world and that ego before which all the world appears." Just as paradoxically, Heidegger's "mineness" is the same for all, yet different by definition. It is a universal experience that is as unique as a fingerprint.

Thus in phenomenology the subject and object are interrelated in such a way that there is never one without the other. Rather than look for a point of contact between the mind and body, as Descartes does, it would seem more profitable to seek the point of transition between the subject and object in the ongoing attempt to determine the relation between the two. Husserl insists on a strict unity of mind and body, and so one would expect him to think along the same lines concerning subject and object even though the mind and body are not necessarily parallel with the subject and object. Mind-body would be more closely associated with subject alone while object would be closer to world. However, the world apparently is broader and takes in much more than object. For instance, there is the subjective, internal world (of the self) and the objective, external world (of things). In this sense, the body would probably be best viewed as a transition between the subject and object, or from the subject to the object. Rather than two worlds side by side with the body in between, it may be that there is a smaller "private" world (or many) within a larger "public" world, a "two-dimensional world." Just as language could be the transition between epistemology and ethics, so might the body (and senses) be the transition between ontology and epistemology, between the object and subject. And just as a text for Ricoeur overlaps speech and action, perhaps the body overlaps external reality and thought. In this way, the senses mediate between the ontological data on the outside and the epistemological data of the intellect on the inside.  So the body is at once both (living) object in the external world and part of the subject in the internal world, a foot as it were in two different worlds, bringing both together in a complementary fashion. Without the body there would be no knowledge of objects in the external world or of other subjects: "empty," according to Kant. And a body as merely object would be "blind." That would be pure solipsism on the one hand and clinical death on the other. An animal, e.g., is an object with a body that is not a transition from or to anything. Descartes no doubt would have done better to distinguish the body and mind not as an extended being and unextended being, which seems to separate them dualistically after all, but as "two modes of being of one and same entity existentially inseparable in an asymmetrical manner," as Mortimer Adler does of the "perceptual object" and "perceptible thing" in Some Questions About Language (1976). The perceptual object is objective because it is intersubjective, but it is dependent on the also objective perceptible thing, which has an independent existence. Since there can be a perceptible thing without a perceptual object, but not vice versa, since the former causes the latter, the relationship between the two is inseparable, asymmetrically. If it were symmetrical, then neither could be, without the other. By analogy, then, the subjective world (subject) and the objective world (object) also have a relation of inseparability in an asymmetrical manner. For where would a body be without an external world, that is,  where would the subject exist? The external world (planet) without the internal world of the subject is conceivable, but not vice versa, unless, of course, it turns out that there is indeed a supernatural realm, which seemed to motivate Descartes in keeping the soul-body distinction.

Thus, paradoxically, the object is immediately prior and can be separated from the subject, but the subject is ultimately primary and can never be separated from the object. In other words, the object is a necessary condition for the subject, and the subject is a sufficient condition for the object. Just as the mind and body are asymmetrically inseparable, so on another level are the subject (as mind and body) and object (as external world) likewise related to each other. In the tale of two worlds, i.e., the-world-within-the-world, without the body never the twain shall meet.


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